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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This  report focuses on offshore logistics patterns in an Arctic environment. We provide 
cases from the northernmost oil and gas fields on the Norwegian and Russian continental shelf. 
In particular we look at the “High Arctic” defined as the Norwegian Barents Sea North and 
Eastwards into Russian waters, and the sea regions in the North East Passage where the cold 
climate and long distances to base provide special challenges.  
The report is made within the project “Operational logistics and business process 
management in high arctic oil & gas operations” (OPLOG) that focuses on the logistic value 
chain for offshore oil and gas activity in Arctic waters. The OPLOG project has emphasized 
vessel operational demands in cold climate regions, optimal combination of field and 
preparedness logistics and vessel configuration, innovation processes within the value chain, and 
business process management models that may increase logistics quality, efficiency and safety. 
The OPLOG project is funded by the Norwegian Research Council, Nord university and the 
industry partners: DOF, ENI, NSO Nor Supply Offshore, Troms Offshore and Vard Design. 
Remoteness and infrastructure limitations 
Most offshore fields in Norwegian and Russian Arctic have a long distance to 
infrastructure and are logistically a challenge due to their remoteness and rough winter 
conditions. There is a general lack of populated area with a well-developed service 
infrastructure, ports and airfields to support the complex and high tech offshore drilling and 
exploitation activities.  Under these conditions, supply bases and their adjoined offshore supply 
vessels (PSV) and other offshore service vessels (OSVs) are crucial integral components of the 
Arctic infrastructure. The costly and high tech oil and gas field operations call for effective 
uplink of the oil rigs and installations with the shore capacities, where fast delivery are in 
demand. 
More tailor-make in offshore logistics 
Flexibility, robustness, functionality and speed are critical elements in the logistics chain. As the 
interest in exploration in Arctic waters increase, the need for OSVs fulfilling these obligations 
will increase. OSV design development has moved towards multifunctional roles among others 
within SAR and ORO, passenger transport and hotel services, helicopter hub functions, 
maintenance and storage. Not the least platform supply vessels (PSVs) play an important role 
in emergency response, including oil spill prevention and evacuation, search and rescue. The 
positioning and in- and outbound logistics flexibility at the supply base as well as the PSVs 
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capacities, are critical elements in providing resilient supply chain operations. The trend 
towards more multifunctional vessels has, however, to be balanced as more functions are both 
costly and maintenance demanding. Some functions may hamper others, for example with 
daughter crafts for SAR operations and oil spill response equipment reducing loading capacity. 
 
Major development projects in the Norwegian and Russian High Arctic 
This report provides an overview of 10 empirical cases to describe the context of the 
 High Arctic, the need for offshore/onshore logistics infrastructure and the configuration of the 
OSV fleet. The set of the cases include 4 cases in the Norwegian Barents Sea, 4 cases in the 
Russian Arctic Seas: the Pechora Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, and 2 cases in the Russian 
sub-Arctic in the Sea of Okhotsk. The cases have been divided into two categories: exploration  
activities (mostly summer) and exploitation (all year activity). These cases illuminate what 
challenges and issues oil/gas companies face when developing offshore oil and gas fields in the 
Arctic Seas.  
 
In addition, different types of regulations are reflected  in the report in order to encompass the 
institutional factors, affecting field logistics operations in the Norwegian and Russian Arctic.  
Offshore activities in the Russian Arctic faces severe and partly extreme winterly conditions 
compared with the activity in the Norwegian Barents Sea South.  Along the delineation line 
between Norway and Russia farther north in the Barents sea the exchange of joint experiences 
from the Norwegian and Russian shelf may be needed for a safe and efficient exploration. 
 
Norwegian Barents Sea- still a promising oil province 
The Norwegian Barents Sea is a relatively benign environment with virtually no sea ice, where 
exploration costs are significantly lower than everywhere else in the Arctic offshore region. 
Several companies regard the Norwegian Barents Sea as a promising long term oil province. 
Experiences from the Snøhvit and Goliat field close to shore shows that there are some winter 
time challenges causing delays in delivery. Going north towards the new Johan Castberg field 
there may be more of the same challenges. Added factors emerge in the new licenses close to 
Bjørnøya or at Korpfjell close to the Russian border at 74° north, especially with winter 
activity.   
Among the oil Norwegian companies engaged in the Norwegian Barents Sea projects there are 
efforts to find solutions for integrated logistics cooperation sharing resources between fields. 
Long distances between the fields may limit the benefits of a joint fleet as to field logistics. 
Within emergency response logistics, there may be benefits, among others as to 2nd line 
 9 
emergency response. The outmost exploration fields face special challenges as to transport 
distances. Foggy weather is especially a threat to a safe and punctual personnel transport by 
helicopter. This may call for more specialized fast going personnel transport vessels and a more 
fine-grained pattern of helicopter and supply bases, especially located in eastern part of 
Finnmark. 
 
Operations in icy waters in North-west Russia- a limited time window 
The Russian Arctic shelf has remained largely unexplored for a long time: only 20 % of 
the Barents Sea and 15 % of the Kara Sea have been explored, while the East Siberian, Laptev and 
Chukchi seas have been almost not explored at all.  A total of 25 reservoirs have so far been 
discovered on the Russian continental shelf, all of which are located in the Barents and Kara seas, 
including the Gulf of Ob and the Taz Estuary. Recoverable commercial reserves in the deposits 
amount to over 430 million tons of oil and 8.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas 
The Russian government is an active player, being  both a regulator and controller of about 65 
% of the petroleum sector. All significant offshore licenses are split between two state 
controlled companies: Gazprom and Rosneft. 
 
In Russian waters field exploration, the main challenge is to organize full-fledged drilling 
operations in a very short iceless operational window until the ice period starts, foreseeing 
when the ice disappears and the start-up date. Lack of region-specific knowledge  and ice 
experience is emphasized specifically as a limiting factor in managing offshore field operations 
in Arctic Russia. In these regions the existing port infrastructure is not adapted to the specific 
needs and requirements of the oil and gas industry in the High North. The quality and capacity 
of the industrial backup services are currently inadequate compared to what is required to 
match the high ambitions of the Russian offshore oil and gas industry. 
 
Among the main Russian players involved in the development of offshore Arctic oil and 
gas field projects, there is a demand for multipurpose vessels which are able to operate without 
icebreaker escort in 1.7-meter thick drifting ice in temperatures as low as -35oC. The vessels 
need a high maneuverability. This demand can be explained by several distinctive features 
related to most Russian arctic offshore fields. These are the presence of harsh ice conditions, 
long distances, limited infrastructure near the fields and the necessity to create  basic onshore 
facilities for each project before its start.  
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For drilling operations on the Russian Arctic shelf the main Russian players are Gazprom and 
Rosneft, which share all offshore Artic licenses. These companies employ both Russian and 
foreign OSVs. For exploitation operations, both companies focus on having their own vessels 
built, owned by their subsidiaries and/or other Russian ship owners.  There is a particular 
demand for OSV functionality like ice management, ice breaking capabilities, offshore hotel, 
hospital and maintenance support vessels,  as well as emergency preparedness capabilities. 
The petroleum authorities play an important role in setting the standards for the bases and 
vessel capacities. 
 
Joint Russian-Norwegian field exploitation 
The area along the Norwegian-Russian maritime border in the Barents Sea farther up north  
may become an arena for potential cooperation between Norwegian and Russian stakeholders. 
This area is challenging due to the lack of cross-border regulation, border-crossing rules, 
remoteness from shore, and competition between supply bases. A joint Norwegian-Russian 
fleet and the flexible use of helicopter sites and supply bases at both sides of the border may 
provide the necessary robustness in the logistics value chain. 
 
International regulations and operational standards in the making. 
The institutional framework for maritime operations have been continuously developed, not the 
least after major disasters at sea related to both general maritime activity and offshore oil and 
gas incidents. The Polar code represents a significant step towards improved vessel standards as 
well as ship owner and vessel preparations for operations in ice-infested waters. The petroleum 
authorities include more demands as to safety and reduced risk of pollution, as well as 
emergency preparedness. Industry standards such G-OMO are also developed to increase 
safety. To avoid effects of human errors more emphasis is laid on navigational competence and 
bridge resource management, area experience, situational awareness, added SAR and oil spill 
preparedness, as well as obligatory use of pilots and/or the establishment of vessel traffic 
services and sailing corridors.  Additional restrictions and preparedness instruments are 
discussed in several international bodies, including the  International Maritime Organization 
and the Arctic Council working groups PAME and EPPR.  
 
The Arctic shipping regulations are still at an incipient stage.  Operations within the Arctic 
offshore oil and gas industry generate more experience step by step,  improving the technology 
and increasing the competence for polar water operations. The IMO polar shipping regulation 
(via the Polar Code) is raising standards particularly through the recognition of the best way to 
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ensure safety of navigation and offshore operations by an integrated approach among all the 
players involved. Sharing best practice and improving standard operating procedures will be a 
continuous process for the ship owners as well as the oil companies as field operators. The 
demands for environmental precautions and reduced “foot print”  as to emission to air and sea 
as well as sea noise will be a continuous part of the new vessel design analyses. 
 
Innovation focus 
This report illuminates the extra vessel demands when the industry move from low Arctic to the 
more extreme High Arctic regions. In the Low Arctic the challenges is not sea ice but a harsh 
winter climate with icing and heavy winter storms, and heavy fog in summer time. The 
infrastructure around the supply bases are gradually improving, but will be limited. This calls for 
innovative solutions along the whole logistics chain. In the High Arctic the added challenges are  
heavy icing risks reducing the functionality of the equipment, ice bergs and multi-year ice 
demanding ice management and re-positioning, longer distances with need for increased speed, 
more vessels and more cargo capacity, and a higher focus on environmental issues with special 
emphasis on engine and propeller systems. 
The vessel capacities have to be developed towards a higher ice class with strengthened 
hull and power,  moving way up the scale towards ice breaker classes. This will, however, both 
increase the investment costs and the operating costs as well, and increase emissions. Thus, the 
ship owner may need assurance for an all-year and a longer term contract than normal. The 
winterization and increase in comfort class are also costly. The continuous reduction in emissions 
and sea noise is obligatory and the pressure towards implementing technology giving the lowest 
emission possible will continuously increase. Moving to battery and LNG-gas powered engines 
may cause a reduction in tank cargo capacity due to space demands for LNG-fuel and batteries. 
Battery charging and LNG fueling facilities must also be available at bases.  
Increases in cargo and passenger capacity call for an increase the length and breadth of the 
vessel. A longer vessel may operate with higher speed. However, it may reduce the 
maneuverability in situations with high waves and strong wind in loading and discharging 
positioning along the rig. This calls for more thruster capacity.  
The functionality as to emergency response should be at the highest and state of the art. 
The special High Arctic conditions call for innovations beyond the present notations when it comes 
to equipment that are flexible and can operate at very low temperatures and in icy conditions. The 
same comes to oil spill recovery equipment, where operations in icy water is a challenge. There 
are pro and cons as to an increased number of functions built in one vessel.  
 12 
Therefore, there is a need for a discussion on multi-functionality turning towards a “multi-
useless” reputation with lower operational capacity. Some tasks may be channeled into more 
specialized vessels tailor-made for the High Arctic region. In general, the innovation process has 
to take a broad view with more actors involved in taking the costs and risks of radical innovations. 
Close cooperation on R&D is in demand. Experience sharing on best-practice with present 
technology should be encouraged between the oil companies, ship owners and design companies 
across the borders.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this report we describe the maritime logistics operations in offshore oil and gas field 
projects located in the Norwegian Barents Sea and Russian North-western sea regions. The report 
provides an understanding of the logistics challenges that oil and gas companies meet when 
exploring and exploiting offshore fields in the Northern and Eastern part of the Norwegian Barents 
Sea and in Arctic Russia. The report also includes the institutional framework and the 
governmental and industrial regulations for offshore field operations. 
Offshore maritime logistics operations in the value chain between the supply base and the 
offshore drilling and production units are defined as “upstream logistics” whose purpose is to 
supply the offshore drilling and production units with all necessary products, personnel and 
services, and to take return cargo and personnel back to shore. The end customers in upstream 
logistics are the offshore drilling and production units. Offshore service vessels (OSVs) have a 
crucial role in implementing offshore activities. We focus especially on the platform supply vessel 
(PSV) as the  “workhorse” in offshore field logistics with cargo and in some cases passengers. 
These vessels are also involved in another part of the logistics, i.e. the preparedness logistics 
related to search and rescue and oil spill response.  
This report presents examples of field operations in different Arctic environments. The 
field projects are located in so-called High Arctic in this report including the Norwegian Barents 
Sea (South and North) and eastwards into Russian waters towards the North East Passage – the 
Barents Sea, Pechora Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea and the Okhotsk Sea. These Arctic environments 
differ from each other by natural conditions, offshore/onshore logistics infrastructure, companies’ 
activities, as well as national legislation. 
We focus on different types of resources and capabilities implemented by oil and gas 
companies in offshore projects. We also reflect on industry regulations that sets the operational 
framework for the supply chain in these regions. 
 
 
1.1. The oil exploration development in the Norwegian Barents Sea: an 
overview  
The Norwegian Barents Sea is considered as a frontier petroleum province, although there 
have been exploration activities there for more than 30 years. The first discovery was made in the 
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early 1980s. Since then, about 130 wildcat and appraisal wells have been drilled.  It is estimated 
that approximately half of the undiscovered resources on the Norwegian continental shelf are in 
the Barents Sea. 
The Norwegian part of the Barents Sea covers an area of 313 000 km2, and is the largest 
sea area on the Norwegian continental shelf. The Barents Sea is also the sea area with the largest 
hydrocarbon potential. Only the area south of 74° 30’ N is open for petroleum activities. 
The only fields in production in the Barents Sea are Snøhvit and Goliat, which came on 
stream in 2007 and 2016 respectively. Gas from Snøhvit is transported by pipeline to the Melkøya 
onshore facility, where it is processed and cooled down to produce liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
which is delivered to the markets on special LNG vessels. Produced oil and gas from Goliat are 
transported onto a Floating Production Storage & Offloading (FPSO), where the oil is processed, 
stabilized and stored for further export in shuttle tankers, while the gas is reinjected into the 
reservoir. 
Figure 1 below presents the main fields and discoveries in the Norwegian Barents Sea. 
 
 
Figure 1. Fields and discoveries in the Norwegian Barents Sea (Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) 
 
Figure #1 shows the discovered volumes in the Barents Sea by discovery year. In total 4 
billion barrels of oil and gas were discovered in the province year to date where 1.8 billion 
barrels are liquids.1 
                                                 
1 Available on: https://www.rystadenergy.com/NewsEvents/PressReleases/barents-sea 
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Figure 2. Discovered resources by year for the Norwegian Barents Sea, Million boe 
(Source: Rystad Energy Ucube) 
 
Norwegian oil and gas companies tend to outsource their logistics activities. That means 
that a number of stakeholders are involved into the maritime logistics schemes for servicing and 
supplying offshore drilling and production units.  
There is a discernible level of interest mounting in Norway's frontier Barents Sea area. New 
entrants coming in via the new licensing rounds in 2016 and 2017 give optimism even with 
fluctuating oil prices. Several companies regard the Norwegian Barents Sea as a promising long-
term oil province.  
 
 “The Barents Sea is the answer…It’s like going into a new country. We are only 
scratching the surface,” – Alex Schneiter, Ludin’s Chief Executive, said - “What is missing 
there is the infrastructure” (Frontier Energy, 2016, p. 8). 
   
While the Norwegian government’s belief and interest in exploration in the Barents Sea 
remains undiminished, new potential discoveries, like the Wisting oil field, have to be very large 
to go beyond breakeven. According to the analyst company Wood Mackenzie, it is primarily 
because of the remoteness of the location from infrastructure, expected challenging reservoir 
characteristics, the shareholder expectations and risk, high return on investment, severe climatic 
conditions and international oil prices fallen to record low levels. Despite all of this, the major oil 
and gas companies view Norway’s frontier Arctic region as a long-term strategic move, whilst 
taking advantage of reduced exploration costs afforded by the Norwegian tax system in the form 
of a 78% tax deduction. 
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According to Dr. Andrew Latham, Vice president of exploration research at Wood 
Mackenzie, the Norwegian Barents Sea is a relatively benign environment with virtually no sea 
ice where exploration costs are significantly lower than everywhere else in the Arctic offshore 
region. He claims that costs are: 
 
 “.. five to 10 times less than the cost per well offshore Greenland during 2010-2011, and more 
than 20 times less than the drilling costs in both in Russian and Alaskan offshore Arctic during 
2014-2015” (Frontier Energy, 2016, p. 6). 
 
In Norway, the shore-based infrastructure has been continuously developed in line with increasing 
oil and gas activities. The ongoing port developments in Sandnessjøen, Tromsø, Hammerfest, 
Honningsvåg and Kirkenes are among others established to meet the requirements from oil and 
gas industry. A more fine-grained set of supply and helicopter bases are expected. 
 
 
1.2. The oil exploration development on the Russian Arctic shelf: an 
overview 
While the Norwegian oil and gas field development tends to move from the South towards 
the North, the Russian oil and gas operations expand  from onshore activities in the High North 
into offshore exploration of the Arctic Seas.  
 
Figure 3. The oil/gas exploration development on the Norwegian and Russian Continental shelves 
(Source: CHNL) 
 
The Soviet Union started actively developing its Arctic shelf in the early 1980s. The most 
promising areas of the Arctic shelf were in the Pechora and Kara seas, which are aquatic extensions 
of the Timan-Pechora and Western Siberian oil and gas provinces. In the period following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, from 1991 to 1998, Russia's drilling fleet operated almost exclusively 
on the shelf of Western Europe, Asia, Africa and South America. The termination of geological 
exploration work in the Arctic after 1991, coupled with the loss of the Arctic drilling fleet, meant 
that the Russian Arctic shelf has remained largely unexplored for a long time: only 20 % of the 
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Barents Sea and 15 % of the Kara Sea have been explored, while the East Siberian, Laptev and 
Chukchi seas have been almost not explored at all.  
A total of new oil and gas fields have been discovered on the Russian continental shelf, all 
of which are located in the Barents and Kara seas, including the Gulf of Ob and the Taz Estuary. 
Recoverable commercial reserves in the deposits amount to over 430 million tons of oil and 8.5 
trillion cubic meters of natural gas2. 
The first and thus far only oil and gas project to be carried out on the Russian Arctic shelf 
is the development of the Prirazlomnoye field, which was discovered in the Pechora Sea in 1989.  
Russia’s Arctic development comes as its oil production increases despite a more than two-
year long supply glut and plunge in prices. However, it also comes as the country’s oil fields 
mature. As commented in April 2016 by Mikå Mered, managing partner at Polarisk, a consultancy 
specializing in polar issues, Russia’s onshore oil and gas fields “are depleting and depleting fast. 
If the Russian government wants to keep having this  oil and gas, it needs to start developing 
offshore Arctic oil and gas fast”3. 
 
The Russian government is an active player, being  both a regulator and controller of about 
65 % of the petroleum sector. All significant offshore licenses are split between two state-
controlled companies: Gazprom and Rosneft. In total, Gazprom owns 7 licensed areas in the 
Barents Sea, 3 in the Pechora Sea, 13 in the Kara Sea, 8 in the Gulf of Ob and 1 in the East Siberian 
Sea. Rosneft owns 6 licensed areas in the Barents Sea, 8 in the Pechora Sea, 4 in the Kara Sea, 4 
in the Laptev Sea, 1 in the East Siberian Sea and 3 in the Chukchi Sea. In order to fulfil its existing 
license obligations, Rosneft signed strategic cooperation agreements in 2011 and 2012 with Exxon 
Mobil, Equinor and Eni, which provide primarily joint geological exploration and development of 
hydrocarbon fields in the Arctic shelf. 
In Russia, the existing port infrastructure is not adapted to the specific needs and 
requirements of the oil and gas industry in the High North. The quality and capacity of the 
industrial backup services are currently inadequate compared to what is required to match the high 
ambitions of the Russian offshore oil and gas industry. 
 
2. THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE ARCTIC  
 
                                                 
2 Available on http://russiancouncil.ru/en/arcticoil 
3 Available on: https://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/08/22/a-deal-with-the-devil-russia-kicks-up-arctic-oil-
drilling/#330c291c381e 
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The institutional environment represents a  number of diverse institutions, each of which 
is filled with different contents and is intended to regulate the behavior of players in a certain way.  
This report explores some of the main institutional regulations and pressures acting in the 
Arctic areas. The focus of the main institutions is on operational safety and protection of the Arctic 
marine environment. It is worth noting that the history of marine safety regulation is almost 
exclusively disaster-driven. Key safety improvements and changes in safety policies occur 
especially after disasters4.  A very strict regime on maritime operations are set by the international 
maritime organizations, by the national maritime and petroleum authorities and by the industry 
itself.  
 
2.1. Demand for legal and policy framework.  
According to Article 194 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter, 
UNCLOS), all states involved in Arctic shipping share the responsibility for the safety of 
navigation and environmental protection of the region. We can observe a surge of shipping activity 
in Arctic waters due to thinner ice and longer ice-free summer periods, including increased 
offshore support vessel activity (supporting offshore exploration and extraction of oil and gas; 
increased destination transport (with ships moving raw materials), increased transit transportation 
via the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Offshore support vessel activity represents a significant form 
of Arctic shipping. Therefore, the harsh, environment requires more enhanced protection to 
mitigate additional risks imposed on shipping in polar waters. Such protection is demanded to be 
achieved through cooperative and preventive measures under international law and national 
regulation. The IMO Polar code set standards for both the vessels specifications, rescue equipment,  
the operational procedures and crew competence for vessels operating in ice infested waters. In 
Norwegian and Russian waters, the polar code area is defined as the Northern part of the 
Norwegian Barents Sea south of Bjørnøya at N73°31’ E 19° through a great circle line down to at  
Cap Kanin Nos north east of Arkangelsk at N68°38’  E43°23’. That means that some of the new 
promising petroleum resource areas are within the Polar code area. This calls for vessels with Polar 
code certificate involving significant hull strengthening, winterization, procedures and 
competence as shown in section 2.2.2.  
 
                                                 
4 From a book titled “Until the Sea Shall Set Them Free” by Robert Frump, Pulitzer Prize nominee. 
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2.2. International institutions and their instruments. 
IMO International Maritime Organization: The International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) is the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of 
shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. This organization is globally responsible 
for addressing safe, secure, and environmentally sound maritime navigation.  
The purpose of the IMO is to facilitate cooperation among governments on regulations and 
practices related to technical matters affecting shipping engaged in international trade. 
The main activity within the IMO, associated with maritime safety in the Arctic, is the 
work on the Polar Code.  
 
PAME: The Arctic Council’s Working Group on the Protection of the Arctic Marine 
Environment (PAME)5 complements the role of the IMO. This working group is the focal point of 
the Arctic Council’s activities related to the protection and sustainable use of the Arctic marine 
environment and provides a unique forum for collaboration on a wide range of activities in this 
regard.  
PAME has a mandate to address marine policy measures and non-emergency pollution 
prevention and control measures such as coordinated strategic plans, developing programs, 
assessments and guidelines related to the protection and sustainable development of the Arctic 
marine environment from both land and sea-based activities.  
The PAME Working Group provides a unique forum for collaboration on a wide range of 
Arctic marine environment issues. One of the most significant tasks by this forum is to raise 
awareness of the Polar Code’s provisions amongst all those involved in or potentially affected by 
Arctic marine operations, including ship owners and operators, Flag, Port and Coastal States, 
classification societies, marine insurers, financial institutions funding Arctic activity, and 
indigenous and local communities. It is intended to promote effective implementation of and 
compliance with the Polar Code.  The Arctic Shipping Best Practice Portal provides information 
needed to comply with the Polar code. 
 
The PAME working group is also working with additional precautions as to environmental 
protection to avoid pollution and negative impact on life in the Artic. This also includes sea noise 
disturbing seal and whale populations. 
                                                 
5 PAME is one of six Arctic Council working groups. It was first established under the 1991 Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy and was continued by the 1996 Ottawa Charter that established the Arctic Council. For more 
information, see: http://pame.is/ 
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PAME released the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines in 2009. The Guidelines are 
intended to be of use to the Arctic nations for offshore oil and gas activities during planning, 
exploration, development, production and decommissioning to help secure common policy and 
practices. 
According to the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, Arctic offshore oil and gas 
activities should be based on the following principles6: 
1. Principle of the Precautionary Approach – refers to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. 
2. Polluter Pays Principle - National authorities should endeavor to promote the 
internalization of the application of the polluter pays approach as reflected in Principle 
16 of the Rio Declaration. The polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, 
with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and 
investment. 
3. Continuous improvement - All parties should continually strive to improve health, 
environment and safety by identifying the processes, activities and products that need 
improvement, and implement necessary improvement measures.  
4. Sustainable Development - In permitting offshore oil and gas activities Arctic 
governments should be mindful of their commitment to sustainable development. 
The goal was to assist regulators in developing standards, which are applied and enforced 
consistently for all offshore Arctic oil and gas operators. 
 
EPPR: The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group (EPPR) 
addresses different aspects of prevention, preparedness and response to environmental 
emergencies in the Arctic. Members of the Working Group exchange information on best practices 
and conduct projects to include development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies, 
response exercises, and training.  
The goal of the EPPR Working Group is to contribute to the protection of the Arctic 
environment from the threat or impact that may result from an accidental release of pollutants or 
                                                 
6 Available at: https://pame.is/images/03_Projects/Offshore_Oil_and_Gas/Offshore_Oil_and_Gas/Arctic-Guidelines-
2009-13th-Mar2009.pdf 
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radionuclides. In addition, the Working Group considers issues related to response to the 
consequences of natural disasters. 
EPPR have prepared several reports, which are also relevant for oil and gas activity: 
- Field Guide for Oil Spill Response in the Arctic Waters, 1998. 
- Standardization as a Tool for Prevention of Oil Spills in the Arctic, 2015. 
- Circumpolar Map of Resources at Risk from Oil Spills in the Arctic, 2002. 
- Arctic Shoreline Clean-up Assessment Technique (SCAT) Manual, 2004. 
- Behavior of oil and other Hazardous Substances in Arctic waters (BoHaSA), 2011. 
- Guidelines and Strategies for Oily Waste Management in the Arctic Region 
featuring the Oily Waste Calculator Tool, 2009. 
EPPR also maintains liaison with the oil industry and other relevant organizations with the 
aim of enhancing oil spill prevention and preparedness in the Arctic7. 
 
2.2.1. International and regional conventions 
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS): 
The most famous disaster of all, the Titanic, with 1,517 dead, struck the first blow for real 
international cooperation on safety regulations, resulted in the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), adopted in 1914. The primary safety book from which most other 
policies and regulations sprang, SOLAS is updated on a regular basis and is considered the safety 
bible for the maritime industries.  
SOLAS is an international maritime treaty, which requires Signatory flag states to ensure 
that ships flagged by them comply with minimum safety standards in construction, equipment and 
operation. The current version of the SOLAS Convention is the 1974 version, known as SOLAS 
1974, which came into force on 25 May 1980. As of March 2016, SOLAS 1974 has 162 
contracting States, which flag about 99% of merchant ships around the world in terms of gross 
tonnage. 
 
 
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL): 
                                                 
7 For more information, see: https://arctic-council.org/eppr/about-eppr/ 
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The Torrey Canyon oil spill off French and the south-west coast of the United Kingdom 
coasts in 1967 was one of the world's most serious oil spills8 that led to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from ships (MARPOL) in 19739.  
MARPOL establishes a system of international standards for on board multi-waste 
management and eventual discharge. It is expected to play an important role in the protection of 
the Arctic marine environment. Mandatory technical rules and procedures of MARPOL are found 
in the six annexes, which respectively deal with the prevention and control of pollution by oil (I), 
noxious liquid substances (II), harmful substances in packaged form (III), sewage from ships (IV), 
garbage from ships (V), and air pollution from ships (VI).  
The Convention includes regulations aimed at preventing and minimizing pollution from 
ships - both accidental pollution and that from routine operations. As of February 2014, both 
Norway and Russia have ratified all the six annexes of the MARPOL. 
 
Amendments to MARPOL and SOLAS: 
The Amoco Cadiz tanker ran aground due to a steering gear failure on March 16, 1978, 
three miles from the coast of Brittany, France. It split in three before sinking, creating the largest 
oil spill of its kind in history to that date – 1.6 million barrels10. In 1978, it was estimated to have 
caused US$250 million in damage to fisheries and tourist amenities. 
Public outcry and political pressure resulted in significant updates to both MARPOL and 
SOLAS, and the addition of safety and pollution audits that led to in 1982 to the Paris 
Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU), which established Port State Control. Port state 
control enabled an international port inspection system that makes it impossible for non-compliant 
ships to hide. It also led to the International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) in 1978. 
 
 
 
The International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW): 
                                                 
8 It was an oil spill with an estimated 25–36 million gallons (94–164 million litres) of crude oil spilt. Attempts to 
mitigate the damage included the bombing of the wreck by aircraft from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. 
Hundreds of miles of coastline in Britain, France, Guernsey, and Spain were affected. For more information, see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Torrey_Canyon_oil_spill. 
9 According to Simon Bennett, Director External Relations for the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), “In the 
same way the Titanic led to the development of safety regimes, the Torrey Canyon stimulated the development of 
international environmental regulations” (available at: https://www.marinelink.com/news/regulation-
disasters371542 ) 
10 For more information, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amoco_Cadiz_oil_spill 
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The STCW Convention was the first to establish on an international level in 1978. 
Previously the standards of training, certification and watchkeeping of officers and ratings were 
established by individual governments, usually without reference to practices in other countries. 
As a result, standards and procedures varied widely, even though shipping is the most international 
of all industries.  
The Convention prescribes minimum standards relating to training, certification and 
watchkeeping for seafarers, which countries are obliged to meet or exceed. 
One of the main updates in the STCW was the requirement for Parties to the Convention 
to provide detailed information to IMO concerning administrative measures taken to ensure 
compliance with the Convention. This represented the first time that IMO had been called upon to 
act in relation to compliance and implementation - generally, implementation is down to the flag 
States, while port State control also acts to ensure compliance11.  
 
The 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
operation (OPRC): 
OPRC sets out a framework for cooperative measures in relation to pollution incidents 
involving oil. Parties to the OPRC are required to establish measures for dealing with pollution 
incidents, either nationally or in co-operation with other countries.  
 Ships are required to carry a shipboard oil pollution emergency plan. Operators of offshore 
units under the jurisdiction of Parties are also required to have oil pollution emergency plans or 
similar arrangements, which must be coordinated with national systems for responding promptly 
and effectively to oil pollution incidents. 
Ships are required to report incidents of pollution to coastal authorities and the convention 
details the actions that are then to be taken. The Convention calls for the establishment of 
stockpiles of oil spill combating equipment, the holding of oil spill combating exercises and the 
development of detailed plans for dealing with pollution incidents. 
Parties to the convention are required to provide assistance to others in the event of a 
pollution emergency and provision is made for the reimbursement of any assistance provided12. 
Both Norway and Russia are parties to the OPRC.  
 
The Arctic Oil Spill Preparedness and Response Agreement: 
                                                 
11 For more information, see http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-Standards-of-Training,-Certification-and-Watchkeeping-for-Seafarers-(STCW).aspx 
12 For more information, see http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-Oil-Pollution-Preparedness,-Response-and-Co-operation-(OPRC).aspx 
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This is a legally binding agreement on cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness 
and Response in the Arctic, which was signed by all the Arctic member states under the auspices 
of the Arctic Council in May 2013. The purpose of the agreement is to strengthen cooperation, 
coordination and mutual assistance among the Parties on oil pollution preparedness and response 
in the Arctic in order to protect the marine environment from oil pollution. The agreement also 
emphasizes regularly conducting joint training and exercises, as well as joint research and 
development. 
 
The Arctic Aeronautical and Maritime SAR Agreement: 
This is the first international agreement, which was prepared exclusively for the Arctic 
region and signed in 2011. The SAR-Agreement is the first legally binding agreement established 
under the auspices of the Arctic Council and covers search and rescue of aeronautical and maritime 
vessels and passengers. The objective of the SAR-agreement is to strengthen the search and rescue 
cooperation and coordination in the Arctic13. 
  
Guidelines for Offshore Marine Operations (G-OMO): 
G-OMO is designed to offer a standard global approach to, and encourage good practice 
in, and safe vessel operations in the offshore oil and gas industry. This international document 
supersedes and replaces the North West European Area (NWEA) Guidelines for the Safe 
Management of Offshore Supply and Rig Move Operations, developed in 2006 as a joint project 
between maritime and offshore organizations in Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. 
Best practice and experience exchange are basis for these guidelines and the aim has been to 
develop a guideline worth using worldwide. 
It particularly relates to the activities: operations of offshore facilities and operations of 
vessels14. 
 
 
2.2.2.  The Polar code 
An important initiative for creating special regulation on vessel design, equipment, and 
operations in Arctic waters was the disaster of Exxon Valdez off the coast of Alaska in 198915. 
                                                 
13 For more information, see https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531 
14 For more information, see http://www.g-omo.info/?page_id=2 
15 The Exxon Valdez, an oil tanker owned by Exxon Shipping Company struck the reef in Prince William Sound, 
Alaska, March 24, 1989 and spilled 10.8 million US gallons (260,000 bbl; more than 37,000 tonnes) of crude oil over 
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This ecological disaster led to the first Port state establishment of policy with international 
repercussions – the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990, which mandated that all tankers entering 
U.S. waters were to be double hulled. This requirement became the rule internationally, especially 
after two more accidents with Prestige (2002) and Erika (1999) off the northwest coast of France 
and Spain, leading to the European equivalent of OPA90 and massive acceleration of phasing out 
single-hulled tankers.  
At the same time, the disaster of Exxon Valdez prompted the IMO to start working on a 
code for navigation in polar waters. Taking into account the fact that ships operating in the Arctic 
environment are exposed to unique risks, the intention by the IMO was not only to create a 
harmonized regulation for Arctic shipping, but also to promote standards for safety of navigation 
and recognize that the best way to do this would be by an integrated approach.   
Before 2017, the IMO used such a regulatory instrument as Guidelines for ships operating 
in Polar Waters. The IMO-guidelines were non-mandatory, serving merely as recommendations. 
To become legally binding, the IMO-guidelines depended on the individual states implementing 
the regulations in their national legislation.  
 
The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters or Polar Code was adopted by 
IMO in 2014. The Polar Code was introduced through amendments to the IMO Safety of Life at 
Sea Convention (SOLAS) and the IMO Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL). The Polar Code is intended to cover the full range of shipping-related matters relevant 
to navigation in waters surrounding the two poles – ship design, construction and equipment; 
operational and training concerns; search and rescue; and, equally important, the protection of the 
unique environment and eco-systems of the polar regions. Thereby, the Code supersedes the 
current IMO Arctic Shipping Guidelines and the IMO Polar Shipping Guidelines. This document 
reflects the concerns of the shipping industry regarding the sensitivity of the ecosystems in the 
Arctic and the Antarctic, and therefore, the need for a higher degree of care when navigating polar 
waters. 
The Polar Code entered into force on 1 January 2017. This marks an historic milestone in 
the IMO’s work to protect ships and people aboard them, both seafarers and passengers, in the 
harsh environment of the waters surrounding the two poles. 
                                                 
the next few days. It is considered to be one of the most devastating human-caused environmental disasters. During 
the first few days of the spill, heavy sheens of oil covered large areas of the surface of Prince William Sound 
(Wikipedia’s source). 
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Figure 4. The Polar Code cover (Source: IMO) 
  
The Polar Code includes mandatory measures covering safety part (part I-A) and pollution 
prevention (part II-A) and recommendatory provisions for both (parts I-B and II-B). 
 
Figure 5. The safety requirements of the Polar Code – What does the Polar Code mean for ship safety?  
(Source: IMO). 
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Figure 6. The environmental requirements of the Polar Code - How does the Polar Code protect the 
environment? (Source: IMO). 
 
The Code requires ships intending to operate in the defined waters of the Antarctic and 
Arctic to apply for a Polar Ship Certificate, which would classify the vessel as: 
- Category A ship - ships designed for operation in polar waters at least in medium first-
year ice, which may include old ice inclusions;  
- Category B ship - a ship not included in category A, designed for operation in polar waters 
in at least thin first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions; 
- Category C ship - a ship designed to operate in open water or in ice conditions less severe 
than those included in Categories A and B. 
The issuance of a certificate would require an assessment, taking into account the 
anticipated range of operating conditions and hazards the ship may encounter in the polar waters. 
The assessment would include information on identified operational limitations, and plans or 
procedures or additional safety equipment necessary to mitigate incidents with potential safety or 
environmental consequences. 
The chapters in the Code set out goals and functional requirements, including: 
- ship structure; stability and subdivision; watertight and weathertight integrity; 
machinery installations; operational safety;  fire safety/protection; life-saving 
appliances and arrangements; safety of navigation; communications; voyage planning; 
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manning and training; prevention of oil pollution; prevention of pollution form from 
noxious liquid substances from ships; prevention of pollution by sewage from ships; 
and prevention of pollution by discharge of garbage from ships. 
It is worth noting also that the Polar Code (Chp.12) contains mandatory requirements for 
the training and qualifications of masters, chief mates and deck officers on ships operating in polar 
waters to be done by companies. The training requirements become mandatory under the 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) Convention and the STCW Code from 1 July 2018. 
 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“In September 2017 we already have Polar Code training to get deck officers certified by 
the 1st of July 2018. Within our company, we started training other crewmembers as well. So, we 
are going to train the crews, vessel offices and private officers. We use virtual reality simulator 
training and class studies at school, not in real conditions, because it’s too much expensive to do 
training in the Arctic conditions – that’s enough for the Polar Code certification.” 
 
At the same time, with regard to ship certification, the interviewee of the Norwegian vessel-
designer stated that they do not plan to go for certification of vessels as to the Polar Code at this 
moment:  
“We don't see the cost benefit as it is now. We think that the characteristics of our vessels 
like the ice class and winterization are sufficient for the possibilities that we have in the Barents 
Sea,”. 
 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
“We use different types of vessels for operations in the High Arctic, in the Norwegian Sea 
and in North Sea. We find a vessel that is suitable for the operation. We can look for a vessel with 
both an oilrec class and standby class.  
 
2.2.3. The Arctic SAR Agreement 
The SAR-Agreement is the first legally binding agreement established in 2011 by the 
Arctic Council. It covers search and rescue of aeronautical and maritime vessels and passenges. 
The objective of the SAR-agreement is to strengthen the search and rescue cooperation and 
coordination in the Arctic. 
Each member state was given a particular search and rescuw area, for which it is 
responsible in order to ensure immediate responses and effiicient operations (See Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Arctic SAR-Agreement areas (Source: CHNL) 
 
2.2.4. Summary  
Maritime regulatory history has been frequently reactive rather than anticipatory, in 
particular regarding changes in marine safety, which often has been disaster-driven. 
The figures from both the “Safety and Shipping 2011-2012” report by Allianz Global 
Corporate & Specialty, the International Union of Marine Insurance, and the 2012 report “15 Years 
of Shipping Accidents: A Review for WWF”, by Southampton Solent University, have shown that 
the extent of severe marine accidents is decreasing. The next step in developing marine regulation 
is expected to be done in targeting the human factor as a key element for the future of marine 
safety. Despite aging ships, bad weather conditions, high sea traffic and runaway cargoes aside, it 
is estimated that 80-85% of all marine accidents can be traced back to human error.  One such step 
is a focus on bridge resource management competence for navigators, the obligatory use of pilots 
in challenging waters, and vessel traffic services (VTS) guiding the traffic.  
However, the Arctic shipping regulation is still at an incipient stage, being interactive and 
adaptive.  With demanding operations within the Arctic offshore oil and gas industry more 
experience is gained step by step improving the technology and increasing the competence for 
polar water operations. The IMO polar shipping regulation (via the Polar Code) is raising standards 
of “polar worthiness”, particularly through the recognition of the best way to ensure safety of 
navigation and offshore operations by an integrated approach among all the players involved.  
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2.3. Regulatory framework in Norway 
The majority (about 80%) of Norway’s oil and gas production is controlled by one 
company – Equinor ASA – which is 67% owned by the government of Norway. It has facilitated 
in setting up a strong and centralized regulatory structure, as well as public-private coordination.  
The regulatory framework for petroleum activities has been designed to give the best 
possible balance between the companies’ and the authorities’ interests. This is achieved among 
other things through taxation policy, through the Petroleum Act and through the authorities’ 
oversight of resource management.  
Norway has established a division of roles and responsibilities between the state and the 
business sector. The authorities regulate the sector by setting a clear and predictable overall 
framework. The oil companies and other actors in the industry are responsible for the operational 
activities and following up on safety measures as well as emergency preparedness. 
 
2.3.1. The Norwegian authorities. 
The authorities, which have the main responsibilities in relation to offshore oil and gas 
industry, as well as to offshore oil spill preparedness and response include: 
The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE): 
The MPE holds broad responsibility over managing the state’s natural resources. It is also 
a key institution for promoting sustainable regulation. 
The Petroleum Act (Act of 29 November 1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities) 
provides the general legal basis for sound resource management, including the licensing system 
that gives companies rights to engage in petroleum operations. The Act establishes that the 
Norwegian state has the proprietary right to subsea petroleum deposits on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. 
 
The Norwegian Maritime Directorate (NMD): 
NPD serves as an advisory body to the MPE. It has administrative authority over resources 
in the Norwegian shelf. 
- Coordination of matters related to safety of life, health, material values and the 
environment on vessels flying the Norwegian flag and foreign ships in Norwegian 
waters; 
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- Ensuring the legal protection of Norwegian-registered ships and registered rights in 
those ships. 
 
The Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA): 
- coordination of all contingency organizations into one national emergency response 
system;  
- Maintenance of preparedness and response to acute pollution which is not covered by 
private or municipal contingency plans. Mainly this consists of response to oil spills 
from ships and shipwrecks or unknown sources. If the responsible polluter is incapable 
of taking action, the NCA can take over the responsibility for the operation.  
- Inspection and control measures relating to pollution and waste; 
- International cooperation on responding to acute oil spills 
 
 
 
The Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA): 
This is the primarily regulatory body responsible for technical and operational safety, 
including emergency preparedness and working environment. 
- Regulation of technical and operational safety, including emergency preparedness, at 
the all phases of the industry (planning, construction, operation, removal); 
-  Stipulation and supervision of compliance with HSE regulations 
- Supervision of operator's HSE management system which is established pursuant to the 
petroleum HSE regulations 
- Cooperation with foreign and national safety regulators 
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) has consequently pronounced “The far 
North” as a main priority, emphasizing operator collaboration as a key to success. 
 
The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD): 
The NPD is a flexible expertise organization. There are no sections or departments in the 
NPD, but about 80 teams with designated mandates and defined tasks. 
There are about 230 employees joining and leaving teams; and they largely control how to 
distribute their time in the different teams themselves. 
- Contribution to creating the greatest possible values for the Norwegian society from 
the oil and gas activities through prudent resource management based on considerations 
for safety, emergency preparedness and the external environment. 
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Prudent resource management, which is a primary consideration in the petroleum 
activities, ref. Sections 1-1 and 1-2 of the Petroleum Act, includes tasks related to: 
Resource and factual basis; Scientific research and exploration; Development and 
operations; Cessation/disposal; External environment; Emergency preparedness. 
- Management and further development of knowledge concerning the petroleum 
resources on the Norwegian continental shelf.  This is a key aspect both as regards the 
opening of new areas for petroleum activities and in the award of new production 
licenses.   
- Opening of new areas (Section 3-1 of the Petroleum Act) 
- Granting of exploration license Section 2-1 of the Petroleum Act) 
- Award of production license (that gives the licensee an exclusive right to explore for 
and produce petroleum) (Section 3-3 of the Petroleum Act) 
- Approval of plans for development and operation of fields (PDO) (Section 4-2 of the 
Petroleum Act) 
- Permission to install and operate installations (PIO) (Section 4-3 of the Petroleum Act) 
- Production permits (Section 4-4 of the Petroleum Act) 
- Decisions on disposal (Sections 5-1 and 5-3 of the Petroleum Act) 
 
The Norwegian Environment Directorate (NED): 
- Sets requirements for emergency oil spill preparedness in municipal and private sector 
and supervision of compliance with them; 
- Monitoring of pollution from petroleum industry on the Norwegian continental shelf; 
- Development of regulations and guidelines for prevention of and response to acute 
pollution; 
- In case of acute oil pollution provides expert advice on environmental issues; 
- Participation in international environmental cooperation 
2.3.2. The Licensing system and Awards in Predefined Areas (APA) 
State management and control of the industry is ensured through an extensive legislation 
that requires companies to obtain licenses and approval from the competent authorities for all 
phases of petroleum activities. 
The Petroleum Act (Act of 29 November 1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities) 
provides the general legal basis for sound resource management, including the licensing system 
that gives companies rights to engage in petroleum operations. The Act establishes that the 
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Norwegian state has the proprietary right to subsea petroleum deposits on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. 
Production licenses are normally awarded through licensing rounds, in which the Ministry 
announces that companies can apply for production licenses in certain geographical areas 
(blocks)16. The announcement procedures, who can apply, the content of applications and 
application procedures are governed by Chapter 3 of the Petroleum Act and Chapter 3 of the 
Petroleum Regulations.  
Two types of licensing rounds have been established to ensure adequate exploration of both 
mature and frontier areas of the NCS – through the numbered licensing rounds or the system of 
awards in predefined areas (APA). The numbered licensing rounds include frontier parts of the 
NCS, where there is limited knowledge of the geology, greater technical challenges than in mature 
areas and a lack of infrastructure. They are normally held every other year. The Awards in 
Predefined Areas (APA) comprise the mature parts of the shelf, where petroleum activities have 
been in progress for many years with known geology and well-developed or planned infrastructure. 
They are announced every year17. 
Companies wanting to pursue petroleum operations on the NCS must be qualified as a 
licensee or operator. A prequalification process is provided to assess whether applicants meet 
government requirements and guidelines18. During an opening process, all relevant arguments for 
and against petroleum activities in the area in question are taken into account. 
Figure 8 gives an overview of the status of the Norwegian continental shelf as of May 2017. 
The green areas have been opened for petroleum activity by the Storting (Norwegian parliament). 
The yellow areas have also been opened, but are subject to special arrangements as described in 
the white paper “An industry for the future – Norway's petroleum activities”. The areas outlined 
in red are covered by the system of awards in predefined areas (APA).  
21 June 2017, the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) announced the 24th licensing 
round. In this round, 102 blocks/parts of blocks will be announced, divided among 9 in the 
Norwegian Sea and 93 in the Barents Sea (see Figure 9). 
 
                                                 
16 Norway’s first licensing round was announced on 13 April 1965, and 22 production licenses were awarded, covering 
78 geographically delimited areas (blocks) – the 1st authors’ note. 
17 For more information, see http://www.norskpetroleum.no/en/framework/the-petroleum-act-and-the-licensing-
system/ 
18 Available on: http://www.npd.no/en/Regulations/Guidelines/ 
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Figure 8.  Licensing position for the Norwegian shelf (Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) 
 
According to Sissel Eriksen, exploration director: “The Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate’s analyses show that the greatest undiscovered resource potential on the Norwegian 
shelf is in the Barents Sea. It is therefore important to facilitate acreage for petroleum activities 
in this sea area”. 
“The interest there is substantial, which is reflected by the fact that 2017 will be a record-
year with regard to exploration wells drilled in the Barents Sea. Several of these will also be 
significant for the blocks now being announced in the 24th round,” says Sissel Eriksen19. 
                                                 
19 Available on: http://www.npd.no/en/Licensing-rounds/Licensing-rounds/24th-Licencing-round/Announcement/ 
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Figure 9. Announced blocks in the 24th licensing round (Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate). 
 
The Norwegian Government aims to award new production licenses in the first half of 
201820. 
02 May 2017 the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy announced the APA 2017, comprising 
predefined areas with blocks in the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea (See Figure 
10). 
 
The predefined areas (APA acreage) have been expanded with 34 blocks in the Norwegian 
Sea and 53 blocks in the Barents Sea since APA 2016. 
It is worth adding that the process of assessment ensures that all relevant arguments for and 
against the project are known before a decision on development is taken.  
 
                                                 
20 For more information, see http://www.npd.no/en/Licensing-rounds/Licensing-rounds/24th-Licencing-
round/Announcement/ 
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Figure 10. APA 2017 (Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate). 
 
 
2.3.3. Norwegian non-state institutions and their instruments. 
NOFO - The Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies21: 
NOFO was established in 1978. Its strategic goal is “To ensure that oil recovery 
preparedness is always dimensioned in keeping with the needs and contingency plans of the 
operating companies”. NOFO conducts around 100 exercises each year. Two to three times a year, 
NOFO conducts exercises that involve several hundred people and 30-50 vessels. These exercises 
involve the entire organization and are intended to prepare every single participant by simulating 
realistic scenarios. 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: “Our company is a part of the 
NOFO cooperation initiative. Together with the NOFO, we develop both the oil recovery system 
and personnel operating system for a concrete project. Equinor as an operator is responsible for 
the implementation, and the NOFO is just a tool for the operator. The oil company provides 
resources, and the NOFO prepares a plan for oil recovery operations. In Equinor, we have a 
general requirement that the first oil recovery system should be at sea within 5 hours. However, 
                                                 
21 In Norwegian, the NOFO means Norsk Oljevernforening For Operatørselskap. 
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during drilling operations at the Korpfjell in August 2017 the NOFO requirement was different 
that the whole oil recovery system must be at sea within 2 hours to start the emergency operation”. 
 
NOFO serves as a coordinating organization if a spill occurs and is responsible for the 
tactical and operational management of recovery resources in use. 
NOFO's bases and depots contributes to an effective preparedness and mobilization of 
equipment and vessels. 
 
Figure 11. The NOFO bases (Source: NOFO). 
 
Requirements for oil recovery vessels on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NOFO2009): 
 
The NOFO Standards (the 2009 revision) were developed by the Norwegian petroleum and 
shipping industry in order to ensure satisfactory safety and efficiency in oil spill response 
operations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
These special standards are intended for the vessels taking part in oil recovery operations 
and include the requirements for tank heating and ventilation, discharge and loading systems, deck 
layout for oil recovery equipment and towing boom systems.  
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Vessels contracted after 01 May 2009 must follow this standard NOFO 2009. The vessel 
must be ready for oil recovery operations (ORO) with 2 hours of the ORO tanks being loaded and, 
if necessary, cleaned22.  
 
The Norwegian Shipowners’ Association (NSA): 
NSA is a trade and employment organization for Norwegian controlled companies within 
the shipping and offshore industry. The primary fields are national and international industry 
policies, employer issues, competence and recruitment, environmental issues and innovation in 
addition to safety at sea. NSA's members employ over 55,000 seafarers and offshore workers from 
more than 50 different nations. The members operate within the following sectors: 
- Deep sea; Offshore contractors, Offshore services, Short sea, Subsea contractors. 
The NSA's primary fields are national and international industry policies, employer issues, 
competence and recruitment, environmental issues and innovation in addition to safety at sea. The 
operations of the NSA are executed in close relation to the industry23. 
 
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association (Norsk olje og gass, NOROG): 
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association (Norwegian Oil and Gas) is a professional body 
and employer’s association for oil and supplier companies engaged in the field of exploration and 
production of oil and gas on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The Norwegian Oil and Gas 
Association works to solve common challenges for the members and to strengthen the 
competitiveness of the Shelf. 
The vision is “to further develop a competitive oil and gas industry which enjoys respect 
and trust”.  
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association believes that value creation and prosperity are 
closely linked. Issues pursued by the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association will also be in the best 
interests of the wider community. The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association’s work is based on the 
following principles and values: 
• Respect for people, safety and the environment 
• The importance of profitability for the industry 
• The principle of free competition 
• A high ethical standard and awareness of the industry’s social responsibility 
 
                                                 
22 For more information, see http://www.nofo.no/globalassets/pdfs/operativ-organisering/nofo-standard-2009---
engelsk-versjon.pdf 
23 For more information, see https://www.rederi.no/en/ 
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HSE Regulation in the offshore petroleum activities: 
Norway’s petroleum sector believes in maintaining a high level of health, safety and the 
environment (HSE) when developing and operating fields on the Norwegian continental shelf, 
particularly in the High North, presenting technical and environmental challenges. The HSE 
regulation contributes to enhancing value creation on the NCS. The Norwegian Oil and Gas 
Association management’s job is to lead and coordinate joint projects on HSE and operations.  
 A special working party appointed by the OLF has pursued offshore issues in the High 
North. Its membership has been broadly representative of operator companies, the supplies 
industry and unions. This working party has devoted particular attention to the additional 
requirements for thermal protection imposed by colder air and sea climates in the High North. 
These include training, dress, enclosure of work areas and survival suits. Long transport distances 
and a lower density of air and sea traffic make bigger demands on emergency preparedness.  
The HSE regulations consist largely of risk- and performance-based requirements, as well 
as risk reduction principles. They regulate important aspects of HSE for the offshore petroleum 
industry in an integrated and coherent manner. 
In addition, they contain helicopter safety guidelines. The helicopter companies operate on 
fixed routes to and from the offshore installations. These routes are planned in collaboration with 
the oil companies. Having a fixed flight schedule permits long-term planning of helicopter 
maintenance and pilot rosters. Day-to-day activities are run by the helicopter companies through 
their operations centers, which coordinate flights with the oil companies’ own operation centers 
and with Avinor, the state-owned air traffic services provider. 
NOFO and the Norwegian Coastal Administration have developed the ”HSE Manual – Oil 
Spill Response”, the object of which is to inform all oil spill response personnel about health, 
safety and environment work in oil spill response operations. The manual has been based on 
experiences from various oil spills and from a larger number of oil spill response exercises. 
 
Norwegian Oil and Gas Recommended guidelines for safety and emergency 
preparedness training: 
The objective of these guidelines is to establish a joint understanding and practice regarding 
safety and emergency preparedness training among the players on the Norwegian continental shelf. 
These guidelines encompass personnel on fixed and mobile facilities, as well as vessels used in 
the petroleum activities. 
 
 
Norwegian Oil and Gas’ Drilling Managers Forum (DMF): 
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In 2010 an initiative was taken for joint efforts by Norwegian Oil and Gas and the NSA 
(Norwegian Shipowners Association). A task force was established with focus on reducing well 
incidents. One of the recommendations from the task force is to communicate actual well control 
incidents that have recently occurred on the NCS that lessons are shared and understood. A number 
of case histories has now been circulated to all installations. 
The key message is to focus on what can be learnt from such events. It is hoped that sharing 
of such incidents will be helpful in our efforts to avoid or reduce the likelihood and severity of 
well incidents24. 
 
Barents Sea Exploration Collaboration (BaSEC): 
BaSEC was established by Equinor, Eni Norge, Engie (GDF Suez), Lundin and OMV, in 
April 2015. From summer 2015 all operators on the Norwegian Continental Shelf were invited to 
join the collaboration.  
The following 18 operators are members of BaSEC now:  
- Equinor ASA; Eni Norge AS; Lundin Norway AS, OMV Norge AS; Engie (GDF Suez 
E&P Norway AS); Chevron Norge AS; Repsol Exploration Norge AS; Total E&P 
Norge AS; Aker BP; ConocoPhillips Skandinavia AS; Wintershall Norge AS; Edison 
Norge AS; Norske Shell AS; DEA E&P Norge AS; Centrica E&P Norway; Cairn 
Energy PLC; PGNiG Upstream International; Lukoil Overseas North Shelf AS. 
 
Building on existing knowledge and experience, the cooperation is motivated by the goal 
of high and cost effective HSE standards for exploration activity in the Norwegian Barents Sea, 
focusing on new areas opened for oil and gas activity in the 23rd concession round. 
 
The companies aim to develop common solutions that can facilitate: 
- A joint operator approach to HSE in the Norwegian Barents Sea; 
- Appropriate level of safety and emergency preparedness; 
- Data sharing; 
- Standardization. 
 
The BaSEC cooperation includes 5 working groups with the focus on the following areas: 
- Metocean and ice; 
- Environment and oil spill preparedness; 
                                                 
24 For more information, see https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/en/Activities/HSE-and-operation/Sharing-to-be-better/ 
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- Emergency Response & Logistics: 1) agree on an operator joint approach  for 
establishing an adequate and cost-efficient level of emergency response for remote 
operations in the Barents Sea; 2) identify potential for cost savings by optimizing 
logistical solutions and sharing of resources; 
- Health and Work Environment; 
- Mobile Drilling Units. 
 
The groups ensure that knowledge and experiences are communicated across the member 
companies and thereby ensure everyone has the full overview. The groups also identify new 
challenges and propose/execute studies in order to improve the knowledge base and improve 
operations support tools25. 
 
DNV-GL 
DNV GL (Det Norske Veritas) is an international accredited registrar and classification 
society. It provides classification, technical assurance, software and independent expert advisory 
services to the maritime, oil & gas, power and renewables industries. It provides services for 
13,175 vessels and mobile offshore units (MOUs) amounting to 265.4 mill gt, which represents a 
global market share of 21%26. DNV’s motto is “It is time to take a broader view to address 
increased complexity”. 
 
2.3.4. Taxation policy 
The petroleum taxation system is based on the rules for ordinary company taxation and are 
set out in the Petroleum Taxation Act (Act of 13 June 1975 No. 35 relating to the taxation of subsea 
petroleum deposits, etc.).  
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Taxation Code includes direct and indirect taxation. Because 
of the extraordinary returns on production of petroleum resources, the oil companies are subject 
to an additional special tax. In 2017, the ordinary company tax rate is 24 %, and the special tax 
rate is 54 %. In 2018, these tax rates will be adjusted to 23 % and 55% respectively. This gives a 
marginal tax rate of 78 %. Thus, direct taxes consist of ordinary petroleum tax and special tax. 
In 2017, Norway’s estimated tax revenues from petroleum activities are about NOK 72 
billion (2018). 
                                                 
25 For more information, see https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/Faktasider/Miljo1/Barents-Sea-Exploration-
Collaboration/ 
26 Available on: http://www.tankeroperator.com/news/dnv-gl-to-unveil-rules-this-year/6356.aspx 
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Figure 12. The net government cash flow from petroleum activities, 1971-2018; updated on 12.10.2017 
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Statistics Norway) 
 
Indirect taxes include carbon dioxide taxes and nitrogen oxide tax. VAT (the value added 
tax), which generally is the main indirect tax in Norway at a rate of 25%, plays a limited role for 
companies engaged in exploration/production on the NCS. The supply of certain goods and 
services to specialized ships for use in the offshore petroleum activities is zero-rated. The supply 
of certain goods and services for use outside Norwegian territorial waters - the 12 nautical mile 
zone - for use in offshore petroleum activity to licensee companies, drilling companies and the 
owners/hirers of platforms are zero-rated27. 
Sale of crude oil and gas made by licensees will in practice always be zero-rated. Import 
of goods into Norway’s customs zone are generally subject to import Vat. The customs zone 
consists of the mainland and 12 nautical miles outside the mainland. Therefore, goods that are 
provided to e.g. installations outside the Norwegian customs zone are not subject to the import 
VAT. If goods are placed in a customs warehouse, in transit or temporarily imported into Norway, 
import VAT may also be avoided28. 
The petroleum taxation system is intended to be neutral, so that an investment project that 
is profitable for an investor before tax is also profitable after tax. This ensures substantial revenues 
for Norwegian society and at the same time encourages companies to carry out all profitable 
projects. To ensure a neutral tax system, only the company's net profit is taxable, and losses may 
                                                 
27 For more information, see https://www.skatteetaten.no/en/International-pages/Felles-innhold-benyttes-i-flere-
malgrupper/Articles/Special-rules-for-goodsservices-for-use-in-offshore-petroleum-activity/ 
28 Available on: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Energy-and-Resources/gx-er-
oil-and-gas-taxguide-norway.pdf 
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be carried forward with interests. Neutral properties in the tax system is also important when 
defining investment-based tax deductions. 
 
2.4. Regulatory framework in Russia 
Russia possesses a strong sense of being an Arctic nation. Accordingly, it has developed 
extensive, strict legal criteria for the impact of many areas of offshore oil and gas activity. 
Russian national regulations include the set of laws, federal programs and strategies 
concerning the Russian continental shelf and field operations, the tax regime, use of subsurface 
resources, licenses and permits, environmental regulations, procurement requirements, labor 
standards and social protection. 
2.4.1. The main federal programs 
The Energy Strategy of Russia up to 2030: 
The official Government policy objectives are set out in the Energy Strategy of Russia up 
to 2030: 
- Transition to innovative development and energy efficiency; 
- Transforming the structure and scale of energy resource production; 
- Creating a competitive market in the energy sector; 
- Further integration into the global energy system. 
 
The Principles of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up 
to 2020 and beyond: 
They were adopted in 2008. The principles define the main goals, key objectives, strategic 
priorities and mechanisms for the implementation of the state policy in the Russian Arctic. It also 
determines the system of measures for strategic forecasting and planning of socio-economic 
development of the Arctic zone and the national security of Russia.  
 
The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation: 
It was adopted in 2013 and emphasizes improving geological prospection of the continental 
shelf, implementing large-scale resource projects as well as upgrading infrastructure related to 
transport and resource development. 
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2.4.2. General Russian legal framework on the continental shelf 
Federal Law #187-FZ on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation of 25 October 
199529: 
This Federal Law defines the status of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation, the 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Russian Federation over its continental shelf and their 
exercise in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the generally recognized 
principles and rules of international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation.  
According to this Law, “the continental shelf of the Russian Federation comprises the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas situated beyond the territorial sea of the Russian 
Federation throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the 
continental margin” (Article #1). 
The continental margin is the prolongation of the land mass of the Russian Federation and 
consists of the seabed and subsoil of the shelf, the slope and the rise. 
In accordance with the provisions of article 2 of this Federal Law, the outer edge of the 
continental shelf is situated at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
width of the territorial sea is measured, provided that the outer edge of the continental margin does 
not extend for a distance of more than 200 nautical miles. 
 
 
Federal Law No. 2395-1 “On Subsoil” of 21 February 1992 (as amended 30 September 
2017): 
This Law governs the relations arising in the field of geological studying, use and 
protection of subsoil, use of waste of mining and the related processing industries, specific mineral 
resources (brine of estuaries and lakes, peat, sapropel and others), underground waters, including 
passing waters (the water extracted from subsoil together with hydrocarbon raw materials), and 
the waters used by subsoil users for own production and technological needs. 
This Law contains legal and economic basis of complex rational use and protection of 
subsoil, provides protection of interests of the state and citizens of the Russian Federation, and 
also the rights of subsoil users. 
Article 1.2. of the Subsoil Law stipulates that subsoil within the territory of the Russian 
Federation, including the subsoil domain and mineral resources contained therein, energy and 
other resources, shall be state property. The basis of the mechanism for realizing the right of state 
                                                 
29 Available on: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/RUS_1995_Law.pdf 
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ownership of subsoil is the principle of the chargeability of subsoil use, which is a special legal 
tool based on the principle of rental relations. 
 
Federal Law No. 225-FZ "On Production Sharing Agreements" of 30 December 1995: 
The Law governs the use of subsoil and investment activities, establishes a legal basis for 
relationship arising with respect to Russian and foreign investment in exploration, development 
and production of mineral raw materials within the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as 
on the continental shelf and/or within the boundaries of the exclusive economic zone of the Russian 
Federation under the terms and conditions of production sharing agreements. 
Clause 7 of the Law states the limitation of foreign employees and subcontractor’s 
involvement: 
- Russian entities have prerogative right to participate in a project as subcontractors; 
- Cost of domestic materials and equipment should be no less than 70% of total costs for 
materials and equipment in a year. Items are considered as domestic, if they are 
produced by Russian entities or individuals at Russian territory with Russian materials 
and details (no less than 50%)30.  
 
 
 
Federal Law No. 155 - FZ "On internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone” of 
31 July 1998 (as amended 22 December 2014): 
The Law establishes status and legal foundations of internal waters, territorial sea and 
contiguous zone of the Russian Federation, including the rights of the Russian Federation within 
its internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone and the modalities of their application in 
accordance the Russian Constitution, universally recognized principles and norms of international 
law and international agreements of the Russian Federation and Federal Laws. 
 
Federal Law No. 147-FZ “On Natural Monopolies” of 17 August 1995 (amended 08 
November 2007)31: 
The Law stipulates that transportation of natural gas via pipelines, as well as transportation 
of oil and products of oil refining via trunk pipelines are covered by natural monopolies. In 
addition, this Law regulates services of transportation terminals, ports and airports.  
 
                                                 
30 Available on https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/rus_e/WTACCRUS48_LEG_76.pdf 
31 Available on: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/rus_e/WTACCRUS58_LEG_52.pdf 
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2.4.3. The licensing system and foreign investment agreements 
In the Russian Federation, there are also two legal approaches to natural gas production: 
the licensing approach (licenses are awarded by tenders and competitions) and production sharing 
agreements. This model can provide a real inflow of investments, despite existing issues of 
inflation, the lack of an effective tax system, and political and legal instability. However, subsoil 
areas according to the production sharing agreement are not currently distributed.  
 
The licensing regime: 
The licensing regime is administered by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of 
the Russian Federation and federal agencies under its jurisdiction. Subordinate to that Ministry, 
the Federal Agency for Subsoil Use (Rosnedra) is the administrative agency primarily responsible 
for the regulation of oil and gas extraction. Rosnedra is responsible for:  
- Issuing, suspending and revoking subsoil use licenses; 
- Approving deposit development plans; 
- Transferring and storing geological information. 
The Federal Service for Supervision of Nature Use (Rosprirodnadzor) oversees compliance 
with legislation regulating subsoil use and protection of the environment. Additionally, the Federal 
Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service (Rostekhnadzor) issues mining 
allotments that determine deposit boundaries, safety certificates and operating licenses. 
There should be no more than one Operator at a new hydrocarbon deposit. License holder 
are resource developers, which have to follow some restrictions: 
- Resource developers must have operated on the Russian continental shelf for at 
least 5 years; 
- Resource developers must be companies in which the government holds more than 
50% of voting shares, either directly or indirectly, i.e. resource developers may not be private 
Russian or foreign companies, including those having significant offshore experience (according 
to Federal Law “On Subsoil”, Clause 3 of Article 9). 
 
At the moment only two companies meet these requirements: “Gazprom” PJSC; “Rosneft 
oil company”, PJSC; Zarubezhneft” JSC. 
As commented on state control and licensing by Head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, in a 
Bloomberg News interview: 
“The type of ownership isn’t a key factor, the company’s efficiency on the market is. And 
in the case of our company, the presence of the state as a controlling shareholder allows us to get 
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licenses to work on the shelf without lots of competition. Because only Gazprom and Rosneft, 
according to Russian law, have an opportunity to work on the shelf. I think for our shareholders 
this is a blessing.”32 
These requirements are not applicable to both offshore projects: Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-
2 under terms of PSAs, concluded before the requirements came into force in 2008. 
 
Foreign investment agreements. 
The governance of major oil and gas projects is framed within investment agreements of 
various types, which are negotiated between investors and host states. Investment agreements 
typically address issues such as the applicable regulatory regime, environmental standards and 
liabilities.  
 
 
Figure 13. Offshore licenses issued on the Russian continental shelf (Source: Rosneft). 
 
                                                 
32 Available on: https://www.rosneft.com/press/Rosneft_in_the_Media/item/173830/ 
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Figure 14. License areas of Rosneft and Gazprom in the Russian Arctic (Source: Rosneft) 
 
 
Production sharing agreements 
In the post-Soviet period (the early 1990s), international oil and gas investment projects 
were negotiated in the form of production sharing agreements (PSA), because companies faced 
greater investment risk.  
“Production sharing agreement” means an agreement under which the Russian Federation 
grants an investor free of charge and for a definite period of time exclusive prospecting, 
exploration and production rights on mineral resources within the subsoil limits specified in the 
Agreement, and rights to perform related works, while the investor undertakes to perform the 
activities at its own expense and risk. Under a PSA the operator bears the cost of development, 
which it then recoups through its allocated share of production33.  
The Russian government abandoned the PSA format in 2008, when the tax policy was 
adjusted, and currency exchange rates stabilized34.    
                                                 
33 There are agreements of various types within oil & gas industry: in terms of concession agreements (e.g. Brazil, 
Egypt, Nigeria, Oman, Thailand), the lease of subsoil plots (e.g. the USA, Canada), or production sharing agreements 
(e.g. Angola, Cameroon, China, Denmark, Uganda, Vietnam, the Netherlands, the Philippines). 
34 First, since 2003, the Russian legislation was tightened with respect to PSA in order to reduce the number of oil and 
gas fields eligible for development under PSAs and the federal tax code was also adjusted to make future PSAs less 
attractive to foreign investors. Secondly, since 2008, the new requirements on licence holder were put into force in 
Law “On Subsoil”), which abandoned PSAs application (the author’s note).  
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At this moment, in Russia there are only three ongoing production sharing agreements 
concluded before these mentioned above requirements came into force. The development of two 
offshore fields: Sakhalin-1 (Exxon Neftegas Limited as an operator) and Sakhalin-2 (Sakhalin 
Energy as an operator) has been carried out under two production sharing agreements35.  
Foreign investment agreements may stipulate that a project is to incorporate a certain 
amount of local content (e.g. a minimum proportion of materials or labor, or a minimum value of 
contracts). For example, the Sakhalin-2 project PSA requires that 70% of materials and labor be 
of Russian origin, provided they can meet equivalent prices and quality to foreign alternatives. 
Since 1996, theSakhalin-2 project has sourced 91% of its materials and equipment within Russia 
(10.2 million tons) and has awarded contracts to the value of 10.9 billion USD (the total amount 
is 20 billion USD)36.  
 
PSA are important to be applied in cases of: 
- Technology difficulties: special technologies are need for efficient special technologies 
are needed for efficient development of a field. Russian companies haven’t access to 
these technologies or want to avoid them. PSA allows to attract those who can and are 
willing to overcome such difficulties; 
- Low profitability: development of marginal deposits under licensing is not interesting 
for investors. For such deposits, PSA plays a role of “a bridge into profitability”. 
 
In Russia, the national legal regime is executed in relation to foreign investors according 
to the general rule. However, specific limitations were set by the following regulations: 
- Federal Law No.57-FZ “Foreign Investments in the Business Entities of Strategic 
Importance for National Defense and State Security”, dated April 29, 2008; 
- Federal Law No.58-FZ “Introducing Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of the 
Russian Federation and Abolition of Certain Provisions of Legislative Acts of the 
Russian Federation in connection with the adoption of the Federal Act, Foreign 
Investments in the Business Entities of Strategic Importance for National Defense and 
State Security Act”.  
Both laws deal with restrictions applied to companies engaged in geological exploration 
and/or mineral prospecting and production in subsoil areas of federal significance. 
 
 
                                                 
35 The 3d production sharing agreement concerns the onshore Khariaga project in the Nenets Autonomous Region. 
36 Available on http://www.sakhalinenergy.com/en/ataglance.asp? 
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2.4.4. Taxation policy 
Main tax regulatory framework: 
1. Introduction of Mineral Extraction Tax / Oil and Gas Condensate 
Federal Law No. 263-FZ “Concerning the Introduction of Amendments to Chapter 26 of 
Part Two of the Tax Code and Article 3.1 of the Federal Law “Concerning Customs Tariff” of 01 
January 2004: 
The Law changes the base rates of mineral extraction tax in the case of the extraction of oil 
and gas condensate. The amendments introduced to the Law of the Russian Federation 
“Concerning the Customs Tariff” provide for a gradual reduction of the rates of export customs 
duties on crude oil. 
 
2. Stimulation of Hydrocarbon Production 
Federal Law No. 268-FZ “Concerning the Introduction of Amendments to Parts One and 
Two of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation and Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian 
Federation in Connection with the Implementation of Measures to Provide Tax and Customs Tariff 
Incentives for Hydrocarbon Extraction Activities on the Continental Shelf of the Russian 
Federation” of 01 January 2014: 
The Law was designed to encourage investment in new offshore hydrocarbon deposits. In 
particular, organizations which carry out hydrocarbon extraction activities at such deposits are 
granted tax and customs- tariff privileges, by creating a special tax regime for continental shelf 
hydrocarbon production projects. 
 
Tax regime: 
Oil and gas revenues account for approximately 36% of federal budget revenue. 
The chargeability of subsoil use is a special legal instrument (Section V “Subsoil use 
payment of Federal Law No. 2395-12 “On Subsoil”). The system of subsoil use payments includes 
three separate types of payments: 
- One-off payments for the award of the subsoil license and other instances established 
in the subsoil use license like changing boundaries of subsoil plots allotted for use (Law 
No. 2395-15, Article 40); 
- Participation fee in a tender or auction (Law No. 2395-15, Article 42); 
- Regular payments for the use of subsoil, including geological study, exploration and 
construction of underground facilities (Law No. 2395-15, Article 43). 
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The Mineral Resource Extraction Tax (MRET) is a specific tax payable by producers. It 
was introduced in January 1, 200237 and replaced three previous subsoil use payments: payment 
for subsoil use (royalties), fees for the regeneration of mineral resources and raw materials, and 
excises on oil and gas condensate. MRET is calculated based on the physical volume of oil and 
gas extracted: 
- Oil extraction tax – based on fluctuations in the world oil price, as well as the depletion 
and volume of reserves. In 2017, it is currently 919 RUB per ton; 
- Gas extraction tax – based on the rate of 35 RUB per 1,000 cubic meters, which is 
multiplied by a number of coefficients expressing the complexity of the gas and the 
cost of transportation. For gas condensate, the rate is 42 RUB per ton. 
 
Some key legislative changes were done to Arctic offshore projects: 
- Companies performing exploration activities on the continental shelf can recognize 
R&D costs at a rate of 1.5; 
- The 0% VAT rate for the services related to carriage and transportation of hydrocarbons 
produced on the continental shelf abroad; 
- VAT on the acquisition of services to minerals exploration and production on the 
continental shelf may be recovered from the RF budget only if the service recipient is 
an RF tax resident. 
 
Tax breaks for the Russian Arctic projects: 
In 2012, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev noted that Russian oil and gas 
operators’ attempts to explore the northern sea shelf were proceeding rather slowly. Exploration 
work in the Russian section of the Arctic has been 10 times less extensive than in the US section 
of the Chukchi Sea and 20 times less than in the Norwegian Arctic shelf. The Russian government 
reportedly decided to accede to the requests of major state-controlled oil and gas operators to 
amend the federal tax code in order to generate additional funding for exploration of crude oil and 
natural gas deposits on the northern sea shelf. On the other hand, many of oil and gas projects have 
been the subject of lobbying to improve primarily fiscal terms for long-term development. 
Here we consider only several examples of tax breaks as a government support to the 
Russian arctic projects.     
                                                 
37 See: Federal Law as of August 8, 2001 No. 126-FZ "On Amendments and Additions to Part Two of the Tax Code 
of the Russian Federation and Certain Other Acts of the Legislation of the Russian Federation, and on the Repeal of 
Certain Acts of the Legislation of the Russian Federation" Collection of legislation of the Russian Federation. 2001. 
No. 33 (part 1). Art. 2174. 
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• Prirazlomnaya platform project: 
Since 2003, the Prirazlomnoya platform project has been the subject of lobbying to improve 
fiscal terms. In 2012, it received a reduced export duty at “around” 50 % of the normal rate. Other 
sources put the export duty at 45% of the underlying rate38.  
According to the official budget plans for 2014-2015, the Prirazlomnoye project was taxed 
at a level of US $155.3 per tons compared to US $348 per ton, implying an effective rate of 44.6 
%. However, in April 2014 the rate was increased to US $190.8 per tons compared to US $387 per 
ton, which implied a rate of 49.3 %. These figures show that the export duty for the Prirazlomnaya 
platform has changed and not proportionally. 
After extensive lobbying campaign, in September 2013, the Prirazlomnaya platform was 
included in Category 2 of Federal Law 268-FZ and granted 7 years of 0 mineral extraction tax for 
up to 35 million tonnes of oil starting from January 01, 2015. 
In addition, the Prirazlomnaya platform project has been exempted from property taxes, 
normally levied at 2.2 % of “the yearly value of the object”. As a result, the regional budge has 
run a deficit of 30%39. 
The government support to the Prirazlomnaya platform project has been provided by the 
following legislative acts: 
1. Federal tax breaks: 
- Federal Law 268-FZ, September 30, 2013: mineral extraction tax: 0 ruble per ton for 
up to 35 mmt within 7 years from January 01, 2015; 
- Federal Law 268-FZ, September 30, 2013: exemption from property tax of 2.2%; 
- Government Instructions on Export duties: the level of export duties is lower than 
normal rates. 
2. Federal legislation on accelerated depreciation based on Tax Code of the Russian 
Federation (Articles 258-259.3): 
- Immediate depreciation allowance for up to 30% for fixed assets; 
- Accelerating depreciation schedule (up to twice as fast) for fixed assets employed in an 
aggressive environment (e.g., north conditions of the Arctic Circle). 
Actually, it is worth noting that the tax breaks in case of the Prirazlomnaya platform were 
granted after most of the investments had already been made (Lunden and Fjaertoft, 2014). 
 
                                                 
38 For more information, see 
https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2012/06/18/gazprom_nakonec_poluchil_lgoty_dlya_prirazlomnogo 
39 For more information, see http://narianmar.bezformata.ru/listnews/byudzhet-2014-budet-defitcitnim/14950437/ 
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• Agreement between Rosneft and ENI on the development of the Fedynskiy field in the 
Barents Sea: 
The key factor that prompted Rosneft and ENI to sign the agreement on the mutual 
Fedynskiy field development in 2012 was the steps taken by the Government of the Russian 
Federation to introduce tax incentives for offshore production, including cancelling export duties 
and introducing a reduced Mineral Extraction Tax rate of 5-15% depending on project complexity. 
The government also offered guarantees that the favorable tax regime will remain in place for a 
prolonged period40. 
The main reason for Rosneft’s request for tax breaks was high costs. In the exploration 
phase of the Fedynskiy field, Eni will fund up to US $1.4 billion; it will also cover Rosneft’s 
previous expenditures in the area. However, in the development phase, Rosneft will be responsible 
for covering 66.7% of costs, while ENI will carry 33.3%. Since the total cost of exploring and 
developing the Fedynskiy field is anticipated to reach US$50-70 billion, Rosneft requested the 
government support. 
 
2.4.5. Northern Sea Route regulations 
Offshore logistics and offshore exploration activities in the Russian Arctic Seas like the 
Kara Sea, the East-Siberian Sea, the Laptev Sea and the Chukchi Sea are subject to a set of specific, 
national regulations applied for navigation along the Northern Sea Route (NSR). 
The Northern Sea Route is defined by the Russian legislation as “a historically developed 
national transport communication of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region” (Law #155-FZ, 
1998). The NSR is not a specific route but a multitude of passageways in the Arctic Ocean, and 
mostly trafficked along the Russian Arctic coast. 
There are two different understandings of what the Northern Sea route is. The international 
community associates the NSR with the Northeast Passage that is the shipping route connecting 
Europe and Asia; and it is considered as the potential transit route for international shipping. You 
can see it as marked by a red line on the two first pictures above. However, the current Russian 
legislation defines the length of the Northern Sea Route as not covering all the waters of the 
Russian Arctic – only from Kara Gate towards the Dezhnev Cape in the Bering Strait (See Figure  
15).  
 
                                                 
40 Available on https://www.rosneft.com/press/releases/item/114471/ 
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Marine transportation on the Northern Sea Route is regulated by the legislation based on 
the principles of the UNCLOS, in particular Article # 234 “Ice-covered Areas”. Article #234 
authorizes the coastal states within the exclusive economic zone to adopt and enforce the non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for prevention and monitoring of marine pollution from 
vessels in the areas covered with ice for most of the year. 
The Russian domestic legislation plays also a key role in defining norms and rules for 
marine activities in the Russian Arctic. 
 
The Marine Doctrine, adopted in 2001, became a key document for the Russian maritime 
legislation, which governs the national maritime policy until 2020. The doctrine establishes that 
“maritime transport is crucial in ensuring the domestic traffic, especially in regions, where sea 
transportation is the only mode of transport, as well as in foreign economic activity”.  According 
to the Maritime Doctrine, the role of maritime transport has been determined as decisive for the 
maintenance and development of the High North and Far East. 
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Figure 15. The Northern Sea Route and the Northeast Passage (Source: Russiancouncil.ru) 
 
In 2012, the Russian government adopted new Federal Law No. 132-FZ “On Amendments 
to Specific Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation related to Governmental Regulation of 
Merchant Shipping in the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route” of 28 July 201241. This Federal 
Law No. 132-FZ presented amendments to make changes and determine the certain laws and 
legislative acts, including the new Rules of Navigation in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, 
adopted January 17, 2013. The essential articles of the Rules of Navigation include: 
- Procedure of the navigation of ships in the water area of the NSR; 
- Rules of the icebreaker assistance of ships in the water area of the NSR; 
- Rules of the pilot ice assistance of ships in the water area of the NSR; 
- Rules on the assistance of ships on seaways of the water area of the NSR; 
- Provision about the navigational-hydrographic and hydrometeorological support of the 
navigation of ships in the water area of the NSR; 
- Rules of the radio communication during the navigation of ships in the water area of 
the NSR; 
- Requirements to ships pertaining to the safety of navigation and protection of the 
marine environment in the water area of the NSR; 
                                                 
41 Federal Law No. 132-FZ is well-known as the NSR Law (the 1st author’s note).  
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- Other provisions in relation to the organization of the navigation of ships in the water 
area of the NSR42. 
 
In addition, the current NSR legislation is carried out through the following norms: 
- Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic; 
- Application for Admission to navigate in the Northern Sea Route Area; 
- Communications instructions for Arctic navigation 2012 - 2013 on the Northern Sea 
Route; 
- Permissions for Cabotage Transportation and Towing. 
 
The responsibility for administrating the NSR is vested with the NSR Administration. This 
organization grants permissions for the navigation of ships in the water area of the NSR. Granting 
permissions is effectuated on the basis of applications that can be submitted to the NSRA by email 
up to four months prior to the intended passage and not less than 15 days prior to entry into the 
NSR. Applications in Russian or in English can be submitted by the shipowner, the shipowner’s 
representative or the ship’s Master. The NSR Administration notifies the shipowner within 12 days 
if permission has been granted or, if not, of the reasons justifying the refusal. The information is 
also posted the NSR Administration website.  
 
Most vessels entering or transiting the NSR will require icebreaker escort. Information on 
the necessity to use icebreaker assistance under heavy, medium and light ice conditions while 
sailing the water area of the NSR is provided by the NSR Administration. Icebreaker assistance is 
rendered by the icebreakers authorized to navigate under the State flag of the Russian Federation.  
Icebreaker assistance involves ice reconnaissance. Icebreakers make channels in ice. The 
fee rate of the icebreaker assistance is determined by Order of Federal Tariff Service No. 45-T/1 
“On approval of the tariff rates for provision of icebreaker pilotage services provided by the FSUE 
“Atomflot” on the Northern Sea Route water area” of 14 March 2014. This Order takes into 
account the capacity of the ship, the ice class of the ship, the escorting distance and the period of 
navigation. 
Pilot ice assistance of ships is carried out with the purpose of ensuring navigation safety, 
the prevention of accidents, as well as the protection of the marine environment in the water area 
of the NSR.  During the pilot ice assistance of ship, the ice pilot gives recommendations to the 
vessel’s master concerning: 
                                                 
42 For more information, see www.NSRA.ru 
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- Assessment of ice conditions and possibility of safe navigation for the vessel in the current 
conditions; 
- Choice of the optimal route for the vessel and the appropriate navigation tactic for the 
vessel on ice-infested water during independent voyage; 
- Selection of speed and ways of maneuvering by the vessel to avoid hazardous interaction 
between the vessel’s hull and propeller-rudder system and ice; 
- Ways to maintain safe speed and distance to the icebreaker or another vessel ahead while 
proceeding in an ice caravan; 
- Ways to fulfill instructions received from the icebreaker performing icebreaker support. 
 
2.4.6. SAR regulations 
The Russian authorities and regulatory framework: 
Any emergency response in Russia is organized and performed in the framework of the 
Integrated National Emergency Prevention and Response System of the Russian Federation 
(INEPRS), which integrates the state authorities and necessary OSR resources/personnel. INEPRS 
was established by the Russian Federation Ministry of Transport (Mintrans) via the Federal 
Agency of Maritime and River Transport (Rosmorrechflot43). 
Responsibility for the regulatory regime on environmental protection for offshore oil and 
gas development belongs to: 
- The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of The Russian Federation 
(Minprirody of Russia); 
- The federal Supervisory Natural Resources Management Services (Rosprirodnadzor); 
- The Federal Subsoil Resources Management Agency (Rosnedra); 
- The Federal Water Resources Agency (Rosvodresursy); 
- The Federal Service on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring 
(Roshydromet). 
The “Ecological Doctrine of the Russian Federation”, worked out by Ministry of Nature 
Resources and approved in 2002, is the main document defining the state policy of the Russian 
Federation, its goal, directions, objectives and principles for the long-term period. According to 
the Ecological Doctrine, the strategic goal of the state ecological policy is preservation of 
ecosystems, maintenance of their integrity and vital functions for sustainable development of the 
                                                 
43 The official Russian name (the 1st author’s note). 
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society, improvement of living standards, improvement of public health and the nation’s 
demographics, and maintenance of the country’s ecological safety. 
 
Marine Rescue Coordination Centers: 
The Federal Agency of Maritime and River Transport (Rosmorrechflot) and the State 
Marine Pollution Control, Salvage and Rescue Administration of the Russian Federation 
(Gosmorspassluzhba) are responsible for oil spill preparedness and response at sea from vessels 
and facilities regardless their ownership or nationality. The Mintrans of Russia is empowered on 
behalf of the Russian Federation to request assistance from foreign countries or to decide to render 
requested assistance. 
Search and Rescue operations and oil spill response are organized through the Marine 
Operations Headquarters: 
- In the Western sector of the Arctic – on the basis of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise 
"Atomflot"; 
- In the Eastern sector of the Arctic – on the basis of "Far Eastern Shipping Company". 
 
7 Marine Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) and 6 Marine Rescue Co-ordination 
Subcenters (MRSCs) are established by Gosmorspassluzhba for the emergency response at sea, 
including OSR. The following MRCCs and MRSCs currently operate in the Russian sector of the 
Arctic: 
MRCC Murmansk (sector West), MRCC Dixson (sector East), MRSC Arkhangelsk, 
MRSC Tiksi and MRSC Pevek (See Figures 16 and 17). 
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Figure 16. The location of MRCCs and MRSCs in the west part of the Russian Arctic (Source: CHNL) 
 
Figure 17. The location of MRCCs and MRSCs in the east part of the Russian Arctic (Source: CHNL). 
 
MRCCs and MRSCs have necessary equipment designed to operate in harsh Arctic 
conditions and fully comply with the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue at 
Sea, 1979, and the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) 
Manual. 
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Since navigation in the area of MRSC Tiksi and MRSC Pevek is seasonable, these MRSCs 
operate only during the navigation season (approximately from the mid of July to the end of 
September). 
Taking into account the remoteness of basing points of MRCCs, the basis for search and 
rescue in the Arctic are icebreakers of FSUE "Atomflot" and "Far Eastern Shipping Company" 
Ltd, while they are in performance of tasks in the Arctic zone.  
In some cases, to search and rescue of people in distress at sea are attracted aviation 
emergency rescue services of the federal bodies of executive authority (the Ministry of Defense of 
Russia, the Russian Emergencies Ministry, and the Federal Security Service of Russia). 
 
2.4.7. The sanctions regime 
The sanctions against Russian economic sectors, including the oil and gas sector, were 
introduced by the EU, U.S. and Canada in three rounds: 
1) the first round applied to equipment deliveries and took effect in late July – early 
August 2014; 
2) the second round was introduced in September 2014. It extended the scope of the 
sanctions, besides equipment deliveries, on the provision of services, information 
exchanges with Russian partners, and engagement of Western companies in the most 
technologically challenging projects; 
3) the third round was introduced in mid-February 2015 and targeted a number of Russian 
officials and nine new companies were introduced. 
The sanctions regime against Russia include a number of restrictions within the fields of 
shipping and offshore. The offshore petroleum sector is one of three sectors that form the so-called 
economic sanctions against Russia, which include measures targeting certain aspects of sectoral 
cooperation and exchanges with Russia.44 
 
Forbidden 
The U.S. sanctions against Russian economy are stricter than the ones imposed by the EU 
and Canada. They apply to licensing of Russia-bound supplies of equipment for deepwater (over 
500 feet, or 152.4 m) hydrocarbon production, development of the Arctic shelf and shale oil and 
                                                 
44 The other two are the defense and the finance sectors. For more information, see 
https://svw.no/contentassets/6a4549f3d6a946f8820891b069de0752/the-sanctions-regime-against-russia-and-the-
effects-on-the-offshore-community.pdf 
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gas deposits. The EU sanctions apply to deep-water hydrocarbon production, but do not specify 
the minimum depth of production. 
 
For deep-water, Arctic and shale projects the following equipment is prohibited by the U.S. 
for import into Russia: 
- drilling rigs; 
- parts for horizontal drilling; 
- drilling equipment and well completion equipment; 
- offshore equipment for Arctic operations; 
- well logging equipment; 
- well pumps; 
- drill pipes and casing pipes; 
- software for hydraulic fracturing; 
- high pressure pumps; 
- seismic exploration equipment; 
- remotely controlled underwater vehicles; 
- compressors; 
- tube expanders; 
- distribution cocks; 
- risers. 
 
The list of equipment prohibited by the EU for import into Russia includes equipment for 
offshore projects, deep water drilling and exploration of hydrocarbon fields in the Arctic, 
equipment for shale hydrocarbons projects, various types of pipes, and pumps for liquids. The EU 
also introduced a pre-approval procedure for deals involving equipment supply to the Russian 
Federation. Such approvals must be granted by the authorized government bodies of the countries 
in which the exporting companies are registered. 
The U.S. restrictions do not provide any exemptions for contracts executed before 6 August 
2014. However, the European authorities may issue a permit for delivery if the export is related to 
a commitment arising from a contract or agreement executed before 1 August 2014, i.e. before the 
EU sanctions effective date. 
The sanctions are not limited to equipment deliveries only – they apply to the financial 
sphere and, therefore, the investment opportunities of Russian companies. 
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Moreover, Western companies are prohibited from continuing their cooperation with 
Rosneft, Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, LUKoil, and Surgutneftegas in joint projects of Arctic, shale 
and deep-water exploration and production. 
 
Focusing on the Norwegian sanctions. 
The Norwegian sanctions regulations against Russia are found in, “Forskrift om restriktive 
tiltak vedrørende handlinger som undergraver eller truer Ukrainas territorielle integritet, 
suverenitet, uavhengighet og stabilitet av 15. august 2014”, as amended on 10 October 2014. 
The Norwegian Foreign Minister stated that the Norwegian government would mirror the 
EU sanctions regime, includes the abovementioned Article 3a. However, Norway decided to 
specify and thereby narrow the wording when translating “supply of specialized floating vessels”. 
The wording used in the Norwegian provision cited below is “supply of specialised floating 
facility”. The Norwegian provision equivalent to the abovementioned Article 3a in the Council 
Regulation, Section 17a, is almost identical to Article 3a and reads as follows (our translation): 
“Section 17a. 
Prohibition against providing certain services to be used in the oil industry. 
1. It shall be prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, the following associated services 
necessary for deep water oil exploration and production, arctic oil exploration and production, or 
shale oil projects in Russia: 
(a) drilling 
(b) well testing 
(c) logging and completion services 
(d) supply of specialized floating facility. 
2. The prohibitions in paragraph 1 shall be without prejudice to the execution of an 
obligation arising from a contract or a framework agreement concluded before 11 October 2014 
or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts. 
3. The prohibition in paragraph 1 shall not apply where the services in question are 
necessary for the urgent prevention or mitigation of an event likely to have a serious and significant 
impact on human health and safety or the environment. 
It is worth emphasizing the difference from the American sanctions regulations is that the 
prohibition against the four specified key services does not apply for the fulfilment of contractual 
obligations which follows from “a contract or framework agreement concluded before 11 October 
2014 or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts”, ref. paragraph 2 as cited 
above. Whereas the American company Exxon Mobile had to stop all drilling operations in Russia 
in 2014 following only a short grace period, Norwegian companies which would fall under the 
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scope of Section 17a could continue obligations under contracts entered into before 11 October 
2014. This provision has obviously and considerably reduced the negative effects of the EU 
sanctions regulations. 
At the same time, it is difficult to give a general statement in an article as regards which 
types of facilities would be included, as there are always borderline examples – when is a “facility” 
a “vessel” and the other way around. The definition of “facility” as provided in the Norwegian 
Petroleum Activities Act of 1996, Section 1-6 litra d, includes; 
“…installation, plant and other equipment for petroleum activities, however, not supply 
and support vessels or ships that transport petroleum in bulk. Facility also comprises pipeline and 
cable unless otherwise provided”. 
The individual supply of pipelines and cables would not be covered by Section 17a, but 
could easily be in breach of the provision in Section 1745. 
It is worth noting as well that the offshore area around the island of Sakhalin in the Sea of 
Okhotsk has not affected by the sanctions because most or all of the oil fields in this area are 
located at depths of less than 152 meters, and would therefore not be considered as “deep sea 
exploration and production”. 
 
 
2.5. Environmentalists’ protesting as a societal institutional pressure 
Greenpeace environmental groups try to stop continued expansion of the oil industry into 
new frontiers, particularly into the Arctic seas. Suing oil companies and governments to ban oil 
drilling and secure Arctic protection, they promote their protest actions, as “This is the people 
versus Arctic oil”46. 
Here are several examples of the protest actions by Greenpeace activists in the Arctic: 
- In October 2016, environmental groups launched legal action under Norway’s 
constitution, arguing that awarding of new exploration licenses in the Barents Sea breaches the 
right to a healthy environment. Norway’s constitution was amended in 2014 to give every person 
“the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a natural environment whose 
productivity and diversity are maintained” and that “natural resources shall be managed on the 
basis of comprehensive long-term considerations which will safeguard this right for future 
generations as well”. In contrast, oil companies argue that it is wrong to conflate the Norwegian 
Barents Sea, which is largely ice-free, with other parts of the Arctic, imprisoned by ice for much 
                                                 
45 For more information, see https://svw.no/contentassets/6a4549f3d6a946f8820891b069de0752/the-sanctions-
regime-against-russia-and-the-effects-on-the-offshore-community.pdf 
46 Available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/this-is-the-people-versus-arctic-oil/ 
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of the year. Equinor and Lundin argue the drilling in the Barents Sea is just little different from 
the rest of the NCS and quite similar to the conditions in the North Sea. 
-  
“The world needs more oil and energy than renewables can provide” as Equinor 
emphasizes47.  
- In August 2017, the Greenpeace activists protested Equinor’s drilling at the 
Korpfjell project in the Barents Sea by entering a 500-metre safety perimeter around the rig “Songa 
Enabler” with kayaks and rubber boats. The rig’s crew stayed on board, but the drilling operations 
were stopped for several days. The Greenpeace “Arctic Sunrise” ship were towed away to Tromsø.  
The Greenpeace activists (6 persons + the captain of the “Arctic Sunrise”) were arrested and then 
fined.  
 
 
Figure 18.  Greenpeace protesting at Korpfjell in August 2017 (Source: Greenpeace). 
 
As commented by the representative of Equinor company: “Actually it was illegal and 
irresponsible for entering the safety zone. The activists violated the Law. The crew on the rig called 
the police to intervene. The coast guards reacted to the call shortly”. In contrast, Truls Gulowsen, 
head of Greenpeace Norway, argued Greenpeace considered the arrest by Norwegian authorities 
to be unlawful as the protest was carried out in an area where the activists had a right to protest 
peacefully in accordance with the freedom of navigation act48.  As told by the representative of 
                                                 
47 Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/a5dacfda-94f8-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582 
48 Available at: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/ecology/2017/08/greenpeace-activists-released-after-oil-protest 
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Equinor company: “The protest was that oil and gas industry is the main carbon dioxide-
emitting source in Norway. They prepared an official complaint at the end of May 2017 to the 
authorities that Norwegian company Equinor had to stop developing this area before the drilling 
operations started. According to their claim, the Norwegian authorities should not open the 
Barents Sea for oil/gas development”.  Despite a number of drilling operations, carried out in 2017 
in the Barents Sea, the Korpfjell project has been of special interest because this area is new, more 
sensitive and remote than other licenses and attracts public attention, according to Equinor’s 
representative. 
- In June 2015, thirteen activists in kayaks intercepted Shell's drilling rig in Seattle 
prepared to depart for the Arctic. That was a boycotting action by Greenpeace activists against 
Shell in response to the oil company receiving the final go-ahead from the American government 
for drilling in Alaska. Shell had to abandon its controversial drilling operations in the Alaskan 
Arctic in the face of mounting opposition in what the environmentalists described as “an 
unmitigated defeat” for big oil. 
 
Figure 19. Greenpeace protesting in Seattle against Shell company (Source: Greenpeace). 
 
- In August 2013, the Greenpeace ship “Arctic Sunrise” sailed into the Barents Sea 
to enter the international waters of the Kara Sea and protest Rosneft’s operations in the Arctic. The 
“Arctic Sunrise” was refused permission three times by the Russian authorities to enter the 
Northern Sea Route although the refusal is in violation of international law including the right to 
freedom of navigation. They stayed in the Kara Sea about 3 days and then left the Northern Sea 
Route, after the Russian coastguard boarded the boat and threatened to use force if they would not 
leave the international waters of the Kara Sea. 
- In September 2013, the Greenpeace activists organized the protest near 
Prirazlomnaya platform in the Pechora Sea in order to try to prevent it from drilling earlier in the 
week. Two activists scaled the side of the Prirazlomnaya oil platform and folded out banners, 
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despite being blasted with water. The ship was subsequently towed by a coastguard vessel to the 
Russian Arctic port of Murmansk. The crew consisted of 28 activists and 2 freelance journalists 
from 16 different nationalities. The Russian government intended to charge the Greenpeace 
activists with piracy, which could carry a maximum penalty of fifteen years of imprisonment.   
 
 
Figure 20. Greenpeace protesting near the Prirazlomnaya platform in 2013 (Source: Greenpeace). 
 
 
Figure 21. The attempt of Greenpeace activists to climb aboard the platform to stop its operations  
(Source: Greenpeace). 
 
Although that Greenpeace International action was dramatic, but it also made possible 
positive changes in Russian policies regarding the Arctic: 
- Russia announced in the Arctic Council that it would support a legally binding 
international agreement against oil pollution of the Arctic Seas. That's exactly what Greenpeace 
has been fighting for; 
- Russia's President Putin tasked the Russian Government and oil companies with 
preparing measures on protecting the Arctic biodiversity from oil spills in cooperation with 
scientists and NGOs; 
- Gazprom made an effort to improve its notoriously weak oil spill contingency plan 
for Prirazlomnaya; 
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- The Russian Ministry of Environment at last acknowledged the huge scale of the 
oil spill problem in Russia and promised to employ new technologies to improve the situation; 
- Greenpeace Russia pointed out that according to current Russian regulations an 
offshore oil rig like Prirazlomnaya is allowed to extract oil for two years without training its 
personnel on how to respond to an oil spill. The Ministry of Emergency has since drafted 
amendments that would change this absurd situation49. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Available at: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/Blogs/makingwaves/how-peaceful-protest-made-
positive-change-in-Russia/blog/50222/ 
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3. LOGISTICS OPERATIONS IN DIFFERENT CONTEXTS  
Offshore production is an extremely challenging and resource-intensive process. It is not 
just the construction of the complex process platform, from which the drilling is performed and 
where people involved in the field’s development live and work. It means the establishment of the 
continuous logistics scheme to guarantee stable facility operation, which is a difficult task as well. 
Maritime transport is the basis of logistics and supply chains for these kinds of projects. It is not 
so difficult to imagine how many additional issues arise when it comes to transportation in an 
Arctic ice harsh location. 
The logistics scheme of any offshore project can be divided into three main constituents:  
 delivery of cargoes to the platform to support operation and personnel needs 
 transportation of produced oil  
 transportation of personnel.  
 
Each offshore project of oil/gas development requires its own unique logistics scheme and supply 
chain. It has to take into consideration the climatic conditions, weather limitations and distances, 
influencing on the number of offshore supply vessels, its variety, and supply linkages with the 
shore base. It is estimated on average 4.2 thousand tons of materials and equipment to be delivered 
to the platform for the construction and operation of only one well. It is the equivalent of a large 
railway train, loaded with pipes, chemicals, bulk materials, etc. required for well construction. This 
figure may vary a little depending on the well type (production, injection, cuttings), methods of 
recovery enhancement, etc.  
 
The development of offshore oil and gas fields involves a wide range of marine assets, 
including the variety of offshore service vessels (OSVs). Generally, OSVs provide support 
services to offshore floating drilling rigs, pipe laying and moored or fixed production platforms, 
utilized in exploration and production activities. 
 
There are three main categories of OSVs: 
- Platform Supply Vessel (PSV): designed for transporting supplies to the rigs and 
oil platform and return other cargoes to shore. The supplies include fuel, fresh water, 
equipment, drilling consumables, stores and provision for the operation of the oil platforms 
and for the personnel onboard. A typical PSV operating profile shows the vessel spending 
about 25% of the time in harbor loading and unloading, 40% sailing at a service in the 13-
16 knot range and 35% loading or discharging at sea.    
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- Anchor Handling Tug Supply Vessel (AHTS): designed to tow rigs from one 
location to another, to lift and position the rigs’ anchors.   
- Construction Support Vessel (CSV): used for subsea operations, and are typically 
equipped with a large crane, heli-deck, and large deck space. 
Further, we present the specific cases and supply logistics operations of certain offshore 
installations in order to examine and identify the main features and challenges when managing 
logistics operations at various Arctic localities to ensure SAR and emergency preparedness. 
 
3.1. Norwegian Barents Sea fields 
3.1.1. Case 1. Goliat project 
3.1.1.1. Field location and natural conditions 
General info and location: 
The Goliat oil offshore field is located in production license PL229 (7122/7-1), which was 
awarded in the “Barents Sea Round” in 1997. The licensing round was initiated by the authorities 
in order to promote interest in the Barents Sea as an oil and gas region. The discovery was made 
with the first exploration well in 2000. This is the first oil offshore field in the Norwegian sector 
of the Barents Sea.  
 
Figure 22. The location and coordinates of the Goliat field (Source: ENI Norge). 
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The license stakeholders are Eni Norge AS (operator, 65%) and Equinor Petroleum AS 
(35%). The field development concept was approved by the Government of Norway on 8 May 
2009. It was developed on the basis of comprehensive impact assessment. 
Estimated recoverable oil reserves are about 180 million barrels of oil. Estimated 
recoverable gas reserves are 8 billion Sm3. Annual operating costs are approximately NOK 1.5 
billion. 
The production with offshore loading started in March 2016. The field will produce 
100,000 barrels of oil per day (65,000 boe net to Eni). The field is estimated to contain about 180 
million barrels of oil and production is assumed to continue to contain about 180 million barrels 
of oil for 10–15 years. Production will be facilitated using a subsea system consisting of 22 wells 
(17 of which are already completed). There are twelve production wells, seven water injectors and 
three gas injectors. The associated gas is reinjected to increase oil recovery and transported to the 
processing plant at Melkøya 2007 Barents Sea Subsea to Shore LNG (Snøhvit field).  
 
The Goliat field is located 88 kilometers (53 miles) northwest of Hammerfest, in water 
depths of 341 m. 
 
Figure 23. The location of the Goliat field and its remoteness from key onshore centers 
(Source: ENI Norge). 
 
 
 
Natural conditions: 
The Goliat field is located in the South-Western Norwegian Barents Sea. This region lies 
within the region that is considered to be Arctic. 
Air temperature: 
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Average temperatures vary between 0 and 2.70C. The extreme minimum air temperatures 
are significantly lower than what is commonly experienced in other parts of the Norwegian shelf. 
Winter temperatures can reach up to – 300C / -340C. The minimum average temperature in 
January/February are expected to be around -15°C. 
Figure 24 shows the 100 years temperature range in course of a year: 
 
Figure 24. Expected temperature range for the Goliat field (Rekdal, 2012, p. 7) 
 
Ice and icebergs: 
There is a low probability of sea ice and icebergs occurring at the Goliat location 
(NORSOK, 2007, p. 27)50. It is anticipated that any sea ice in the South‐Eastern Barents Sea will 
not form locally, but will drift in from areas further north‐north‐east. The reason for this is the 
dominant ocean currents that bring warm Atlantic waters into the Southern Barents Sea. In order 
for ice to enter these areas, a north‐north-easterly wind is required over an extended period. 
However, local formation of ice in the northernmost blocks cannot be ruled out, and the use of 
weather forecasts will be vital for predicting any local freezing. 
An important prerequisite of the authorities is that drilling in oil‐bearing layers must not 
take place closer than 50 kilometers to the marginal ice zone. The authorities have defined the 
marginal ice zone as the transition between offshore areas covered by more than 40% ice and open 
sea. Thus, exploration drilling will not take place if sea ice drifts towards the drilling location. In 
practice, this is managed by monitoring large expanses of water and monitoring sea ice. If sea ice 
approaches a drilling location, drilling activity will cease in anticipation of the ice receding to a 
point at least 50 kilometers from the drilling location. Sea ice closer than 50 kilometers will cause 
disruption to a drilling operation and will delay exploration. Statistics on the occurrence of sea ice 
                                                 
50 Sea ice is ice that forms when the sea level temperature drops below freezing (-1.9 C0 for salt water). It is this type 
of ice that constitutes what is known as the “marginal ice zone” (also known as the “ice edge” in the Norwegian 
debate). Problems associated with sea ice, and especially the marginal ice zone, have been the subject of discussion 
over the last couple of years when the issue of oil and gas activity in the Barents Sea has been addressed. 
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makes it possible to estimate how often such events may occur in selected locations, as well as the 
expected waiting time before operations can resume. 
There is a possibility for occurrence of icebergs. Icebergs are affected by wind, currents 
and waves and normally move at a speed of around 0.7 km/h. The most important sources of 
icebergs in the Barents Sea are the glaciers on Franz Josef Land. Normally, circulation in the 
Barents Sea will drive the icebergs west towards the eastern coast of Svalbard, but in certain years 
with northerly winds, they can drift relatively far south. 
Wind:  
Polar lows are relatively uncommon and will not affect the companies' ability to operate in 
the South‐Eastern Barents Sea. 
 
Figure 25.  Expected wind speed/ direction for the Goliat field (Rekdal, 2012, p. 7) 
 
According to Figure 25, rather high wind speeds can be expected primarily from a western 
direction. The maximum wind speed to occur in 100 years equals 30 m/s; in 10 years, this value 
equals approximately 27 m/s and every year 26 m/s. Average wind speed is 8.3 m/s.                                        
Weather data shows that strong winds from the western direction are significantly warmer 
then the less strong winds from the eastern direction. Thus, the possibility for a combination of 
cold temperatures and strong winds, which will lead to a strong wind chill effect, is low. 
Waves and current: 
Average wave height for all areas in the South‐Eastern Barents Sea is about 2.1 m, with an 
extreme significant wave height of approximately 13.8 m (100‐year sea state). For individual 
waves an extreme wave of approximately 26 meters has been estimated, while an extreme wave 
crest has been estimated at 15.5 meters above calm water.  
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The ocean current conditions also have characteristics similar to those in the Western North 
Sea and will therefore be conditions that the industry is used to operating in. For example, the 
ocean currents in the Norwegian trench and in the Troll field are significantly more dynamic than 
in the South‐Eastern Barents Sea. 
Snow and icing: 
Experience from previous exploration activity indicates that wind significantly reduces the 
volume of snow that accumulates on rigs, to the extent that even extreme snow loads are expected 
to be manageable. However, it will be important that all operators consider preventative measures 
such as mechanical or thermal removal, for example. Ice accumulation from sea spray could occur 
under specific climatic conditions relating to wind strength, water and air temperature. Thus, polar 
lows, snow and icing must be taken into account in the planning and implementation phases of 
any exploration activity during winter. 
 
3.1.1.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure 
Offshore supplies: 
The Goliat platform is a floating, production, storage and off-loading unit (FPSO). It was 
designed by Norwegian company Sevan Marine. The Goliat FPSO is designed and built both to 
withstand icing and to ensure that rain and snow drain naturally from the walls and roofs. Goliat 
is a geostationary FPSO and the tanker can move relative to the platform in response to prevailing 
weather conditions. The hose is longer than what is normally used, almost 400 meters. The system 
is housed in an enclosure to prevent icing. 
 
Figure 26. Goliat FPSO preparations in full swing (Source: Offshorenergytoday.com) 
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The Goliat FPSO is served by a fleet consisted of 2 supply vessels, 1 standby vessel and 3 
shuttle tankers. Two supply vessels are equipped for mechanical oil recovery and dispersal 
operations: 
- “Esvagt Aurora” – a contingency vessel equipped for both mechanical oil recovery and 
dispersal operations. Oil-detecting radar and IR cameras provides the vessel with the ability to 
operate regardless of daylight conditions. The oil boom systems and skimmers are stored below 
deck and, thus, is well-protected from winter conditions, while at the same time providing a good 
working environment for the crew. The winterized vessel is able to meet the most recent oil spill 
contingency standards (NOFO2009). It will be a rescue operations resource and will increase 
towing vessel capacity in the region. 
 
Figure 27. “Esvagt Aurora” contingency vessel 
- “Stril Barents” – designed and built to operate as a supply and stand-by vessel at the 
Goliat location. Under normal circumstances, the vessel operates mainly as a supply vessel. It is 
also able to replace Goliat's current standby vessel, Esvagt Aurora, and provide the first response 
both in case of emergency life-saving intervention and oil spill situations. This double function 
makes the vessel unique on the Norwegian shelf. 
 
Figure 28. “Stril Barents” supply and stand-by vessel 
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Three tankers serve the Goliat project. Two Knudsen NYK Offshore Tankers transport Eni 
Norge’s share of oil production to the market from the Goliat field: “Torill Knutsen” and “Hilda 
Knutsen”. These tankers work at Goliat on a weekly basis to collect 850 000 barrels of oil from 
the Goliat FPSO. Equinor collects its share of Goliat production using its own tanker: “Eagle 
Barents”. 
 
Table 1. Vessel engaged in the Goliat project. 
Vessel Ice class Characteristics Additional equipment Owner Built Flag 
“Esvagt 
Aurora” 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Contingency 
vessel 
Oil.rec. - oil-detecting radar 
and IR cameras,  
Winterized by oil boom 
systems and skimmers,  
FiFi I 
ESVAGT 
(in 
Esbjerg) 
2012 – 
Zamakona 
Shipyard, 
Bilbao, Spain 
Denmark 
“Stril 
Barents” 
+1A1 Supply/stand-
by vessel 
Oil.Rec. - oil-detecting radar 
and IR cameras, NOFO2009 
Simon 
Møkster 
Shipping 
2015 – Vard 
Aukra 
Norway 
“Skandi 
Iceman” 
DnV-GL 
+1A1,  
ICE-1B 
AHTS Winterized, oil.rec. – 
NOFO2009, FiFi I+II, 
DYNPOS-AUTR, 
300 evacuees 
DOF 
Group 
2013 - VARD 
TULCEA 
Norway 
“Torill 
Knutsen” 
+1A1,  
ICE-1C 
Crude oil / 
Shuttle tanker 
 Knudsen 
NYK 
Offshore 
Tankers 
AS 
2013 - 
Hyundai 
Heavy 
Industries  
United 
Kingdom 
“Hilda 
Knutsen” 
+1A1,  
ICE-1C 
Crude oil / 
Shuttle tanker 
 Knudsen 
NYK 
Offshore 
Tankers 
AS 
2013 - 
Hyundai 
Heavy 
Industries Co. 
Ltd 
United 
Kingdom 
“Eagle 
Barents” 
Arc 6 Shuttle tanker  AET Sea 
Shuttle AS 
2015 - 
Samsung 
Heavy 
Industries 
Bahamas 
 
 
Onshore operations and facilities: 
The operational organization and support functions for the Goliat project are located in 
Hammerfest, where Eni Norge AS established its regional office. Between 40 and 60 persons work 
at Eni Norge’s offices in Hammerfest. Eni Norge AS is currently establishing a supply and 
helicopter base in Hammerfest, including provision for logistics and maritime services. In total, 
this will create between 150 and 200 directly-related jobs. 
The main offshore supply facility is Polarbase supply base in Hammerfest, which is 
responsible for inbound deliveries of all supplies to the base and waste transportation from the 
base by using “Bring-Logistics” trucks.   
Two supply bases for emergency equipment are located in Hasvik municipality and Måsøy 
municipality.  
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The availability of onshore resources like AWSAR helicopters and hospitals is extremely 
limited: in Hammerfest, at UNN in Tromsø, in Longyearbyen. That increases potential risk factors. 
 
3.1.1.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response; challenges 
and accidents 
 
There are several challenges to SAR and oil spill preparedness in this region. These are, 
among others: 
- Closeness to coast – short drifting time to shore 
- Environmental sensitive areas 
- Distances and limited infrastructure 
- Long response time for resources from the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea 
- Limited access to personnel resources 
- Light conditions and icing during winter season51. 
                                                 
51 Available on http://www.arctic-council.org/eppr/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Eni_Oil_Spill_Preparedness_Workshop_Kirkenes_June_2012.pdf 
Figure 29. Two supply bases for emergency equipment in Hasvik and Måsøy municipalities (Source: Eni Norge)
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- A light type of crude oil 
 
In order to ensure safe and efficient working at the Goliat field, Eni Norge introduced 
integrated operations, based on the proactive use of real-time data, analytics and interaction 
encompassing offshore and onshore organizations and suppliers. Eni Norge established a new 
office in Hammerfest and in Stavanger to facilitate efficient interaction. According to Managing 
Director Eni Norge, Phillip Hemmers, 
 
“Nothing is so urgent or important that we cannot find the time to do it safely”.52 
 
To increase coherence and test the Goliat contingency equipment, in September 2012 the 
exercise, known as “Barents Solutions 2012”, was conducted to verify for the first time that Eni 
Norge’s contingency plans were fully functional and effective prior to the field coming on stream. 
That exercise was a joint effort between Eni Norge AS, Equinor and NOFO. Several public and 
private sector partners also contributed with personnel and equipment. It was carried out as a 
combination of oil spill and other practical exercises, which involved the use of actual contingency 
resources during all phases of an oil spill response, the practical training of crews and personnel, 
several vessels and other types of contingency resources. The principal activities took place in 
Hammerfest, Nordkapp, Måsøy and Berlevåg municipalities53. 
Several new principles to strengthen integration activities and cooperation and increase the 
level of emergency preparedness were applied and put into practice after the exercise. It has related 
to the use of fishing vessels for coastal contingency operations, and separate task forces or 
operational teams of professionals linked to emergency response actions along the coastlines and 
beaches. 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
 
“The NOFO uses also fishing boats, which main task is to tow equipment that collects, 
records and stores oil. They started to use them at the Goliat project and then extended to the 
Korpfjell project in 2017. It turned out to be efficient and profitable to use the fishing fleet, because 
fishing boats are small. It makes the oil recovery preparedness more effective and adapted to local 
conditions. The agreements with local fishing boat owners became an important contribution to 
realizing this goal. Fishing vessels are now used along the entire Norwegian coast. It’s good 
                                                 
52 Available on http://www.eninorge.com/en/News--Media/Multimedia-archive/Film/ 
53 For more information see Press Release, September 11, 2012 that is available on 
https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/oil-spill-drill-at-goliat-field-norway/ 
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cooperation between the petroleum and fishing industries”. 
 
The responsibility between Eni Norge and NOFO for the emergency preparedness 
operations was redistributed as follows: 
1) Eni Norge: for emergency preparedness; environmental impact analysis; emergency 
preparedness analysis; dimensioning of preparedness resources; 
2) NOFO administers and maintains the oil spill preparedness resources on behalf of the 
operators. 
 
Therefore, 6 NOFO-systems were organized for offshore and coastal preparedness during 
production drilling at Goliat: 
 Improved open sea emergency preparedness (Barriers 1 and 2): 
- Detection and monitoring 
- Standby vessel “Esvagt Aurora” – NOFO2009 standard (1800 m3) 
- Additional available resources. 
 
The standby vessel “Esvagt Aurora”, which is constantly on duty near the Goliat platform, also 
took part in the exercise. This vessel serves as a valuable resource during any rescue operations, 
as well as reinforcing the capacity of the towing vessels in the area. The on-board oil spill 
protection equipment is stored below deck, and is optimized for cold conditions and winter 
operations. Advanced monitoring equipment on board makes it possible to discover and follow up 
any oil spills, under any light conditions. These monitoring systems are part of the modernization 
of Norwegian oil spill contingency strategy. 
In addition, two supply vessels have minimum NOFO 2005 standard. All supply vessels 
are equipped with infra-red cameras and oil-detecting radar. 
Eni Norge uses a set of integrated platforms to detect and monitor immediate discharges 
from the Goliat field: 
- Satellite +Sensors on the subsea templates; 
- Plane and helicopter (SAR, SLAR, IR) 
- Installation (radar, IR) + Stand-by vessel (radar, IR) 
- ROV on the stand-by vessel 
- Land based installations (HF radar) 
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Figure 30. The concept of emergency preparedness to SAR and oil spill response (Source: Eni Norge). 
 
 Improved coastal and shore zone preparedness (Barriers 3 and 4): 
- 30-40 fishing vessels in permanent preparedness 
- New task force/ operational groups in the coastal and beach zone 
A new operational “response team” concept was adopted to improve preparedness in the 
coastal zone. The operational unit was specially adapted for oil spill recovery operations in the 
coastal zone and it consists of: 
- Vessels with emergency preparedness contract with NOFO (oil spill certificate); 
- Light and mid-weight boom systems, skimmers and storage units; 
- Support vessel within oil spill monitoring equipment and tactical command; 
- Experience from the oil spill contingency in Prince William Sound,  Alaska. 
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 Infrastructure, logistics and remote sensing (all barriers): 
- Use of new monitoring technology 
- Dedicated material to coastal and shore zone operations 
- Support vessel to coastal and shore zone operations 
- Detailed mapping of the coastal zone 
- Equipment in new depots: Hasvik and Måsøy municipalities 
- Detailed contingency plans for selected areas 
- Holistic logistics plan. 
 
 
3.1.2. Case 2. Johan Castberg project 
3.1.2.1. Field location and natural conditions 
General info and location: 
The Johan Castberg (formerly Skrugard) field development Project is the largest oil field 
yet to be developed on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) The licence is PL 532. The field’s 
resource base consists of the three oil discoveries Skrugard (in April 2011), Havis (in January 
2012) and Drivis (May 2014). All three fields are assumed to share common infrastructure. 
The license stakeholders are Equinor (50%), Eni Norge As (30%) and Petoro AS (20%). 
The operator is Equinor.  
The field is located in the Norwegian Barents Sea in blocks 7219/9 and 7220/4,5,7, 
approximately 240 km north-west of Hammerfest, nearly 240 km from Melkøya, 150 km from 
Figure 31. Operational “response team” with the participation of fishing vessels (Source: Eni Norge) 
 91 
Goliat field, and about 100 km north of the Snøhvit-field. Johan Castberg and Havis oil fields are 
located at a distance of about 7 km from each other. The water depth is about 360 -390 meters. 
 
 
 
Figure 32. The location of the Johan Castberg field (Source: Equinor). 
 
The current recoverable reserves are estimated at being 400 to 600 million barrels of oil. 
The production capacity of the field is estimated at 200,000 barrels of oil equivalent each day. 
The first phase of the Johan Sverdrup development will be completed in the period 2018-
2022. As told by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
 
“The initial costs for the project development were estimated approximately NOK 1.15 
billion annually to operate the Johan Castberg field – the huge amount and the main reason to 
postpone the project! During our improvement work, we conducted several logistics studies and 
found new cost-effective solutions that allow us to realize the project. Now the estimated 
investments are NOK 50-60 billion. There is a lot of preparation work still. The drilling operations 
is about 40 wells for 4-5 years and the oil production to be started in 2022. The most important 
what we experienced is that the logistics solutions are primarily the main driver for cost-
effectiveness of the project.” 
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In December 2017, the capital expenditures for the Johan Castberg project were estimated 
at some NOK 49 billion, according to the new plan for development and operation that is able to 
make the project development be profitable even at oil prices of less than USD 35 per barrel54. 
3.1.2.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure 
 
Offshore facilities: 
The Johan Castberg field is assumed to be developed using a floating, production, storage, 
and offloading (FPSO) unit and production vessel with additional subsea solutions. 
November 10, 2017 Equinor signed a letter of intent with Sembcorp Marine Rigs & 
Floaters Pte. Ltd in Singapore for the construction of the hull and integrated living quarters for the 
floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) vessel that will be located on the Johan 
Castberg field in the Barents Sea55 (See Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33. Johan Castberg floating production vessel (Source: Equinor) 
 
Oilfield services provider Aker Solutions will supply the subsea production system and 
design the topside of the floating production, storage and offloading (FPSO) facility, which will 
be the largest-ever of its kind offshore Norway. The subsea production system will consist of 30 
wells with vertical subsea trees, wellheads, control systems, 10 templates and manifolds, two 
satellite structures and tooling. Initial deliveries are scheduled for the second quarter of 2019 with 
final delivery in the first half of 2023. The FPSO agreement covers engineering, procurement and 
management assistance for the detailed design of the Johan Castberg topside. The detailed design 
is set to be completed in 201956. 
                                                 
54 For more information, see https://www.Equinor.com/en/news/05dec2017-johan-castberg.html 
55 For more information, see https://www.Equinor.com/en/news/10nov2017-johan-castberg.html 
56 For more information, see https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/aker-solutions-lands-johan-castberg-work-worth-
over-480m/ 
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As told by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1 about how effective logistics 
solutions for the project can be found at the stage of preparation: 
 
“We look into the demand and what we are going to do with the drilling rig at the Johan 
Castberg project. Taking into account that the distance is about 140 nm from Hammerfest, we 
estimate 10 hours that the supply vessel needs. Then, we estimate that it can be enough to support 
the rig by using 1 supply vessel to make 3-4 trips per week. In addition, we have 1 stand-by vessel 
that should be at place when we start drilling operations. There are on-going talks of what kind of 
stand-by vessel should be and what tasks it has to resolve like oil recovery and emergency 
response. Now it is assumed to use a multifunctional vessel if it is possible. We also have 1 
transport helicopter and 1 SAR helicopter from Hammerfest to be shared with ENI’s Goliat project 
in order to reduce costs. We share 50/50% of all costs for the helicopters that is a good solution. 
The use of a SAR helicopter costs about NOK 100 hundred million per year and a transport 
helicopter for the crew shift is NOK 80-90 million per year.” 
 
Transportation of the produced oil from the offshore site to the onshore oil storage facility 
will be carried out by a pipeline measuring 280 km in length. The oil will be stored in two mountain 
caverns. It will be transferred to the quay through a pipeline. Crude tankers will further transport 
the oil from the terminal. 
 
Onshore operations and facilities: 
The main onshore facilities will be located at Polarbase supply base in Hammerfest.  
The Equinor’s new plan for development and operation at Johan Castberg required 
expanding the Polarbase supply base, owned by NorSea Group. It will be invested NOK 60 
million, with Hammerfest harbor, to build a new Roll-on/Roll-off facility at the Polarbase as it 
expects more workload in the area when the Johan Castberg field development begins57. 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
“Our existing supply base in Hammerfest is well established and functions very well.  We 
anticipate that new ro-ro facilities at the quay will allow for even more efficient loading and 
unloading work”. 
“In addition, we signed a new agreement with ASCO supply base, also located in 
Hammerfest, for the next 4 years of operations. Thereby, we just look for new solutions for 
cooperation to share supply vessels if it is possible to use them together somehow with Lundin. 
                                                 
57 For more information, see https://www.offshoreenergytoday.com/Equinors-johan-castberg-move-spurs-norsea-to-
expand-supply-base/ 
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Lundin uses the ASCO base for their operations in the Norwegian Barents Sea. Actually, there is 
no lack of supply vessels. This is only due to high expenses, because to hire a supply vessel in the 
spot market it costs about NOK 200 thousand per day”, as shared by the interviewee of Norwegian 
oil company #1.   
3.1.2.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response 
While a well-developed emergency system is somehow available in coastal Norway close 
to the mainland, there is the limited preparedness capacity for search and rescue, hospital care and 
oil spill response in the Svalbard area. The remote location of onshore resources like AWSAR 
helicopters and hospitals (availability of onshore hospitals in Hammerfest, at UNN in Tromsø, in 
Longyearbyen) increases potential risk factors for the Johan Castberg development. 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1, it is expected to use one of 
emergency response and rescue vessels, which Equinor awarded new seven-year contracts in 2017 
to two contractors - Simon Møkster Shipping and Havila Shipping. The vessels are part of 
Equinor’s area-wide emergency response on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS). Simon 
Møkster Shipping’s vessels are the “Stril Poseidon”, “Stril Merkur”, and “Stril Herkules”. Havila 
Shipping’s vessels are the “Havila Troll”, which took part in the Korpfjell drilling operations in 
August 201758. 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1, the area emergency response 
vessels are required to be fitted with two MOB boats, fire-fighting equipment, a minimum 110-
metric ton towing capacity, and an emergency hospital. In addition, they should carry oil spill 
response equipment such as oil booms and skimmers, with storage capacity for oil spill clean-up 
in accordance with NOFO requirements, oil dispersing equipment, a stern lifeboat recovery 
system, and a helipad. 
 
 
3.1.3. Case 3. Korpfjell project in the North-East Barents Sea (PL859). 
3.1.3.1. Field location and natural conditions 
General info: 
The Korpfjell oil field is one of the northernmost formations in the Norwegian Arctic 
waters. The license is PL859, which was awarded in the 23rd licensing round in 2016. The area in 
                                                 
58 It is worth noting that today Equinor has a total of six emergency response and rescue vessels on the NCS, and one 
currently being upgraded to an adequate relief vessel, a 24-hour operations center at Sandsli, and five operative search 
and rescue (SAR) helicopters on the NCS. For more information, see http://www.offshore-
mag.com/articles/2017/02/Equinor-extends-norway-emergency-vessel-deals.html 
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this license consists of 12 blocks: 7335/1, 7335/2, 7335/3, 7336/1, 7434/7, 7434/8, 7434/9, 7435/9, 
7435/10, 7435/11, 7435/12, and 7436/10.  
The license stakeholders are Equinor (30%), Chevron (20%), ConocoPhillips (15%), 
Lundin (15%) and SDØE (20%). The operator is Equinor. 
The first exploration drilling operations of well 7435/12-1 were carried out in August 
201759. The main objective of the well was to prove oil in reservoir rocks. The well encountered a 
gas column of 34 meters in sandstone with good reservoir quality in the main target. The Korpfjell 
gas discovery is estimated to contain gross resources between 40 and 75 million barrels of oil 
equivalent (MMboe). The well proved a small, non-commercial gas discovery. 
Korpfjell is the first exploration well drilled in the Norwegian section of a formerly 
disputed area between Norway and Russia, which was opened for exploration activity in 2013. It 
is also the northernmost wildcat well drilled on the Norwegian shelf, located on the 74th parallel.  
According to the experts, more exploration is needed to understand the potential of this 
area. Further drilling is expected to take place in 2018 in PL859 to test additional prospects. 
It is worth noting that the “Songa Enabler” was attacked by Greenpeace activists, who 
protested Equinor’s drilling operations at the Korpfjell (See more details in Section 2.5). 
 
 
Location: 
The well 7435/12-1 at Korpfjell field is located about 415 km from the Norwegian coast, 
about 475 km from the Russian coast, 570 km from Hammerfest, about 365 km northeast of the 
Wisting discovery well 7324/8-1 in production license 537, and about 555 km from Novaya 
Zemlya (See Figure 34 and Figure 35). The water depth is 253 meters. 
In addition, the Korpfjell is not only located far north, but also far east, only 37 km from 
Norway’s maritime border to Russia. For Equinor, its location is of major interest because of its 
vicinity to the Perseevsky license area on the Russian side of the border. The Perseevsky block is 
located in the western Russian part of the Barents Sea in an area adjacent to the Norwegian 
economic zone. It covers 23,000 km2 in water depths 120 – 250 meters. A first exploration well is 
to be drilled by 2020. 
 
                                                 
59 Korpfjell is the fourth well in Equinor’s 2017 exploration campaign in the Barents Sea, where the Kayak oil 
discovery was announced on 3 July, the Blåmann gas discovery on 17 July and Gemini North on 7 August. Then, the 
fifth well was Koigen Central in Equinor’s campaign 2017 (the 1st author’s note). 
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Figure 34. The location of the Korpfjell project in the Barents Sea (Source: Equinor). 
 
Figure 35. The distances of the Korpfjell field location in the Barents Sea (Source: Equinor). 
 
 
 
Natural conditions: 
In the Korpfjell area of the Norwegian Barents Sea, awareness must be given to low 
temperatures, heavy snowfall, icing and occurrence of sea ice and icebergs. 
The average January sea temperature is close to 00C. The extreme minimum temperature 
for the last 100 years reached -34 0C. The average wind speed is 8.3 m/s. The extreme mean for 
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the last 100 years was 30.5 m/s. The wave height is about 2.1 m, but the extreme wave height 
reached up to 13.8 m. The probability of ice intrusions during time-limited operations is low and 
negligible during summer months. Drill rigs are less vulnerable to snow and icing compared to 
minor vessels60. 
In the Korpfjell area, which is near the polar front, there is a relatively high likelihood of 
fog in summer and autumn. This may impose restrictions on some methods of mapping and 
monitoring an oil spill during an oil spill action and hence the effectiveness of the operation61. 
Data from the Norwegian Meteorological Institute show that there has been no ice during the 
summer months in this area during the last 50 years. Throughout the year, there has been extremely 
limited ice in all areas.  During the last 14 years, there have been fewer than 10 days of ice near 
Korpfjell’s location. The presence of ice for the area varies from a few days in 2011 to between 
five and six months in 1978, 1979 and 2003. However, the latter is a rare event for the period for 
which data exist. The tendency in the area is that there is an ever-decreasing presence of ice, and 
that the sea area is generally open almost all year.  
 
3.1.3.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure 
Offshore infrastructure and sea supplies: 
The well was drilled by using the semi-submersible drilling rig “Songa Enabler” to a 
vertical depth of 1,540 meters below the sea surface and in a water depth of 253 meters.  
“Songa Enabler” is a floating, self-propelled rig built in 2016 and designed specifically for 
cold climates. The rig was approved and classed by DNVGL for such conditions. 
                                                 
60 From BaSec report: Barents East blocks Metocean Design Basis ME2015_005 (Equinor-2015). Available at:  
https://www.norskoljeoggass.no/Global/BaSEC%20rapporter/Introduction%20for%20authorities%20-
%20MetOcean%20and%20Ice_EN.pdf 
61 The data is from Emergency preparedness analysis, available at: 
http://www.miljodirektoratet.no/Global/dokumenter/horinger/Petroleum/Beredskapsanalyse%20for%20letebr%C3%
B8nn%207435-12-1%20Korpfjell%20-%20Equinor%20ASA.pdf?epslanguage=no 
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Figure 36. “Songa Enabler” rig in the Barents Sea (Source: Lundin). 
When the well was permanently plugged and abandoned the rig moved to the Koigen 
Central prospect in licence PL718 in the western part of the Barents Sea. 
 
Maritime vessel availability: 
The support fleet for the Songa Enabler rig consisted of three vessels - “Havila Troll”, 
“Troms Arcturus” and “Viking Queen” (See Table #2).  
 
 
 
 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
Figure 38. “Havila Troll” vessel (Source: Shipspotting) Figure 37. “Troms Arcturus” vessel (Source:Skipsrevyen)
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“One of the main challenges when developing the Korpfjell field is remoteness. Two vessels 
must be available for supplying the rig due to long distances and one standby vessel “Havila 
Troll” was on duty near the rig to meet requirements on oil spill preparedness”. 
The distance between the drilling site and the supply base in Hammerfest was 570 km that 
required 24 hours sailing per one way. Per week, each of two supply vessels - “Troms Arcturus” 
and “Viking Queen” - made two round trips between the rig and the supply base, as told by the 
interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1. 
“Havila Troll” remained on duty 24 hours a day near the “Songa Enabler” rig to ensure 
emergency preparedness.  
 
Table 2. Vessels engaged in the drilling operations at Korpfjell in 2017. 
Vessel Ice class Characteristics Additional equipment Owner Built Flag 
“Songa 
Enabler” 
DNV 
1A1 
Midwater 
floater 
Helideck, mooring 
system 
Songa 
Offshore 
2016 - Okpo 
Shipyard - Daewoo 
Shipbuilding & 
Marine 
Engineering, South 
Korea 
Norway 
“Havila 
Troll” 
DNV-GL, 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
AHTS Oil.Rec., oil-detecting 
radar, IR cameras, 
Winterized basic - by 
oil boom systems and 
skimmers, hospital, 
telemedicine 
equipment, 
FiFi I &II, MOB boat, 
320 survivors  
Havila 
Shipping 
2003 – Havyard in 
Sogn, Norway 
Norway 
“Troms 
Arcturus” 
DNV, 
1A1 
ICE-C 
PSV Oil.Rec., NOFO2009,  
150 evacuators 
Troms 
Offshore 
Manage-
ment 
2014 – Vard Aukra, 
Norway 
Norway 
“Viking 
Queen” 
DNV 
1A1, 
ICE-C 
 
Supply vessel Oil.Rec. NOFO209, 
FiFi II, gas fueled, 
240 evacuators, MOB 
boat 
Eidesvik 
Shipping 
AS 
2008- Westcon 
Yard, Ølensvåg, 
Norway 
Norway 
“Esvagt 
Aurora” 
DNV-
GL, 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Standby vessel Oil.Rec., oil-detecting 
radar, IR cameras, 
winterized basic - by 
oil boom systems and 
skimmers,  
FiFi I&II, 
320 survivors 
Esvagt 2012 – Zamakona 
Shipyard, Bilbao, 
Spain 
Denmark 
 
In addition, “Esvagt Aurora” vessel, engaged in the Goliat project, was included in the 
emergency plan for the Korpfjell project. This vessel stayed near the Goliat platform during the 
drilling operations at Korpfjell site, but it would support in case of any emergency (See Section 
3.1.3.3. below for more details).   
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Aviation infrastructure: 
During the drilling operations at Korpfjell site, which lasted four weeks, the rig’s crew was 
changed by the helicopter. The crew flew to Korpfjell from Hammerfest and Kirkenes with 
refueling in Vardø62. The time of flying from Vardø took 1 hour 42minutes. 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
“Due to the long distance and requirements on emergency preparedness, we could take on 
board the helicopter only seven passengers as maximum at each flight, because we needed extra 
fuel for the helicopter to reach the rig and back the shore base. The crew shift was in two weeks. 
So, if the crew on board the rig was 120 persons, we changed 60 persons per week. According to 
the Norwegian law, the rig personnel work two weeks and then are off during the next four weeks. 
As we planned initially, the helicopter’s capacity was 98 persons: seven on board for 14 flights 
per week. However, there were some limitations for using the helicopter like the ordinary 
maintenance or inspection, which took one day or another per week.  So, every week during the 
four drilling weeks, we changed 60 persons from the rig. It is also quite risky to use the helicopter 
for the crew change for such long distances”. 
In addition to the opinion above, it is worth noting that recently there has been a surge of 
criticizing talks about helicopter crew changes in the offshore oil and gas industry to be taken into 
account when planning offshore logistics operations63. 
 
 
Onshore operations and facilities: 
The “Songa Enabler” received all supplies from the Polarbase, located in Hammerfest. This 
supply base is built on a concept “A one stop shop” and is the closest to the offshore projects in 
the Norwegian Barents Sea. 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1 about their experience during the 
drilling campaign of summer 2017: 
“As we planned, and it was agreed with the supply base, the vessels should be uploaded 
and loaded again for the next voyage within 8 hours. However, our vessels spent more time - on 
average, 16-18 hours and up to 20 hours. Sometimes it was due to the opening hours of the supply 
base. Due to long distances, we could not predict the vessel speed all the time. If the vessel moored 
at the supply base in the middle of the night, it had to wait until 7 o’clock when the supply base is 
opened again. It was very often discussed that the supply base should be open 24 hours to utilize 
                                                 
62 Available at: https://www.Equinor.com/en/what-we-do/responsible-drilling-in-the-barents-sea.html#  
63 A good example of such kind of criticizing talks is available on https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/time-stop-
helicopter-crew-changes-offshore-industry-dennis-knox/ 
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the vessel at the main cost without paying demurrage as well. It was not so critical for the drilling 
operations, we predicted this. However, we realized that if we pursued a long-term development 
of offshore northern projects, the proportion of cost-time in relation to the vessel demurrage would 
be a challenge”.  
In addition to the Polarbase in Hammerfest, it was organized also an extra receiving center 
in Kirkenes because of many different operations in Hammerfest. The extra center used also as an 
emergency response for medical evacuation. 
 
3.1.3.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response 
 
One of the main challenges of this project was remoteness from the shore. As told by the 
interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
“To elaborate the logistics scheme and emergency preparedness for so remote area from 
the shore requires too long preparations and efforts – about 8 months before the start of the 
drilling operations. There were a lot of analysis during the preparations to the project around the 
Korpfjell activities. Some nuances may occur only during the project implementation. For 
example, for the previous project, we planned only 50% of the operations from Hammerfest 
according the rig’s drilling schedule. At the same time, that project was delayed mainly because 
of start-up in Kirkenes with helicopters. It costed a lot of troubles for the helicopter supplier 
because of summer holidays for the pilots and so on. I think, they did not get so long holiday this 
summer”.  
 Due to remoteness, the drilling operations at Korpfjell required to take additional measures 
to upgrade  emergency preparedness. 
During the drilling operations at the Korpfjell site, both companies – Equinor and ENI - 
jointly used two helicopters to develop different oil fields in the Norwegian Barents Sea: one SAR 
helicopter, and one transport helicopter, which can be converted to a SAR helicopter when needed. 
Both are Sikorsky S-92 helicopters. 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
“Both helicopters are intended to contribute to enhanced safety offshore in the Barents 
Sea. This contributes to flexibility and good utilization of capacity, as well as long-term planning 
for the supplier. The SAR helicopter is equipped with the newly developed NVG (Night Vision 
Goggles) technology, as well as other search technology, which significantly enhances its rescue 
capability, especially in SAR operations in the dark. These two helicopters are intended to be used 
also for the Johan Castberg field (Equinor-ENI-Petoro), pending an investment decision by the 
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end of 2017, as well as for drilling operations on the Snøhvit field in September 2018”. 
 
At the Korpfjell location, there were two NOFO recovery systems for both winter and 
summer conditions. As the Korpfjell area is located near the polar front, there is a relatively high 
probability of fog in the summer and autumn. This may impose restrictions on some methods of 
mapping and monitoring an oil spill under one oil spill action and thus the effectiveness of the 
action. To compensate for this, Equinor adds to a NOFO system beyond the estimated need for 
resources in barriers 1 and 2. Therefore, a need for 3 NOFO systems was defined for the Korpfjell 
location, according to Equinor Contingency Analysis for exploration well #7435/12-1 at the 
Korpfjell64. 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
“We planned for fog conditions at Korpfjell. The helicopter could not be used in this case. 
We had a solution to transport personnel by vessels.  In addition, we had a basket at the rig for 
transport personnel from the rig into the vessel. We could use the stand-by supply vessel for the 
evacuation of the personnel”. 
 
Since the Korpfjell’s exploration well had a long distance to today's location of NOFO's 
oil spill resources, Equinor planned an enhanced preparedness solution for this well. The third 
system included “Esvagt Aurora” vessel from the Goliat project, which was at a distance of 293 
nm from the “Songa Enabler” rig. The response time for this vessel was defined 26 hours.  
 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
“We have a general requirement that the first recovery system should be in the sea within 
5 hours, including alarm system, pumps, the vessel to control the lens. However, in the Barents 
Sea the requirement was different, and the first recovery system should be in the sea within 2 hours 
to start the operations and the fully developed barrier within 36 hours. At the same time, if an oil 
spill happened, it took many days to eliminate the negative effect of an oil spill”. 
 
To optimize the effort on oil spill response, the emergency system included also oil 
detecting radar, infrared camera and possibility of downlinking images taken from helicopters. 
Satellite radar was included as a capacity for both detection and mapping through download of 
daily radar images. During an emergency operation, one can be  download pictures two times per 
                                                 
64 Available on 
http://www.miljodirektoratet.no/Global/dokumenter/horinger/Petroleum/Beredskapsanalyse%20for%20letebr%C3%
B8nn%207435-12-1%20Korpfjell%20-%20Equinor%20ASA.pdf?epslanguage=no 
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day. NOFO had access to aerostat (Ocean Eye), which can be used to get an overview of oil at an 
action. 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
“The analysis for the Korpfjell well showed that there was no possibility for oil spills to 
reach the shore – too far away for any oil spill. The expected potential dispersion of oil on the 
ocean varies from well to well. For Korpfjell it is 120 km. The oil spill preparedness was specified 
in such a way that the most of oil would be recovered before it reached the shore. It also concerned 
the island of Hopen in the Svalbard archipelago, which is the closest land area to Korpfjell, 410 
km away. We had also an extra capacity – tank boat capacity for having oil spill operations. There 
was also an agreement between Norwegian and Russian authorities in case of oil spill recovery 
operations crossed the Russian border”. 
 
Sharing the experience, the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1 noted: 
“It was the first and positive experience of sharing the SAR helicopter with ENI and the 
Goliat’s vessel in the case of possible oil spills”.     
 
 
 
3.1.4. Case 4. Wisting project in the North-West Barents Sea. 
3.1.4.1. Field location and natural conditions 
General info: 
The Wisting oil field is the northernmost oil field in Norway. The area in this license 
consists of parts of block 7324/7 and block 7324/8. The Wisting oil was discovered in September 
2013 during the drilling of the Wisting Central exploration well 7324/8-1. The license PL537 is 
owned by OMV (Norge) AS (as operator has 25% share), Petoro (20%), Idemitsu (20%), Tullow 
(20%) and Equinor (15%).  
The Wisting field area has been divided into six sections: Wisting Central East, Wisting 
Central West, Wisting Central South, Hanssen, Hassel, and Bjaaland. Exploration has confirmed 
hydrocarbons in the Wisting Central East and Hanssen segments.  
The Wisting oil field awarded the production license PL537 in Q2, 2009. 3D seismic shot 
was carried out in 2009. The prospect was defined in Q4, 2010. Six wells at Wisting oil field were 
drilled: 
- 2 wells in Q3/Q4 2013; 
- 1 well in Q2 2014; 
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- 1 well in Q2 2015; 
- 1 well in Q1/Q2 2016; 
- 1 well in Q3, 2017. 
The Wisting Alternative well (7324/7-1S) was drilled in October 2013 following the 
discovery of Wisting. The well was drilled to a depth of 2,452m by the Leiv Eiriksson semi-
submersible rig to prove reserves in the Middle Triassic Kobbe formation. 
The discovery contains reserves in a shallow reservoir located 250m below the seabed. The 
field is estimated to contain between 200 million and 500 million barrels of oil equivalent. 
"OMV is very satisfied with the well test results, which are promising. This well is an 
important milestone towards a future field development on Wisting" -said Johann Pleininger, OMV 
Executive Board member responsible for Upstream65. 
During the period of January - March 2016, OMV successfully completed the drilling and 
testing of the Wisting Central II appraisal well. This well was the first horizontal appraisal well in 
the Barents Sea and set a new drilling record. It is the shallowest horizontal offshore well drilled 
from a floating drilling facility in the Norwegian Barents Sea. The well was spudded on January 
15, 2016, by the semisubmersible rig Transocean Spitsbergen. The well test was finalized at the 
end of March 2016.  
The drilling operation of Wisting Central III was carried out in August 2017. 
 
Location: 
The Wisting Central III well is located in the northern part of the Barents Sea, about 315 
km (166 nautical miles) north of Hammerfest, several 100 kilometers away from any permanent 
ice and around 180 kilometers away from the nature reserve Bjørnøya (Bear Island). The water 
depth is 394.5m. The total well length is 2,354 meters and the horizontal section measures 1,402 
meters. Advanced data collection and geo-steering was conducted through the entire horizontal 
phase.  
                                                 
65 Available at: 
https://www.omv.com/portal/ 
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Figure 39. The location of Wisting oil field in the Norwegian Barents Sea (Source: miljodirektoratet.no) 
 
 
Figure 40. The distances from the Wisting oil field (Source: miljodirektoratet.no) 
 
3.1.4.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure 
Logistics challenges are primarily due to the remote geographical location of the well in 
the northern-most area with no previous drilling history. The distance from the supply base in 
Hammerfest is 315 km. There is low density of resources in the area. 
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During OMV’s drilling operations in August 2017 the favorable weather conditions was 
experienced. The location reported about 12 hours of day light, average daily temperature of a few 
degrees’ centigrade minus, low to medium wind speeds and wave heights. 
 
Figure 41. The Global Maritime rig at the Wisting Central III site (Source: Island Innovator). 
 
The rig was a Global Maritime GM4000 type, delivered by the COSCO shipyard in China 
in 2012. It is owned by Island Drilling Company, AS and operated by Odfjell Drilling. It is fitted 
with accommodation areas with one-man cabins for a 120-person crew. It was issued with an 
Acknowledgement of Compliance (AoC) by the Petroleum Safety Authority in August 2013. 
Four vessels were engaged in the drilling operations in August 2017, presented in Table 
#3).  These vessels are also fully equipped to ensure an immediate oil spill response in line with 
the strict local laws and regulations66. 
 
Table 3. Vessels engaged in the drilling operations of Wisting Central III in August 2017.  
Vessel Ice class Characteristics Additional equipment Owner Built Flag 
“North 
Cruys” 
ICE-1B 
Icebreaker, 
DnV +1A1 
Platform 
supply vessel 
OIL-REC NOFO2009, 
Oil- and Ice-radar, 
Winterized, Rescue 
300 evacuees 
GulfMark 
Rederi AS  
2014 – 
Simek, 
Norway 
Norway 
“North 
Barents” 
ICE-1B 
Icebreaker, 
DnV +1A1 
Platform 
supply vessel 
OIL-REC NOFO2009, 
Oil- and Ice –radar, 
Winterized, Rescue 
300 evacuees 
GulfMark 
Rederi AS 
2013 – 
Skipsteknisk 
AS, Norway 
Norway 
“KL 
Sandefjord” 
DnV +1A1 AHTS ROV hangar & ODIM 
LARS system for 
underwater search 
operations; Hospital 1 
“K” Line 
Offshore, AS 
2011 – STX 
Norway 
Offshore 
Norway 
“KL 
Saltfjord” 
DnV +1A1 AHTS ROV hangar & ODIM 
LARS system for 
underwater search 
operations; Hospital 1 
“K” Line 
Offshore, AS 
2011 – STX 
Norway 
Langsten 
Norway 
 
Onshore operations and facilities: 
                                                 
66 Available at https://www.omv.com/portal/01/com/omv/OMV_Group/upstream/norway/activities_in_barents_sea 
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The Global Maritime rig was supplied during the drilling operations from the ASCO supply 
base, located in Hammerfest.  
 
3.1.4.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response 
Emergency preparedness is mostly challenged by the following factors: 
- Environmentally sensitive area with harsh weather conditions and icing possibility: long 
periods of dense fog expected; 
- Limited offset well data available; 
- Unexplored area for drilling activity; 
- Extremely shallow reservoir requiring enhanced focus on well control; 
- Logistical challenges due to geographical location; 
- Remote location and low density of resources in the area: medevac to Tromsø hospital 
takes up to 4 hours or more; 
- Evacuation solution independent of helicopters. 
These factors require increased focus and extended amount of efforts invested into securing 
safe operations. A stand by vessel with capability to operate in harsh weather is the primary 
resource to ensure emergency preparedness with telemedicine and two nurses on board (Krainer, 
2015). 
In case of an oil spill, extensive measures are required: 
- Spill detection within one hour; 
- SECurus detection system (radar plus IR); 
- NOFO vessel at location; 
- Full barrier I and II in place within 24 hours. 
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3.2. The Russian Arctic fields 
3.2.1. Case 5. The Prirazlomnaya platform (the Pechora Sea) 
3.2.1.1. Field location and natural conditions 
General info: 
The first and thus far only oil and gas project to be carried out on the Russian Arctic shelf 
is the development of the Prirazlomnoye field, which was discovered in the Pechora Sea in 1989. 
The field has estimated reserves of 72 million tons of oil. GazpromNeft-Shelf, LLC67 holds the 
license for its development. The single stationary Prirazlomnaya platform, which has become the 
first Arctic-class ice-resistant oil platform in the world, was delivered to the oil field in August 
2011. It has a design capacity of 6.5 million tons per year. Field reserves are estimated to about 72 
million tons of oil and annual peak production of five million tons is planned for around year 2022. 
Commercial drilling was planned to begin in early 2012, however, it was delayed at least 
until the Spring of 2013 due to "safety concerns". This is the first commercial offshore oil 
development in the Arctic. In 2014, the platform delivered around 2.2 million barrels of oil to the 
Port of Rotterdam. The oil produced by the Prirazlomnaya platform is called ARCO (Arctic Oil)68. 
The Prirazlomnaya platform produced the 10 millionth barrel of Russian North Arctic Oil in March 
2016. 
Location: 
The Prirazlomnoye oilfield is located in the Pechora Sea, 60 km from the shore, at 19,2 m 
depth. Coordinates: 69°15′7″N 57°20′34″E. 
 
Figure 42. The map of the Pechora Sea (Source: oilandgasonline.com) 
                                                 
67 Gazprom Neft Shelf, LLC is GazpromNeft subsidiary founded in 2002 (the 1st author’s note). 
68 ARCO is a new type of oil. It entered the global market in April 2014. ARCO is characterized by high density 
(about 910 kilograms per cubic meter), an increased concentration of sulfur and low paraffin content. ARCO serves 
as the basis for unique chemical products, which may be used in road-building, rubber tire manufacturing, space 
industry and pharmaceutics. Available on http://www.gazprom.com/about/production/projects/deposits/pnm/ 
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Natural conditions: 
The length of the Pechora Sea is about 300 km from West to East and 180 km from North 
to South having the surface area of approximately 81 000 km2 and the overall water volume of 
4380 km3. The Sea is shallow since its average water depth is around 6 m, but it gradually increases 
toward the North reaching the maximum depth of 210 m. 
The typical environment of the Pechora Sea is given in Table #4.  
Table 4. Typical environmental conditions of the Pechora Sea (Gudmestad et. al., 1999). 
Parameters: Pechora sea conditions  
Maximum wind gust, m/s  41 m/s 
Minimum air temperature, °C  -48  
Sign. wave height, m  6,2 (at 45 m water depth)  
Currents velocity, m/s  1  
Freezing up (average)  Nov. (Oct.) – Eastern part of the Sea  
Clearing (average)  June  
Average open water, days  110  
Multi-year ice, %  -  
Maximum level ice thickness, m  1,3  
Rafted ice thickness, m  2,6 (twice level ice thickness)  
First-year ridge thickness, m  12-18  
Multi-year ridge thickness, m  -  
 
An air temperature is below 0 °C for 230 days per year. Air temperature at the 
Prirazlomnaya platform varies from -46 °C in January to +26 °C in July-August. During the year 
the monthly average air temperature fluctuates from -17,4 °C in February to +6,5 °C in July, while 
the annual average value is about -5,1 °C. 
In the summer season, a mean value of wind speed is about 6 m/s. During a storm, in the 
same season the speed can reach 20 m/s with duration of 6 hours in average and 36 hours at 
maximum. Even 30 m/s is possible with the maximum duration of 6 hours. 
Extreme waves may reach up to 11.5 m at water depth 20-30 meters in October-November 
(Mischenko, 1996). It means that during the storm season there is a dangerous situation for supply 
vessels carrying out marine operations in the open sea. The average parameters of 10-100 year 
wave in the region are the following (Novikov, 2014): 
- wave height – 3,2-4,7 m; 
- wave length – 110-154 m; 
- wave period – 8,6-10,5 s. 
Ice conditions: 
The sea is free of ice during about 110 days per year, but in the region of the field, the ice-
free period can vary from 3 to 7 month (Novikov, 2014). Ice in the sea mainly has local origin, 
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rarely accompanied with ice coming from the Kara Sea because of ice exchange between the seas. 
The first year ice is one of the characteristics of the Pechora Sea (Gudmestad et al., 1999). Ice 
covers the sea in winter period and melts away in the summer. The ice period lasts from the end 
of October until the end of July/early August (Mironov et al., 1994). Ice conditions of the western 
part of the Pechora Sea are milder than in the eastern part. The most extensive ice cover period is 
observed in March-April, when the whole sea surface is covered with ice (Spichkin and Egorov, 
1995). 
The thickness of level ice starts increasing in winter following the period of ice extension 
and reaches the maximum value, which is approximately 1.3 m in spring or beginning of summer. 
The extreme thickness is about 1.6 m. The thickness of rafted ice in the sea can be up to 2.5-3 m 
thick. In February, the sea surface coverage by hummocks can reach 60 to 80%, in April the 
hummocks can cover entire sea surface (Gudmestad, 1999). 
Based on the data presented in the Pechora Sea Environment (Bauch et al., 2005), ice 
parameters for the Pechora Sea are provided in Table #5. 
 
Table 5. Ice parameters in the Pechora Sea (Bauch et al., 2005) 
Ice Parameters Early dates Average dates Late dates 
1. Beginning of ice freeze-up 25.10 18.11 23.12 
2. Fast freeze-up 23.12 22.02 11.04 
3. Beginning of fast ice break-up 05.04 23.05 07.07 
4. Total disappearance of ice cover 10.04 19.05 30.08 
5. Duration of ice-covered season 131 213 272 
 
 
Some characteristics of fast and drift ices are shown in Table #6 (Bauch et al., 2005). 
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Table 6. Parameters of fast and drift ices in the Pechora Sea (Bauch et al., 2005) 
Fast ice 
Extent, km 3-15 
Average thickness, cm 110 
Drift ice 
Thickness, cm: 
Average 80 
Maximum 145 
Size of ice fields, km: 
Average 1,4 
Maximum 17,5 
Continuity, units 10 
Hummocks, % 60-90 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure 
Offshore facilities and sea supplies: 
The Prirazlomnaya is an offshore ice-resistant oil-producing stationary platform, built 
specifically for the development of the Prirazlomnoye oil field. The platform has been used for all 
production operations, namely well drilling, oil extraction, storage, treatment and offloading.  
The platform’s residential module is designed to accommodate up to 200 people, all year 
round. Due to the depth of the sea (19.2 meters), the facility — at 126 m2 the size of two football 
fields, and weighing 500,000 tons — has been installed directly onto the seabed and reinforced 
with a protective 45,000 cubic-meter-plus stone berm (weighing 120,000 tons) ensuring the well 
cluster has no direct contact with the water. 
The towing operation of the Prirazlomnaya platform into the Pechora sea started in August 
2011 from the shipyard of the shipbuilding plant in Murmansk (See Figure 43). 
The following vessels were engaged in the towing operation: 
- Icebreaker “Vladislav Strizhov”; 
- Transport and towing vessels - “Kapitan Martyshkin”, “Neptun” and “Eems”;  
-  AHTS – “Neftegaz-57”, “Neftegaz-61”, “Pasvik”; 
- Russian coast guard vessel “Zapolyarye”. 
The towing operation lasted about two weeks. The length of the itinerary was 1,200 km.  
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Figure 43. The towing operation of the Prirazlomnaya platform in August 2011 
(Source: by the 1st author based on Gazpromneft data) 
 
All wells in operation on the platform are horizontal wells. A total 32 wells are expected 
to be drilled by 2023 — 19 production wells, 12 injection wells, and one absorption well. Eleven 
directional wells will run to depths of more than 6,000 meters, with horizontal sections of up to 
1,000 meters and horizontal displacement of up to 4,000 meters. 
 
 
Figure 44. Drilling operations at the Prirazlomanya platform (Source: Gazprom Neft). 
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The wellheads of all wells to be drilled at the field are located within the platform, while 
its foundation serves as a buffer zone between the well and the open sea. In addition, a two-tier 
protection system - an emergency shutdown valve (ESDV) was installed at the wells to prevent 
blowouts of oil or gas.  The offloading line used for transferring oil to tankers is provided with an 
emergency shutdown system that can be activated instantly. The round-the-clock monitoring of 
the Prirazlomnaya platform is ensured through a special system with over 60 detectors tracing the 
changes in its operation. 
The Prirazlomnaya platform’s needs: 
To estimate the scale of operations, it is worth taking into account that the construction of 
32 wells has been planned, according to the Prirazlomnoye field development project. A large 
quantity of materials and equipment is not the major part of the cargo traffic from the onshore base 
in Murmansk to the platform installed in the Pechora Sea. For example, in 2015 the total cargo 
volume was about 100 thousand tons. That amount included almost 30 thousand tons of drinking 
water and approximately 25 thousand tons of diesel fuel that were delivered to the Prirazlomnaya 
platform. At the same time, approximately 12 thousand tons of cuttings were transported from the 
platform to the shore in 2015 because the Prirazlomnaya platform operation principle envisages 
zero discharges. 
The volume of oil to be transported from the Prirazlomnaya platform is to about 2 million 
tons in 2016. After 2020, when the field reaches the planned peak production performance, this 
figure will increase to 5 million tons. All operations necessary for the preparation, storage and 
shipment of crude oil are carried out directly on the offshore ice-resistant fixed platform. 
 
Figure 45 illustrates the general logistics scheme for servicing the Prirazlomnaya platform, 
which includes the sea route between the platform and the supply base/oil terminal in the 
Murmansk port, as well as air routes for the transportation of rotating personnel and contractors’ 
employees by chartered AN-24 aircrafts and MI-8 AMT helicopters: Arkhangelsk or Naryan-May 
– Varandey airport – Prirazlomnaya platform.   
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Figure 45. The general logistics scheme for servicing the Prirazlomnaya platform 
(Source: Gazprom Neft & Sibirskaya Neft Magazine). 
 
 
 
 
 
Onshore operations and facilities: 
To manage the production and delivery of personnel and cargo, a developed coastal 
infrastructure was created: a supply base in Murmansk and a storage terminal on Varandey Island. 
The onshore supply base is located on the Kola Bay coast near Murmansk port, 980 km 
away from the platform. This is one of the main challenges for ensuring regular support of the 
Prirazlomnaya platform according to Oleg Sokolov, Deputy Head of Transportation Support 
Department in GazpromNeft-Shelf:  
“We work in harsh weather and ice conditions. Moreover, the platform is located far from 
the onshore supply base”.69 
                                                 
69 Available on https://rogtecmagazine.com/gazprom-neft-arctic-routes2/ 
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It is also worth emphasizing that the Prirazlomnaya platform is located in an area, which is 
ice-free for just 110 days a year. 
The onshore supply base consists of several bases used for transportation of cargoes for the 
Prirazlomnaya platform, which are leased by GazpromNeft-Shelf from third parties. 
GazpromNeft-Snabzhenie, a specialized company, is responsible for delivery of materials, 
equipment and foodstuff from all parts of the country and from around the world as well as for 
onshore warehousing logistics. The company faces another challenge. Despite the availability of 
its own logistics operator, contractual relationships and interaction with several third parties, as 
well as working from several distant bases make supply support of the platform more complicate. 
Therefore, GazpromNeft-Shelf is currently studying the possibility of constructing its own 
onshore supply base in Murmansk, which is able to serve this and other offshore projects for the 
company. 
The storage terminal near Varandey settlement is presented on Figure 46. 
 
Figure 46. The storage terminal near Varandey 
(Source: http://russiatrek.org/blog/business/oil-production-on-the-shelf-in-the-russian-arctic/) 
 
Gazprom Neft Shelf operates one more transport terminal in the Kola Bay for oil 
transshipment from the field to the European ports. Crude oil from the Prirazlomnaya platform is 
transported by the Panamax shuttle tankers, serving the field to the very large crude carrier Umba 
with 300,259 t dead weight, which is installed in a roadstead. Umba is used for oil storage, customs 
clearance and border control. After all formalities are completed, the oil is loaded onto the end-
user’s tankers. This scheme allows oil tankers to reduce the number of round trips considerably – 
from 3,500 to 1,070 nm per trip and, therefore, increase the frequency of shipments while not 
increasing the number of the tankers. Moreover, the transportation terminal allows the buyers to 
use standard non-ice class vessels for ARCO oil transportation. Only special sea going vessels 
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capable of cutting their way through the ice up to 1.5 m thick are to be utilized to reach the ice-
free Kola Bay from the Pechora Sea coast. 
 
Maritime vessel availability: 
 The Prirazlomnaya platform is usually served by a fleet consisted of 3 supply vessels, 1 
rescue (stand-by) vessel and 2 shuttle tankers. All vessels are capable of operating in the ice 
conditions (See Table #7). 
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Table 7. Vessels engaged in the Prirazlomnaya platform’s activities. 
Vessel Ice class Characteristics Additional 
equipment 
Owner Built Flag 
“Yury 
Topchev” 
DNV Ice-15, 
1A1 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking 
supply vessel 
Oil.rec., FiFi I, 
85 survivors, 
DAT (-40) 
Gazflot - 
subsidiary of 
Gazprom 
2006 – Havyard 
Leirvik, 
Norway 
Russia 
“Vladislav 
Strizhov” 
DNV Ice-15, 
1A1 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking 
supply vessel 
Oil.rec., FiFi I, 
85 survivors, 
DAT (-40) 
Gazflot -
subsidiary of 
Gazprom 
2006 – Havyard 
Leirvik, 
Norway 
Russia 
“Aleut” Icebreaker6, 
ARC5  
(DnV Ice-10) 
Supply vessel DYNPOS-1, 
Winterized (-30), 
Oil.Rec., 
FiFi 3 
FEMCO 2015 – Havyard 
Ship 
Technology AS, 
Norway 
Russia 
“Balder 
Viking” 
DNV Ice-10, 
+1A1 
AHTS - Viking Supply 
Ships 
2000 – Havyard 
Leirvik, 
Norway 
Sweden 
“Murman” Icebreaker6 Rescue vessel Oil.Rec., 
DYNPOS-2, 
FiFi2, helidec 
Rosmorrechflot  2015 - Nordic 
Yards, Wismar, 
Germany 
Russia 
“Mikhail 
Ulyanov” 
RMRS 
+LU6,  
1A Super 
Panamax shuttle 
tanker (double-
hulled) 
Helicopter 
Landing Area 
Sovcomflot 2010 - 
Admiralty 
Shipyards, 
St.Petersburg, 
Russia 
Russia 
“Kirill 
Lavrov” 
RMRS 
+LU6,  
1A Super 
Panamax shuttle 
tanker (double-
hulled) 
Helicopter 
Landing Area 
Sovcomflot 2010 - 
Admiralty 
Shipyards, 
St.Petersburg, 
Russia 
Russia 
 
“Murman” rescue vessel is constantly near the Prirazlomnaya platform and responsible for 
emergency preparedness. 
It is worth noting that “Balder Viking” vessel takes part in supply operations during several 
winter seasons: 2013, 2015, 2018.  
As told the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“During several winter seasons we provided the vessel as extra for ice management. 
Actually, ice management at the Prirazlomnaya has been challenged because there are regular 
loading/offloading operations of oil tankers. These operations have been interrupted if there is ice 
drifting and/or ice rubble formation alongside the platform. This can delay the tanker operations. 
Once we provided our vessel because the icebreaker, which usually serves the platform, was on 
maintenance, docking additional tonnage.” 
Both “Yury Topchev” and “Vladislav Strizhov” multifunctional vessels have onboard 
additional equipment for oil spill recovery in ice conditions. Both supply vessels are 
interchangeable. It means that various special modules can be installed on any vessel and removed 
if the vessel is on the cargo trip.  
In March 2016, GazpromNeft-Shelf extended its fleet for Prirazlomnoye field with a new 
tug/supply vessel “Aleut”. This vessel was built specially for the Prirazlomnoye project and has 
 118 
been assumed to execute the entire range of supply functions as well as technological/ecological 
standby functions. 
In future, however, Gazprom Neft-Shelf plans to enhance the company’s fleet with 
additional icebreakers considering the production program, changes in the ice conditions and other 
factors. According to Oleg Sokolov, Deputy Head of Transportation Support Department in 
Gazprom Neft-Shelf: “To estimate the need in supply vessels, we have planned cargo traffic up to 
2038, taking into account the well commissioning schedule and available statistical data, 
calculated the required deck and cargo hold area and now have an aggregate but complete 
picture. The main cargo traffic is expected up to 2023. The fleet composition will be changed as 
necessary thereafter”70. 
 
Figure 47. “Murman” rescue vessel and the oil tanker at the Prirazlomnaya platform (Source: Gazprom Neft). 
 
Two reinforced, 70,000-tonne maximum-deadweight double-hulled ice-class oil tankers – 
“Mikhail Ulyanov” and “Kirill Lavrov” - have been commissioned specifically to work at 
Prirazlomnoye. 
Offloading of oil from the platform’s storage facilities onto tankers is undertaken with the 
use of two direct offloading CUPON systems. One of them is located in the southern part, while 
another one in the northeast (See Figure 48). In order to prevent any spills during pumping and 
offloading operations the offloading line is equipped with an emergency shutdown system, with a 
maximum seven-second response time. 
                                                 
70 Available on https://rogtecmagazine.com/gazprom-neft-arctic-routes2/ 
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Figure 48. Oil production, storage and offloading (Source: GazpromNeft). 
 
Offloading time is within 8-9 hours. 
According to Oleg Sokolov, Deputy Head of Transportation Support Department in 
Gazprom Neft Shelf: “The tankers are equipped with the unique oil transfer system. A dynamic 
positioning system allows the vessels to moor and pump oil from the Prirazlomnaya platform 
unloading module via the bow loading gear while staying away from the platform regardless of 
wind or waves”.  
At the same time, the climatic challenges have to be taken into account regardless of the 
start-of-the-art equipment. According to Konstantin Surikov, Deputy Head of the Fleet Operation 
Department in Gazprom Neft Shelf: “Ice near the platform is drifting and we have to wait for the 
weather windows to pump the oil. These windows last for maximum six hours; then the current 
changes direction and ice squeezing against the tanker prevents it from holding the loading 
position. Thus, the vessel has to disconnect and retreat until the conditions are favorable again”.71  
As told by the interviewee of Russian oil company #3: 
“Ice rubble formation is a real challenge for us because it is hard to remove, and it is 
formed again and again. The OSVs are not able to get close to the platform. The length of the 
cargo can be not so long as the width of the ice rubble. Lifting cargo from the vessels and 
uploading the vessels with waste and empty containers can be not difficult and risky”. 
                                                 
71 Available on https://rogtecmagazine.com/gazprom-neft-arctic-routes2/ 
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Figure 49 presents oil transport routes of two Panamax shuttle tankers - “Mikhail Ulyanov” 
and “Kirill Lavrov” - from the platform to oil terminal, located in the Kola Bay for oil 
transshipment on end-users’ large crude carriers. 
 
Figure 49. Oil transport routes form the platform to Murmansk oil terminal (Source: GazpromNeft). 
 
Aviation Infrastructure: 
Although the sea shipment is relatively inexpensive and allows shipment of huge cargo 
volumes, but it has one major drawback – it takes much time. In addition to the OSVs involved, 
aviation is the only option to resolve urgent transportation tasks on the shelf projects. However, 
there are also certain restrictions. For example, the length of the takeoff strip at the Varandey 
airport that bridges the platform with the mainland is 1.7 km, so the airport can only accommodate 
small aircrafts with the take-off weight up to 25 tons. For this reason, Prirazlomnaya platform 
personnel is transported from Arkhangelsk, which is the project air support base, using AN-24 
turbo-prop aircrafts. The airplanes are reliable, but you can hardly call them state-of-the-art. The 
first AN-24 was commissioned back in 1959. Certainly, all aircrafts pass scheduled maintenance 
and repair and Gazprom Neft-Shelf conducts audits of the contractors’ airplanes, but nothing lasts 
forever, and the aircraft life will come to end in 2020. 
There are no aircrafts to replace AN-24 and even if similar ones exist somewhere in the 
world, they are not certified in Russia. Therefore, Gazprom Neft-Shelf is currently in active search 
for the ways to resolve the upcoming problem. One of the options is to use an alternate airport in 
Naryan-Mar and transport people by helicopter to Varandey. However, this is more expensive as 
the number of helicopter flights will be three times as many as the airplane flights (currently 8-
11). 
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Rotating personnel is transported from Varandey to the platform by helicopters. Special 
requirements are set to these helicopters as they fly over the sea. According to Alexander Voronin, 
Deputy Head of Logistics Department in Gazprom Neft-Shelf,  
“There are four MI-8 AMT helicopters flying to the Prirazlomnaya platform. In 2015, 
Gazprom Neft-Shelf and Gazprom Avia completed the refurbishment of these four helicopters. We 
installed windows that can be broken outside, 16 chairs facing the direction of travel instead of 
benches along the sides, provided special cargo compartments for transportation of over-sized 
cargoes and installed ditching system”72. 
Today the company is constructing its own heliport in Varandey. The design passed state 
expert review and the plan is to commission the heliport in 2017-2018. According to Oleg Sokolov, 
Deputy Head of Transportation Support Department in Gazprom Neft-Shelf, “Varandey airport 
is private owned by Lukoil company, and thereby, the expenses for airport use are high. Moreover, 
the importance of our own heliport in the region increases when we think of future Arctic shelf 
projects. Because even now the passenger traffic counts almost 10 thousand people”. 
 
 
Summing up the description of the logistics operations at the Prirazlomnaya platform: 
It is worth noting that the main challenge has been to provide regular deliveries of supplies 
to the platform for up to 200 persons, as well as to ensure safe oil offloading and oil transportation, 
despite a long distance between the supply base and the platform, and the harsh weather conditions 
– waves, ice drifting, ice rubbly formation and wind, according to the interviewee of Russian oil 
company #3. Figure 50 presents the logistics scheme with distances and travel time. 
 
                                                 
72 Available on https://rogtecmagazine.com/gazprom-neft-arctic-routes2/ 
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Figure 50. The logistics scheme with distances and travel time (Source: GazpromNeft). 
 
 
3.2.1.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response 
According to numerous Internet sources, Gazprom has for years been battered by 
accusations of insufficient attention to the potential environmental consequences of the project. 
The main concern is an oil spill in an environmentally fragile area with cold-water conditions 
amplifying the problem by making oil disperse more slowly than in warmer waters.  
The project has been delayed several times, leading to increasing doubt about the 
platform’s suitability for Arctic operations. Since 2004, seven delays have been announced, for 
example due to lack of environmental approval and deficiencies in drilling equipment (Sotnikova, 
2012). Gazprom officials have retorted that the Prirazlomnaya platform could withstand a hit from 
a torpedo, and people drawing comparisons with the Macondo spill in the Gulf of Mexico have 
limited technical proficiency (Ramsdal, 2013). 
 
Figure 51. Potential oil pollution of the seawaters and the shoreline after oil spill of 10000 tons over 5 days 
(Source: Greenpeace). 
 
The maximum size of possible oil spills from Prirazlomnoe are officially calculated to be 
1,500 tons of oil for wells and 10,000 tons for oil tankers. This implies that the impacted area could 
reach 140,000 km2 (or four times the size of Lake Baikal) and affect more than 3,000 kilometers 
of shoreline. Figure 48 illustrates potential oil pollution of the seawaters and the shoreline after oil 
spill of 1,000 tons over 5 days. Three nature preserves are within the area of potential impact: the 
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national park “Nenetsky” as well as the nature reserves Vaygach and Nenetsky (Starinskaya, 
2012a).  
A report commissioned by WWF and Greenpeace Russia in 2012 points out that with the 
equipment employed in the oil spill preparedness plan, only 20 per cent of an oil spill could be 
collected and no plan for saving the local fauna exists (Lunden & Fjaertoft, 2014).  
 
There was developed a special oil spill response plan for cooperative and joint activities 
between supply vessels and other resources presented on Figure 52.  
The oil spill response plan provides for permanent presence of rescue and salvage vessel 
“Murman” near the Prirazlomnaya platform. This role is performed also by multifunctional 
icebreaking supply vessels - “VladislavStrizhov” and “Yury Topchev”. 
 
 
Figure 52. Allocation of supply vessels and other resources for cooperative and joint oil spill response around the 
Prirazlomnaya platform (Source: GazpromNeft). 
 
The main oil spill response technologies are: 
- In the open sea: a duty rescue and salvage vessel supported by a boom powerboat sets 
booms in order to localize the spill or trap a part of it; then a high capacity free floating 
offshore oleophilic skimmer collects the oil from the trap formed by the boom; 
- In coastal waters: setting of protection or deflection booms and oil collection with low 
capacity oleophilic skimmers; 
- In ice conditions: oil collection from ice-free areas with Arctic skimmer.                                              
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“Zero emissions” technology has been integrated into the platform to prevent the discharge 
of any production or drilling waste into the sea, with used drilling mud, slurry and other wastes, 
instead, re-injected directly into the strata through a special absorption well, or transported onshore 
for recycling. Process water is supplied via special fish-protection devices. 
Table #8 provides the location of these technologies to be used in case of an oil spill73. 
  
                                                 
73 Available in WWF research report on https://new.wwf.ru/upload/iblock/c08/arctic_oil_spills_modeling_eng.pdf 
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Table 8. The type and location of the technologies to be used in case of oil spill near the Prirazlomnaya platform. 
Boom type Length, m 
Total 
height, 
mm 
Location 
Marine inflatable 
boom  1,200  1,500  
Each supply vessel carries 400 m of booms, 400 m of 
booms, 400 m of booms are stored in a container at the 
platform  
Permanent buoyancy 
port booms 2,000  1,000  
Stored at the OSR base in Murmansk. In case of oil spill 
emergency, the booms are delivered to the spill site by a 
supply vessel within 23 days. Used in ice-free periods 
Coast isolating booms 300 500 
Stored at the OSR base in Murmansk. In case of oil spill 
emergency, the booms are delivered to the spill site by a 
supply vessel within 2-3 days. Used in ice-free periods. 
Skimmer type 
Collection 
capacity, 
m3/h 
Qty, pcs Planned location 
Brush Minimax 10 
(Lamor Company)  
for oil collection in 
hard-to-reach places 
10 6 Varandey coastal base -3pcs; 1pc on each supply vessel; 1pc placed on the platform 
Free floating offshore 
– for oil collection 
offshore  
200 2 
During ice-free period – onboard a supply vessel, in winter 
the skimmer is stored at the OSR base in Murmansk. If 
needed, the skimmer is delivered to the spill area by a 
supply vessel. 
Arctic skimmer (oil 
collection in ice 
conditions) 
70 2 
In winter it is placed onboard a supply vessel. During ice-
free period the skimmer is stored at the OSR base in 
Murmansk 
Water-borne vehicles Characteristics Package, application, location 
Supply vessel – 2 units 
Deadweight 3,800 t; 
speed at 8.00 m draft – 15 
knots; 
Ice1,5 m; snow 70cm – 
2knots; 
Ice 0.8 m – 10knots 
Year-round emergency and rescue readiness at the platform 
is ensured by multipurpose icebreaking supply vessels, each 
carrying 3 skimmers with power units (Minimax 10 & FFO 
skimmer (in ice-free period), Arctic skimmer (in ice 
period), and a set of floating booms (400m long). Function: 
boom deployment, oil collection activities, oil dredging. 
Each supply vessel also carries tanks for temporary storage 
of collected oil with total capacity of 1,000m3 and a 
dispersion medium application device    
High-speed boom 
powerboat (onboard 
the supply vessel) – 
2units 
Length – 10m, draft – 1m 
Delivery of coast-isolating and permanent buoyancy booms 
and their deployment for oil spill deviation and protection 
of peculiarly sensitive coasts. Located onboard a supply 
vessel 
Work boat (Sever-7) – 
2 units 
Length 12.98 m,  
width 3.6m, draft 1.03m, 
speed 8knots,  
deadweight 2t 
Personnel and equipment delivery to hard-to-reach coast 
areas, oil collection at shallow waters. Rented when 
necessary 
 
To reduce noise impacts, helicopters delivering personnel to the platform fly over the sea 
at a height that will not disturb its inhabitants — i.e., not less than 500 meters. In addition, 
Prirazlomnaya has a specialist birdlife protection facility, covering a range of 3,000 meters. 
Broadcasting disturbing and annoying sounds, as well as authentic predator calls and man-made 
noises, it prevents birds from nesting and forming permanent flocks in the protected area. 
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Figure 53 illustrates oil spill response protection at the Prirazlomnaya. There were 
determined three levels of responsibility: 
Level: Responsibility: Possible reasons of oil spill accident: 
- Local level - Platform crew - Loading system accident 
- Regional level - Regional command post - Loss of control of a well 
- Federal level - Rosmorrechflot - Rupture of an oil tank 
- Accident at a tanker 
 
 
Figure 53. Oil spill response protection at the Prirazlomnaya (Source: GazpromNeft) 
 
Accidents: 
The first accident happened in the middle of October 2011: the evacuation ladder was 
blown off during a storm in the Pechora Sea. Information about the incident appeared in the media 
only in November 2011. According to one of the employees during that period, this incident 
embarrassed the platform's connection with OSVs and, in case of any emergencies, it would be 
very difficult to evacuate people from the platform. It eloquently illustrated the degree of 
"readiness" of the Prirazlomnaya platform for working in the harsh conditions of the Arctic seas74. 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Available at: http://gp-russia.livejournal.com/1534144.html  
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3.2.2. Case 6. The Universitetskaya-1 well, the East-Prinovozemelsky 
field, later renamed the Victory field (the Kara Sea) 
3.2.2.1. Field location and natural conditions 
General info: 
The Universitetskaya-1 well (later renamed the Victory field) is a vertical well drilled at 
the depth of over 2,000 meters in the East-Prinovozemelsky-1 license area, which is a gigantic 
undeveloped Arctic oil and gas field. It is located in the South Kara basin of the continental shelf 
of Russia, in the South Kara Sea between the Yamal Peninsula and Novaya Zemlya Island. The 
University-1 well in the Kara Sea is the northernmost well in the world 
The operator was a joint venture called Karmorneftegaz, owned by Rosneft (51%) and 
ExxonMobil (49%). The drilling was completed in record-breaking time for 1.5 months – August-
September 2014. It was initially expected that the drilling would continue for around two months, 
during the ice-free season that lasts from August through mid-October. 
“According to the results, the resource base of the first hydrocarbons trap discovered 
through the drilling is estimated to hold 396 billion cubic meters of gas and over 130 million tons 
(730 million barrels) of crude oil”, as reported by Head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin. “This is light 
crude comparable to the Siberian Light blend, according to the initial tests. This is an outstanding 
result of the first exploratory drilling on a completely new offshore field”, he added. 
The new deposit was given a symbolic name “Pobeda” (means Victory) after the drilling 
operations were completed and the good results were received. 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“The Kara Sea exploratory operations was a huge operation and the first one where we 
provided our services as a turn-key provider – in the combination of supplying anchor handling 
by our vessels and different tasks of ice management duties. It was a huge project! The contract 
for ice consultancy and ice management services valued only 60mln US Dollars, excluding the 
vessel contracts.” 
For the drilling operations, there was organized a united team of several partners like 
ExxonMobil, Nord Atlantic Drilling, Viking Ice Consultancy, Viking Supply Ships, 
Schlumberger, AARI, StormGeo, 123Logistics, KSAT, Halliburton, Weatherford, Baker, 
Trendsetter, FMC Technologies and others. 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1, it matters that all 
suppliers put together into one project, work cohesively: 
“It was the biggest campaign in the Arctic ever. One of the most important at the 
preparation stage is the selection of the right competent suppliers and right partners with a lot of 
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experience working in the particular area. It will be not a big failure or difficult to change a 
supplier when you start the operations. That was our responsibility and we paid a lot of attention 
to our choice. These operations were unique not only because of new experience in ice conditions, 
but also because a huge number of suppliers and partners from various fields were involved. Thus, 
that was part of the logistics strategy development to find a proper way to coordinate all their 
different activities.”  
 
 
Location: 
The drilling operations took place on the Russian continental shelf Northwest in the Kara 
Sea, approximately at N 74o30’ and E 064o. The well was drilled to a depth of 2,113 meters in 
open-water conditions, 250 km off the Russian coast and 50nm from the coast of Novaya Zemlya. 
The sea depth at the drilling site was 81 meters. 
 
Figure 54. The location of the University-1 well in the Kara Sea (Source: ExxonMobil.com). 
 
The Kara Sea has a special regulatory status.  In contrast to the norms of navigation in the 
waters of the Barents Sea and the Pechora Sea, sailing and navigation in the Kara Sea is subject to 
a special maritime legislation of sailing in the water area of the Northern Sea Route (See Section 
2.4.5.). Further, most of the area around Novaya Zemlya is highly restricted due to military zones 
and regulations. Even potential use as a place of refuge for vessels is prohibited, although this 
could be disputed according to international laws of the sea. During the 2014 season, some of the 
service vessels experienced a quite annoying situation when they had to change their course by 
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demand of the naval ships between the drilling site and the Murmansk port. These factors serve as 
limiting factors for logistics preparations and planning of emergency preparedness.   
 
Natural conditions: 
The Kara Sea. 
The Kara Sea is part of the Arctic Ocean north of Siberia. The Kara Sea, an extension of 
the Arctic Ocean, is located off the coastline of Siberia in far northwestern Russia. It is separated 
from the Barents Sea (in the west) by the Kara Strait and Novaya Zemlya Archipelago; and from 
the Laptev Sea (in the east) by the Taymyr Peninsula and Severnaya Zemlya (See Figure 55).  
 
Figure 55. The map of the Kara Sea (Source: Worldatlas.com) 
 
In the Kara Sea, the average depth of the sea is 111 m and the maximum depth 600 m. The 
sea is ice-bound for most of the year; the sea is generally navigable only during August – 
September season. 
The Kara Sea is almost non-seismic. However, there were four events with source depths 
of 10 to 25 km and magnitudes up to 5 on the Richter scale, two of which occurred on the island 
of the October Revolution. 
There is one main type of water mass in the Kara Sea: cold Arctic water (temperature <0 
°C, salinity <35) from the north. 
The air temperature is below 0 °C retained in the north of the Kara Sea 9-10 months, in the 
south - 7 - 8 months. The average January temperature is about -20 to -28 °C (minimum can reach 
-50 °C), July -6 to +1 °C (maximum can reach +16 °C). 
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The relative humidity is high throughout the year (80-85% in winter, 90- 95% in summer). 
Fogs at the sea are most frequent in July and August. The number of days with storms – is 1-2 
month in the summer months and 6-7 in the winter. The greatest number of storms is observed in 
the western part of the sea. 
The sea temperature defines ice extent and ice concentration. Ice ranges in thickness from 
1.2 to 1.6 meters. the Kara Sea is subdivided into two large areas, the north-eastern and south-
western, in which ice conditions are poorly related. In the winter, the entire Kara Sea is covered 
with close drifting ice with fast ice occupying large areas of the coastal areas. Its south-western 
part is covered by one-year ice of local origin with a predominant thickness up to 1.8 meters and 
young ice up to 0.3 m for 8-10 months a year, whereas summer it is usually completely ice free. 
Freeze-up of the south-western Kara Sea usually occurs in October, in the absence of residual ice. 
The north-eastern part is not completely free of drifting ice during the summer. In the winter, the 
north-eastern part is covered by perennial ice with a thickness of about 2.5 – 3.0 m. The fast ice is 
formed annually along all the continental and insular coasts of the Kara Sea. The Kara Sea is also 
occupied by icebergs, ice ridges and hummocks. The maximum-recorded values of the hummocks 
geometric characteristics are: the height of the above-water part is from 10 to 15 m, the keel depth 
is from 20 to 25 m. The icebergs are mainly concentrated near the northeastern coast of Novaya 
Zemlya.75  
 
The Kara gate strait. 
The Kara gate strait is the main shipping lane between the Barents and Kara seas, 
connecting the western part of the Russian Arctic and the Northern Sea Route. The 18 nautical 
miles strait has a minimum depth of 21 meters and shipping uses an established traffic separation 
scheme. Maximum fog and low visibility occur during July and August. In winter, the Kara Gate 
strait is covered with drift ice. The duration of the sailing season without icebreaker escort is 3 - 
3.5 months. 
 
Sanctions and further development: 
A second drilling operation at the Universitetskaya-1 field was originally to be conducted 
in 2015. However, Rosneft and ExxonMobil stopped their Kara Sea drilling operations on October 
10, 2014, due to sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury against Russia for its involvement in the 
                                                 
75 Available on http://studbooks.net/1825318/geografiya/karskoe_more 
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Ukraine crisis76 (See Section #2.4.7.). The original deadline for the companies to comply with the 
sanctions was September 26, 2014, but ExxonMobil gave more time to wind down its Arctic 
operations in a safe manner. 
Rosneft had to postpone all activities in the Kara Sea ”to a later stage”, as told by Russian 
Minister of Natural Resources Sergey Donskoy, - “A key reason for the delays are western 
sanctions which are limiting  access to necessary offshore technology”77. According to Head of 
Rosneft, Igor Sechin, Rosneft plans to resume the drilling operations at Universitetskaya-1 field 
in the Kara Sea in 201978.  
Then Karmorneftegaz company had to terminate the contract with Siem Offshore for lease 
of two service vessels: “Siem Topaz” and “Siem Amethyst”, and one platform supply vessel “Siem 
Pilot”, which were intended for exploration operations 2015 in the Kara Sea. Karmorneftegaz had 
to pay a big amount of fines to Siem Offshore79. 
 
The field exploratory activities-2014 in the Kara Sea required a lot of the Kara Sea studies, 
organized by Rosneft in partnership with the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, before the 
drilling operations at the Universitetskaya-1 well in 2014 and afterwards for further development 
of this field. These Arctic studies have been based on a detailed collection and a deep analysis of 
met-ocean data (wave, currents, sea level fluctuation, wind velocity, etc.), as well as ice-data for 
conceptual design of year-round oil and gas production facilities in the Kara Sea license blocks. 
As told by the interviewee of Russian oil company #2: 
“Our winter/summer expeditions in the Kara Sea and other Arctic Russian seas allow us 
increasing knowledge about the field conditions, acquiring experience in the field of ice 
management, improving the Kara Sea weather forecasts and… We assure that this knowledge in 
real ice conditions will allow us to evaluate logistics for shelf projects and find the most efficient 
logistics solutions, to ensure emergency preparedness of the offshore facilities and crews onboard 
both the platforms and service vessels. Our knowledge and experience in ice management will 
help to prevent any possible collisions with icebergs and to reduce the strength of drifting ice. We 
prefer to work with ice, but not to fight ice!” 
                                                 
76 The sanctions, established in 2014, have prevented all U.S. based oil companies from conducting operations related 
to the exportation of goods, services, or technology in support of exploration or production for Russian deep-water, 
Arctic offshore, or shale projects, which have the potential to produce oil, to five Russian energy companies – 
Gazprom, Gazprom Neft, Lukoil, Surgutneftegas, and Rosneft (the 1st author’s note). 
77 For more information, see https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry/2015/11/drilling-kara-sea-put-ice 
78 Available on: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2017/04/russian-drilling-barents-sea-coming  
79 For more information, see http://www.yamalpro.ru/2014/12/02/rosneft-otkazalas-ot-norvezhskih-sudov-
prednaznachennyih-dlya-razvedki-v-karskom-more/ 
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There were organized 18 specific expeditions for today80 in order to be able to manage and 
tow icebergs as a result. Here are some of them related particularly to the Kara Sea studies: 
- The Kara-Summer-2013 in August 2013: experts spent 30 days at sea onboard the 
“Akademik Fyodorov” survey vessel. Rosneft used 12 vessels, three aircraft, air drones, 
submersibles, subsea and floating self-contained stations, satellite surveillance systems and other 
equipment for the Kara Sea studies. 
- The Kara-Winter-2014 in April 2014: it was organized on board icebreaker “Yamal” and 
lasted 55 days to explore the glaciers at Novaya Zemlya, Severnaya Zemlya, New Siberian Islands 
and Franz Josef Land with a special focus on biological studies and environmental protection 
measures. In addition to “Yamal”, Rosneft used satellites, a KA-32 helicopter, an unmanned air 
drone, an underwater camera, buoys and remotely operated vehicles Gnom with depth of 
submersion of up to 100 meters for the exploration of sea floor. 
- The Kara-Summer-2014 in August 2014: it was organized onboard the “Akademik 
Tryoshnikov” scientific research vessel and lasted 57 days to explore the sea and ice conditions of 
several Rosneft license blocks in the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, the East Siberian Sea, and the 
Chukchee Sea. Experts installed 45 drifting buoys to track the movements of icebergs in the glacier 
areas of the northern island of Novaya Zemlya and the islands of the archipelago Severnaya 
Zemlya. 
- The Kara-Winter-2015: it was organized on board icebreaker “Yamal” and lasted 55 days 
to explore specifically mechanical properties of ice (over 2 thousand of measurements on 35 ice 
stations), morphometric parameters of flat ice and hummock for calculation of load on designed 
engineering structures. More than 100 autonomous sensors were installed on icebergs and ice 
fields for measurement of parameters of drift and tracking of their coordinates.  
 
Figure 56. One of ice stations during the Kara-Winter-2015 to explore mechanical properties of ice  
(Source: Rosneft). 
                                                 
80 Available on https://www.newstube.ru/media/specialnyj-reportazh-kara-leto-2017 
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- The Kara-Summer-2015 in August 2015: it was organized onboard the ”Viktor Buinitsky” 
research vessel and lasted over 35 days to explore an area between the Kara Sea and the 
East Siberian Sea and then to assess the environmental impact in developing Rosneft's 
license blocks.   
- The Kara-Summer-2016: it was organized to establish Rosneft's first scientific base in the 
Khatanga Gulf (See Section #3.2.6. of the report). In the Kara Sea, specialists performed 
a specific experimental work in ice management and changed for the first time in Russia 
the trajectory of iceberg drifts by external influence: 18 successful towages of icebergs, 
including a simultaneous towage of two icebergs, were performed. Icebreaker “Captain 
Dranitsin” towed the icebergs with a 90 and 180-degree turn of movement vs. their original 
trajectory. 
- The Kara-Summer-2017: it was organized onboard the ”Novorossiysk” icebreaker (built 
2016) and lasted over 40 days to perform eight experiments on hunting icebergs from oil 
platforms in the Kara Sea. 18 experiments were performed on physical impact on icebergs. 
For the first time, a controlled towing of the iceberg was carried out with the help of the 
“Novorossiysk” icebreaker at a distance of 50nm for one day (See Section #4.3. Ice 
management).    
 
Figure 57. Towing of the iceberg (1.1 million tons by the «Novorossiysk icebreaker in 2017 (Source: Rosneft)
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Rosneft plans to resume the drilling operations in the East-Prinovozemelsky-1 license area 
in 2019. Initially, the construction of at least 15 offshore platforms was planned for the 
development of the Kara Sea fields.  
 
3.2.2.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure 
The only well drilled on the Universitetskaya structure during the ice-free drilling season 
in August demanded implementation of a powerful shipping support system including rescue and 
transportation vessels, icebreakers, floating hotels all worked in the Kara Sea. The drilling activity 
required long preparations and complex pre-lay logistics operations related mainly to the rig 
towing, icebreaker participation, service vessel support and ice management. 
As told by the interviewee of Russian oil company #2, they faced a lot of challenges when 
starting the preparation to the Kara Sea drilling campaign (presented in Table #9): 
 
Table 9. Main challenges of the Arctic shelf (according to the interviewee of Russian oil company #2) 
1. Complexity of offshore 
drilling unit selection: 
2. Drilling campaigns planning: 3. Support and follow up of 
drilling campaigns: 
- The offered duration of its 
lease (operation in arctic lasts 
up to 6 months), while 
normally lease duration offered 
by contractors is minimum 2 
years period. 
- the availability of all the necessary 
equipment, materials and spare parts in 
order before starting of drilling operation, 
including extra drilling pipes and other 
necessary equipment to achieve the 
planned well depth and avoid downtime 
caused by missing of spares  
- Estimation of the required 
number of supply vessels and 
determine vessels types and 
needed technical and operational 
characteristics to effectively 
support operations in Arctic 
conditions 
- Adequate design and 
technical specifications for 
Arctic environment operation. 
- Short ice-free drilling time window 
(from 2.5 to 5 months) 
- Remoteness from the coastline 
and lack of infrastructure in the 
region. 
- Adequate design and 
technical specifications for 
emergency preparedness and 
environmental protection (zero 
discharges requirement) 
- Planning and preparation of the drilling 
operations, permissions to conduct 
operations at least 1.5 years before the 
planned drilling start 
- Limited available infrastructure 
for the drilling waste disposal. 
- Drilling unit crew should 
have the experience in drilling 
operations in arctic conditions 
- the necessity of  the upgrading/ 
winterization of drilling and supporting 
drilling equipment to adapt it for 
operation in harsh Arctic conditions 
 
 - The organization of the required 
onshore facilities in advance (including 
the quay facilities) for effective 
operations support and rig supply during 
the drilling operation.  
 
 - the required onshore medical support in 
advance, required in the situation of an 
emergency offshore personnel evacuation 
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Main challenge of marine operation in the Kara Sea is the unpredictable ice and weather 
conditions. Ice masses movements are to be constantly monitored from both on board the vessels 
and the onshore control center or the office in order to track changes and coordinate all activities 
with other partners involved. The interviewee of Russian oil company #2 shared experience: 
“Once we faced with a situation when during seismic operation the ice masses unexpected 
arrived from the north, while that was not typical for that year season, and happens extremely 
seldom according to our previous experience. As a result, we could not complete the part of 
operation by end of season and had to correct our working program and postpone it to the 
following ice-free season”.  
 
Maritime vessel availability: 
The support fleet for the West Alfa rig consisted of 15 vessels, including a dedicated ice-
class oil spill response vessel, ice-class anchor handling and support vessels, as well as two 
icebreakers “Kapitan Khlebnikov” and “Taymyr” equipped with spill response and ice 
management capabilities (See Table #10). 
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Table 10. Vessels engaged in the drilling operations at Universitetskaya-1 well in 2014. 
Vessel Ice class Type Additional 
equipment 
Owner Built Flag 
West Alpha rig None Jack-up 
rig 
2 groups of 
blowout 
preventers; 
iceberg warning 
system 
North Atlantic 
Alpha Ltd. 
1986 - Tsu 
Shipyard, Japan 
Panama 
“Kapitan 
Khlebnikov” 
Polar10 Icebreaker Helipad, 2 hangars 
to accept 2 
helicopters 
FESCO - Far 
East Shipping 
Company 
1981 – Wärtsila, 
Helsinki 
shipyard, Finland 
Russia 
“Taymyr” Polar10 Icebreaker Helipad,  
hangar for one 
KA-32 helicopter 
FSUE Atomflot 1989 – Wärtsila, 
Marine Helsinki 
Shipyard, 
Finland; 
Baltic Shipyard  
Russia 
“Balder 
Viking” 
DnV, 
ICE-10, 
+1A1  
AHTS - Viking Supply 
Ships AS 
2000 – Havyard 
Leirvik  Norway  
Sweden 
“Brage 
Viking” 
DnV 
ICE-1A 
Super, 
+1A1 
AHTS FiFi II, Oil.rec. 
NOFO2009,  
120-200 evacuees 
Viking Supply 
Ships AS 
2012 - Astilleros 
Zamakona Pasaia 
– Pasajes, Spain 
Norway 
“Loke Viking” DnV 
ICE-1A, 
+1A1 
AHTS FiFi II, Oil.rec. 
NOFO2009,  
120-200 evacuees 
Viking Supply 
Ships AS 
2010- Astilleros 
Zamakona Pasaia 
– Pasajes, Spain 
Norway 
“Magne 
Viking” 
DnV 
ICE-1A, 
+1A1 
AHTS FiFi II, Oil.rec. 
NOFO2009,  
120-200 evacuees 
Viking Supply 
Ships AS 
2011 – Astilleros 
Zamakona Pasaia 
– Pasajes, Spain 
Denmark 
“SIEM 
Amethyst” 
DnV 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 
AHTS Oil. Rec. 
NOFO2009, 
FiFi, De-ice 
Siem Offshore 
Rederi AS 
2011 - Kleven 
Verft AS 
Norway 
“SIEM Topaz” DnV 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 
AHTS Oil. Rec. 
NOFO2009, 
FiFi II, De-ice, 
300 evacuees 
Siem Offshore 
Rederi AS 
2010 – Kherson 
Shipyard - 
Kherson, Ukraine 
Norway 
“SIEM Pilot” DnV 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 
PSV Oil. Rec., 
FiFi II 
Siem Offshore 
Rederi AS 
2010 - EIDSVIK 
SKIPSBYGGERI 
AS 
Norway 
“REM Server” DnV 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 
PSV Oil. Rec.  Rem Supply AS 2011 - Vard 
Langsten– 
Tomrefjord, 
Norway 
Norway 
“REM 
Supporter” 
DnV 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 
PSV Oil. Rec. Rem Supply AS  
 
2012 – Vard 
Langsten– 
Tomrefjord, 
Norway 
Norway 
“Island 
Crown” 
DnV 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 
OSV Oil.Rec. 
Helipad, 
Medical personnel 
onboard 
Island Offshore 
Group – 
Ulsteinvik, 
Norway 
2013 – Vard 
Brevik – Brevik, 
Norway 
Bahamas 
“Botnica” DnV 
ICE-10 
Multi-
purpose 
icebreaker 
2* 5MW Azipods, 
helipad  
TS Shipping 
Haren – Haren  
EMS, Germany 
1998 – STX 
Finland Rauma – 
Rauma, Finland 
Estonia 
“RN 
Magellan” 
Arc 4 
(ICE-1A) 
Chemical 
tanker 
equipped with 
separate tanks to 
bunker vessels  
RosNefteFlot, 
Russia 
2007 – Ceksan 
Shipyard, Turkey 
Russia 
“Spasatel 
Kavdeykin” 
ICE-1A* Multi-
purpose 
rescue 
vessel 
DYNPOS-2, 
Oil.Rec., 
2 skimmers 
Rosmorrechflot 
- 
2013 – Nevsky 
Shipyard, Russia 
Russia 
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Many types of support vessels were used during the whole process of the drilling operation 
in the Kara Sea 2014: AHTS (anchoring and towing) vessels; passenger vessels; rig supply vessels; 
ice monitoring and defense vessels; oil spill recovery vessels; rescue boats, icebreakers and one 
oil tanker. Each of them had its own particular role in the operation according to Table #11. 
As commented on the variety of the vessels by the interviewee of Russian oil company 
#2:“More kinds of available marine units supporting offshore drilling operations provide 
reliability and flexibility when planning and executing drilling operations in harsh Arctic 
conditions”. 
 
Table 11. Vessels and their roles in the Kara Sea operation: P – primary function; S- secondary function; A – 
possible additional duties; P1 – “Botnica” could be used for transfer of the crew between the rig and “Island 
Crown”. 
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West Alpha 
rig 
None - - - - - - - - - - - - P - 
“Kapitan 
Khlebnikov” 
Polar10 
(LL3) 
- P - - - - - - - - - - - - 
“Taymyr” Polar10 - P - - - - - - - - - - - - 
“Balder 
Viking” 
ICE-10, 
+1A1  
P P A S A - A - - A - A - - 
“Brage 
Viking” 
ICE-1A 
Super, 
+1A1 
P P S S S - A - - S - A - - 
“Loke 
Viking” 
ICE-1A, 
+1A1 P P S S S - 
A - - S - A - - 
“Magne 
Viking” 
ICE-1A, 
+1A1 P P S S S - 
A - - S - A - - 
“SIEM 
Amethyst” 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 S S P P P S 
A - S S - A - - 
“SIEM 
Topaz” 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 S S P P P A 
A - S S - A - - 
“SIEM Pilot” ICE-C, 
+1A1 - - S - A - 
A S - - - P - - 
“REM 
Server” 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 - - A - - - 
A S - - - P - - 
“REM 
Supporter” 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 - - A - - - 
A S - - - P - - 
“Island 
Crown” 
ICE-C, 
+1A1 
- - - - - - P P - - - A - - 
“Botnica” ICE-10 - A P - - - P1 P P P P - - - 
“RN 
Magellan” 
Arc 4 
(ICE-1A) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - P 
“Spasatel 
Kavdeykin” 
ICE-1A*  A S - - P - - - A - - - - 
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The logistics operations required long and complex preparations. For instance, the 
icebreaker “Kapitan Khlebnikov” sailed towards the Kara Sea from the Vladivostok port via the 
Northern Sea Route. It is worth noting that it proceeded to the Pevek port independently, but then 
continued its journey to the drilling site under the escort of the atomic icebreaker Yamal as part of 
the first convoy from East to West81. Its journey took about 1 month from June 20 until July 2082. 
From July 20 to October 8, 2014, “Kapitan Khlebnikov” carried out duties in ice monitoring and 
ice protecting the “West Alpha” rig from ice. “Kapitan Khlebnikov” performed the reverse 
transition from the Kara Sea to the Vladivostol port independently without the atomic icebreaker 
escort. In total, the “Kapitan Khlebnikov” 's journey lasted 134 days, during this period it sailed 
24,066 nautical miles. 
 
Figure 58. “Kapitan Khlebnikov” icebreaker along the Northern Sea Route (Source: Fesco) 
 
The icebreaker “Taymyr” and “Balder Viking” set working their duties at the beginning of 
June long before the drilling operations themselves started. During June-July 2014, ice up to 2.5m 
thick remained in the Kara Sea and Kara Gate. Since the middle of June, both vessels conducted 
ground thrusting to determine the rate of the ice breakup and to confirm if the predetermined 
operational criteria were met. In addition, “Balder Viking” worked in the Kara Gate area to cut 
loose ice from coast, according to the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1. The Kara 
Gate area was emptied from ice within three days July 22-25, 2014. 
                                                 
81 “Yamal” nuclear-powered icebreaker built in 1992 is able to overcome ice up to 2.5-2.9 m thick at an average speed 
of 3 knots. “Kapitan Khlebnikov” polar-class diesel icebreaker built in 1981 is able to overcome ice up to 1.5 m thick. 
“Taymyr” shallow-draft nuclear-powered icebreaker built in 1989 is able to overcome ice up to 1.7 m thick (the 1st 
author’s note). 
82 For more information, see http://newsletter.towingline.com/NewsLetterPage/GetNewsLetter/47!36617/ 
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Figure 59. The Kara Gate area covered by ice and emptied from ice within July 22 and July 25, 2014 
(Source: Viking Supply Ships). 
 
Then the pre-lay operations of anchors was done between July 27 and July 29. 
On July 28, 2014, the West Alpha rig arrived at the staging area south of the Kara Gate and 
in accordance with the strategic configuration of ice defense and management, it was towed to the 
drilling site location in the Kara Sea (See Figure 61). 
The well was actually drilled in open water during the ice-free season in August-September 
drilling period, but few and minor icebergs still expected and tracked through a tested ice 
management program. Thus, both icebreakers participated actively in ice management: one of 
them was on duty in the Kara Strait, and the other constantly examined the sea areas in a certain 
vicinity of the rig. In addition, the ice management program used proven technologies such as 
vessel radar, satellite and infrared imaging, visual observations and aircraft reconnaissance. 
 
Offshore facilities and sea supplies: 
The Universitetskaya-1 well was drilled using the West Alpha semi-submersible drilling 
rig, owned by Norway’s North Atlantic Drilling83. The rig has a deadweight of 30,700 tons, 70 m 
long, 66 m wide, the derrick hangs 108.5 meters over the main deck. It is capable of drilling to a 
depth of up to 7 km. It made the way of over 1900 nautical miles to reach the drilling site in the 
Kara Sea.  
The West Alpha rig underwent additional modernization to enable it to operate in the Arctic 
waters. It was equipped with an advanced iceberg warning system, which tracked potentially 
dangerous icebergs, giving enough time either for support vessels to tow them away, or for the rig 
itself to seal off the well and evacuate to safety. 
                                                 
83 In order to fulfil its existing license obligations, Rosneft signed a long-term agreement in 2014 with the Norwegian 
company North Atlantic Drilling for the use of six offshore drilling rigs in its shelf projects, including its Arctic shelf 
projects, until 2022. To increase access to its drilling fleet, Rosneft also signed a framework agreement in 2014 with 
Seadrill Limited and North Atlantic Drilling Limited on the exchange of assets and investments (the 1st author’s note). 
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Considering the extreme conditions, a special 3 weeks on - 6 weeks off rotating scheme 
was elaborated for the project workers. 
 
Figure 60. The West Alfa drilling rig in the Kara Sea (Source: Livejournal.com) 
 
The West Alpha drilling rig moved from “Westcon Yard” shipyard (Norway) towards the 
Kara Sea since the 20th of July 2014. It was escorted by a coast guard vessel. From the Pechora 
Sea into the Kara Sea through the Strait of the Kara Gate within July 28 and August 03, the rig 
was towed according to the strategic configuration of ice defense and management (See Figure 
61). About 100 servicemen, including ice advisors and other special personnel, for quick release 
of anchor lines were taken onboard the West Alpha.  
 
Figure 61. Ice defense base configuration during the towing of West Alpha to the Kara Sea 
(Source: Viking Supply Ships). 
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As told the interviewee of the Norwegian shipping company #1, four service vessels and 
“Kapitan Khlebnikov” icebreaker were involved in the rig towing and ice defense operation: 
- Towing vessels: “Siem Topaz” and “Siem Amethyst” with (1) Norwegian ice advisor on 
each vessel. 
- Ice defense vessels: “Magne Viking” and “Brage Viking” with (1) Norwegian ice advisor 
on each vessel. 
- Ice defense reconnaissance vessel: “Kapitan Khlebnikov” icebreaker with Russian officers 
and crew. 
- West Alpha: it took on board (1) lead ice advisor, (1) ice advisor, (3) radar/ice observers, 
(1) ice defense operations lead. 
The crew onboard had limited ice arctic experience and the ice advisors had a special 
educational role, as told the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1. 
Figure 61 illustrates the location of the vessels during the West Alpha towing through the 
Kara Gate. 
Because the rig had no ice-strengthening, ice-free water along the towing route and around 
the drilling site was an absolute requirement. The convoy of four vessels and the icebreaker was 
not allowed to enter the narrow Kara Gate strait and then the Kara Sea before ice-free water in a 
radius of 40 nm from the drill site and no potential hazardous ice 10 nm on each side of the planned 
towing route could be documented. Towing speed in the Kara Sea was reduced to maximum 5knots 
from 9knots in the Barents Sea. In addition, a minimum weather window was required for leaving 
the staging area and entering the Kara Sea. It implies that many efforts had to be done in the field 
of ice reconnaissance and ice management.  
As told the interviewee of the Norwegian shipping company #1, the following factors 
affected ice defense configuration: 
- Natural conditions: wind, waves, rain, fog, icing; 
- Radar, IR; 
- Ice reports, overflight, satellite images, weather forecast; 
- Tow speed; 
- The Kara Gate’s peculiarities: narrower formation, approximately 3nm between ice 
defense vessels. 
 
On August 06, 2014, the rig was ready to drill. 
The West Alfa was equipped with two groups of blowout preventers and an independent 
submarine locking device, which, in case of minor risks would seal the well. It was held at the 
drilling site by an anchoring positioning system, consisting of eight anchors. This guaranteed an 
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elevate rig stability. Most of the rig was out of the reach of the waves, which did not impede the 
rig’s operations. 
Sharing his experience, the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1 told: 
“The most important experience was how to operate in a very short operating window, 
trying to identify when the ice melts and when the ice freezes again. It was a crucial learning from 
the operation to identify when is the earliest point of time you can start and when is the latest point 
of time you have to leave the area. That was a crucial learning from the drilling campaign of 
2014”. 
The West Alfa left Russia for Norway on October 8, 2014, following the completion of the 
Kara Sea campaign. The ice was not far behind, according to the interviewee of Norwegian 
shipping company #1. 
As the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1 commented on the operations for 
towing of the rig and ice defensing in the Kara Sea: 
“Good planning is the key! In order to handle the challenges, all parties involved have to 
be aware of the hazards and of what is required to mitigate the risks. A small thing can become a 
big problem in the remote Arctic. Well prepared scope includes defining the weak links, developing 
manuals of environmental issues description, using vessels and equipment suitable to the 
particular area, training the personnel”. 
In addition, the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1 stressed how much 
complicate the logistics preparation and the logistics in practice were during the whole drilling 
campaign of 2014 and added: 
“The ice defense and reconnaissance implied a huge operation where we successfully 
provided a great service. However, the logistics was maybe where we did not actually provide the 
best service. It was a lot of failing and learning during those operations. The logistics could be 
more efficient what we plan to improve in the net campaign in 2019”. 
 
Aviation availability: 
In addition to the vessels involved, an ice reconnaissance airplane were hired to fly on daily 
basis (or as often as needed) over the drill site and potential ice infested waters nearby. The airplane 
was equipped with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) for ice detection under al weather conditions. 
The airplane was a fixed-wing Antonov-26 operated in a cooperation between Blom and AARI 
(Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, St. Petersburg). 
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Helicopters could have been helpful for ice reconnaissance and personnel transfer, but they 
were excluded on a safety evaluation and Russian legal issues84. In spite of this, a drone was tested 
from the “Kapitan Khlebnikov” icebreaker for reconnaissance and ice drift measurements. 
As told the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“We were not allowed to use helicopter services during the drilling operations in 2014. I 
guess because of the vicinity of Russian military bases on Novaya Zemlya. There was a lot of 
submarine traffic in 2014 in the Kara Sea and some other legal issues. Even Head of Rosneft, Igor 
Sechin, used a helicopter just once from Rogachevo settlement, located on Novaya Zemlya. In his 
second arrival in September 2014, he spent two days sailing on a Russian research ship to the 
drilling rig to announce about the new unveiled oil deposit during a teleconference with President 
Putin. Otherwise, in case of the crew transportation and shift, it was not possible to use helicopters 
because the distance was too far.” 
 
Onshore operations and facilities: 
The onshore facilities included the logistics supply base in Murmansk, the shore operation 
center in Moscow and infield operations command center on rig in the Kara Sea85.  
 
Figure 62. The locations of the offshore and onshore logistics base and operational 
center(Source: Viking Ice Consultancy) 
 
                                                 
84 It is worth noting that in fact helicopter services are widely used in the Kara Sea. For example, Gazprom used Ka-
32 helicopter owned by “UTair – Helicopter services” in August, 2017 to explore a well at the Leningradskaya gas 
condensate field in the Kara Sea. “Utair-Helicopter services” has performed employee shift and cargo transport works 
for Rosneft after it won a tender for helicopter operations in July 2015. “UTair - Helicopter Services” has significant 
experience of performing offshore flights and providing air support for vessels in the Arctic oil and gas projects in 
Sakhalin, in the Kara Sea and Pechora Sea. Available on https://www.aex.ru/news/2017/8/1/173186/ and 
https://heli.utair.ru/en/o-kompanii/  
85 The infield operations command center on the rig was an offshore coordination center, but its activity closely related 
to the shore operation center located in Moscow. Thus, we describe it in sub-Section of Onshore operations and 
facilities (the 1st author’s note).  
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The logistics supply base in Murmansk was established in 2014 by “Sakhalin-Shelf-
Service”, LLC to support specifically the construction of exploration Universitetskaya-1 well in 
the Kara Sea. It was made total modernization of existing port facilities, including repairing of 
existing warehouse, building of a new warehouse, preparation of open storage areas, installation 
of mud and bulk plants. Besides, border checkpoint was organized in accordance with the norms 
and requirements of Russian Law. New cargo lifting equipment was purchased to meet the most 
contemporary safety requirements. The number of personnel was up to 100 people. 
 
Facilities: - Offices  200 м2 
 - Covered warehouses  2500 м2. 
 - Open storage areas  45000 м2.   
 - Berth 220 m2 
Main equipment: -  Mobile cranes, capacity  90 and 160 tons. 
 - Forklifts, capacity 2,5-16 tons. 
 - Port crane, capacity 32 tons 
 - Telescopic loader, capacity 4 tons 
 - Trucks, capacity 20 tons 
 
The distance was over 1,600 km between the Murmansk supply base and the drilling site 
location in the Kara Sea. It required 3.5 days for the vessel sailing. Therefore, it took one week for 
the vessel to go forth and back to the Murmansk port to change the crew. 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“Actually, the distance between the supply base and the drilling location, as well as the 
complexity to predict changing ice conditions determined the number of vessels and their versatile 
types”. 
 
The Shore Operation Center (S-O-C) was organized in Moscow to provide appropriate 
supply operation management and allocate all the resources efficiently.    
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“The shore operation center was like a brain storming area where ice advisors, ice 
analysts and meteorologists, including people from AARI, StormGeo, both oil companies, KSAT 
and others, worked together and prepared data about satellite imagery, aerial ice reconnaissance 
and weather forecasts. Then they distributed the data to the system “COPD – Common operational 
picture display in order to make everyone involved in the drilling campaign of 2014 be aware of 
the current situation: the weather and ice conditions, time data, the position of vessels and so on”.  
 
Figure 63 illustrates the main principles of the shore operation center’s activities. 
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Figure 63. Shore operation center in Moscow for the drilling campaign of 2014 (Source: vikingsupplyships) 
 
A special purpose information and communication system “COPD – Common operational 
picture display” was designed to share information, obtained in the shore operation center, between 
all project partners and make the operations safe and more effective (See Figure 64). 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1:  
“The COPD – Common operational picture display made everyone involved in the drilling 
campaign of 2014 –people on the rig, from oil companies, crews on board, suppliers, vessel 
operators, staff from the shore and infield operation centers - be aware of the current situation: 
the weather and ice conditions, time data, the position of vessels and so on. Therefore, everyone 
could see the same operational picture in real time getting the same information and messages 
integrated in the single system”. 
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Figure 64. Communication system in the COPD – Common operation picture display 
(Source: Marine Technologies). 
 
The infield operations command center was organized on the “West Alpha” rig in the Kara 
Sea to coordinate the operations in the field and ice defense activity in the different zones around 
the rig. 
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“The infield shore operation center included mainly ice advisors and meteorologists who 
monitored and determined if the ice was potentially hazardous for the vessels and rig or not. Then 
they reported and distributed data to the center in Moscow. The rig was equipped by special radars 
for ice observation”.  
 
3.2.2.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response 
In order to provide emergency preparedness for the operations in the Kara Sea, Rosneft 
established in 2012 a permanent Arctic base of rescue personnel and divers in Amderma, a village 
on the Kara Sea coast86. The initial task of the base is to support Rosneft’s ongoing exploration 
activities in the Kara Sea. It includes a team of divers and a MI-8 helicopter87. Then the Amderma 
unit became a part of the federal rescue network. The divers came from a special operations team 
                                                 
86 Amderma is located to the east of the Kara Gate on the coast of the Kara Sea. It has about 580 inhabitants now. In 
the late 1980s, about 5,000 people lived here. Amderma has an airport with several flights per week to Arkhangelsk 
(the 1st author’s note). 
87 Available on https://www.marinelink.com/news/maritime/kara-sea 
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under the Arkhangelsk Regional Rescue Service, the only of its kind in Northwest Russia. All of 
the men have been part of a four-year special training program based on experiences from Norway, 
Sweden, Germany and the United States. In addition to the provision of emergency and rescue 
services, the base personnel makes regular ice monitoring missions to the areas of the seismic 
studies. 
 
Figure 65. Location of Amderma village on the map 
(Source: http://ultima0thule.blogspot.no/2016/04/naryan-mar-russian-arctic-town-in.html) 
 
In case of medical emergency, no resources are available along the coasts of the Kara Sea 
and Novaya Zemlya. The closest hospital facilities are in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk that take 
approximately 3,5 days of sailing to be reached. In order to minimize the medical risks, just a few 
stand-by vessels had a dedicated hospital function like “Botnica” and “Island Crown” (See Table 
#11). In addition, paramedic trained officers were onboard most vessels.  
The emergency preparedness and oil spill response was elaborated by professional 
emergency rescue team “ECOSPAS” and included the following activities: 
- ice reconnaissance and monitoring of ice conditions in the area of the drilling operations; 
- two vessels on duty near the West Alpha rig; 
- oil spill prevention exercises for the personnel of Rosneft and ExxonMobil; 
- providing support and protection to the West Alpha rig; 
- the towing of the West Alpha rig as a safe support on its way to the Kara sea from the 
Pechora Sea and back; 
- ensuring safety during the crew’s shift from the vessel to the West Alpha rig and 
otherwise. 
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The oil spill prevention plan included vessels, aircrafts, data collection by satellites and 
drones. 
As told the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“It was the first experience when we tested the drone support. We used initially 6 drones, 
but then one crashed. It was useful because of low temperatures, poor JPS signals and 
magnetism”. 
The main resource in case of an oil spill was a dedicated response vessel “Spasatel 
Kavdeykin”, which was located close to the West Alpha rig during the whole operation. In 
addition, just two of the AHTS vessels “Siem Amethyst” and “Siem Topaz” had onboard special 
equipment and trained operators for oil spill response (See Table #11).  In case of a major spill, 
the closest base and depot for oil spill resources is located in Arkhangelsk, approximately 900nm 
away.  
As the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1 shared his experience: 
“Longer planning phase is needed to avoid expensive emergency scheduling. It’s difficult 
also to plan satellite acquisition for the vessels sailing. All emergency systems should be tested in 
advance like SAR-imagery, specifically on board. We experienced how much this is important to 
have a back-up plan with additional access to, for example, satellite communication, not to make 
the vessels wait for the data of the real ice conditions. Without this info we could wait for extra 7-
10 days for icebreaker assistance.  For SAR and oil spill response operations, there is a challenge 
to predict exact vessel speed for tasking due to changing ice conditions, weather conditions that 
may result in operational delay”.     
There is no effective way of cleaning up an oil spill if it spreads under ice. Therefore, as an 
example Norway is not allowing oil drilling in icy waters. According to Greenpeace, 
Karmorneftegaz conducted the drilling operation in the Kara Sea where regulations do not require 
a relief rig that could be crucial stop a spill before it reaches the ice. 
“The operation is the most extreme and remote drilling ever. If there is a spill, the effect 
might be catastrophic” – according to the Greenpeace’s experts88. 
An ice advisor of Norwegian shipping company #1 shared his opinion on emergency 
preparedness during the drilling operation of 2014 in the ice conditions: 
“I think we were not fully prepared to meet any challenges. We took just the best equipment 
and well-experienced trained people we had. However, in case of any possible oil spill there have 
not been a good efficient solution for today how to treat an oil spill in ice. You can burn it off, but 
                                                 
88 Available on: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/sweden/Global/sweden/Arktis/Dokument/Exxon%20drilling%20plans%20in%20Russia
_Brief.pdf 
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there is no vessel today that you can collect oil in ice, especially in ice constant drift when there 
is a lot of ice mixed with oil. When you start any operations in an area where the ice is and where 
the ice is constantly moving, you have to avoid anything going wrong by using vessels with high 
ice class and towing equipment”.   
This opinion can be confirmed by the practical long-term impacts of oil spills, which may 
persist for decades. For instance, lingering oil from the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince 
William Sound, Alaska has persisted far beyond initial forecasts. In 2005, it was discovered that 
oil only slightly weathered under beaches across the spill impact area. The lingering oil remains 
toxic and biologically available. The lingering effects of oil spills have also been documented in 
Cape Cod, Massachusetts, where recent studies found that oil remains in the sediment layer of 
some coastal marshes from a 1969 oil spill (WWF report, 2007). 
 
 
 
3.2.3. Case 7. Dolginskoye field development project (the Pechora Sea) 
3.2.3.1. Field location and natural conditions 
General info and location: 
The Dolginskoye oil field discovered in 1999 is located in the middle of the Pechora Sea, 
120km south of the Novaya Zemlya archipelago and 110km north of the mainland. The license for 
oil exploration and production at this field was given to Gazprom in 2005.  
The water depth in the field location varies from 20-25 m in South-East part to 40-45 m in 
North-West part. At the drilling site, the sea is approximately 35-55m deep. 2D seismic work has 
been carried out on more than 11,000 linear kilometers, and 3D seismic on 1,600 km2. Four 
exploratory wells have already been drilled: three at North Dolginskoye and one at South 
Dolginskoye. Recoverable reserves are estimated to be in excess of 235 million tons of oil 
equivalent (1.7 billion barrels). It is the largest among discovered oil fields in the Pechora Sea. 
Production is expected to start in 2020, with peak levels of 4.8 million tons of oil per year to be 
achieved by 2026. The operator is Gazpromneft-Sakhalin, a subsidiary of Gazprom Neft. 
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Figure 66. The location of the Dolginskoye oil field in the Pechora Sea (Source: GazpromNeft-Sakhalin). 
 
In August 2014, Gazpromneft-Sakhalin carried out the fourth drilling operations of an 
exploratory well (to a depth of 3,500 meters) in the northern part of the Dolginskoye field, located 
90 km offshore. The completion of geophysical and hydrodynamic testing allowed clarifying the 
underlying structure of the field and the development of a program for its further investigation. 
This is the first time that such a major volume of work has been completed at a well during this 
region’s short ice-free season. In November 2014, the well was abandoned, all equipment 
dismantled, and the empty wellhead hermetically sealed to ensure complete isolation from the 
external environment.  
 
 
Figure 67 .  The Dolginskoye field’s location in the Pechora Sea (Source: sdelanounas.ru) 
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Natural conditions: 
The length of the Pechora Sea is about 300 km from West to East and 180 km from North 
to South having the surface area of approximately 81 000 km2 and the overall water volume of 
4380 km3. The Sea is shallow since its average water depth is around 6 m, but it gradually increases 
toward the North reaching the maximum depth of 210 m. 
The typical environment of the Pechora Sea taken from the first source is given in Table 
#12.  
 
Table 12. Typical environmental conditions of the Pechora Sea (Gudmestad et. al., 1999). 
Parameters: Pechora sea conditions  
Maximum wind gust, m/s  41 m/s 
Minimum air temperature, °C  -48  
Sign. wave height, m  6,2 (at 45 m water depth)  
Currents velocity, m/s  1  
Freezing up (average)  Nov. (Oct.) – Eastern part of the Sea  
Clearing (average)  June  
Average open water, days  110  
Multi-year ice, %  -  
Maximum level ice thickness, m  1,3  
Rafted ice thickness, m  2,6 (twice level ice thickness)  
First-year ridge thickness, m  12-18  
Multi-year ridge thickness, m  -  
 
An air temperature is below 0 °C for 230 days per year. Air temperature at the Dolginskoye 
field varies from -46 °C in January to +26 °C in July-August. During the year the monthly average 
air temperature fluctuates from -17,4 °C in February to +6,5 °C in July, while the annual average 
value is about -5,1 °C. 
In the summer season, a mean value of wind speed is about 6 m/s. During a storm, in the 
same season the speed can reach 20 m/s with duration of 6 hours in average and 36 hours at 
maximum. Even 30 m/s is possible with the maximum duration of 6 hours. 
In the region of the Dolginskoye field average parameters of 10-100 year wave in the region 
are the following (Novikov, 2014): 
- wave height – 3,2-4,7 m; 
- wave length – 110-154 m; 
- wave period – 8,6-10,5 s. 
 
The sea is free of ice during about 110 days per year, but in the region of the field, the ice-
free period can vary from 3 to 7 month (Novikov, 2014). Ice in the sea mainly has local origin, 
rarely accompanied with ice coming from the Kara Sea because of ice exchange between the seas. 
The thickness of level ice starts increasing in winter following the period of ice extension and 
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reaches the maximum value, which is approximately 1.3 m in spring or beginning of summer. The 
extreme thickness is about 1.6 m. The thickness of rafted ice in the sea can be up to 2.5-3 m thick. 
In February, the sea surface coverage by hummocks can reach 60 to 80%, in April the hummocks 
can cover entire sea surface (Gudmestad, 1999 
 
The oil and gas field development is a big challenge due to severe environment. Polar lows, 
strong winds, waves and currents accompanied with ice drift, ridges and icebergs can create huge 
loads on structures, which are aimed to develop the fields. Moreover, the sea depth variations lead 
to different structure design. For instance, an application of Gravity Based Structures in the Arctic 
is limited by approximately 100 meters depth. While floating or subsea units have much higher 
limits, it is impossible to install them in shallow water due to inefficient operability and higher 
costs comparing to gravity based structures. 
 
 
3.2.3.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure and challenges 
For the drilling operations at the Dolginskoye field in 2014, the GSP Saturn jack-up rig 
was used. The GSP Saturn was transported to the location by a special vessel “Hua Hai Long” in 
the OSV escort in the mid-June to ensure the utmost safety. Throughout the transportation from 
Vlissingen in the Netherlands to the platform’s destination, a rescue vessel was on hand round the 
clock to supervise and respond immediately to any potential incidents. After the drilling operations 
were finished, the rig was towed to the port of Murmansk in November 2014. 
The drilling operations were served by four vessels89, presented in Table #13. Along with 
the four OSVs chartered for ancillary work, they were equipped with a DP-2 dynamic positioning 
system that allowed it to maintain a fixed position for loading in extreme weather conditions. The 
field’s support fleet was equipped to all international naval safety standards.                                                     
The border checkpoint at Varandey airport was extended to allow flights to the 
Dolginskoye field. Until the drilling operations in 2014, the airport was only open for flights to 
the Prirazlomnoye platform90. 
 
                                                 
89 For more information, see http://pandia.ru/text/78/208/68042.php 
90 For more information, see https://sdelanounas.ru/blogs/51051 
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Figure 68.  The GSP Saturn rig (Source: GazpromNeft-Sakhalin). 
 
The platform was served by three AHTS vessels and one rescue vessel (See Table #13). 
 
Table 13. Vessels engaged in drilling operations at Dolginskoye field in 2014. 
Vessel Ice class Characteristics Additional 
equipment 
Owner Built Flag 
“Strilborg” DNV 
+1A1, 
ICE-C 
AHTS  Oil.rec. NOFO 
2009, DYNPOS 
AUTR, FiFi I & 
II, 300 survivors 
Simon Møkster 
Rederi AS 
1998 – 
Builders 
Aukra Yard 
Norway 
Norway 
“Stril 
Challenger” 
100A1,  
1E 
AHTS Oil. Rec., 
NOFO2005, 
FiFi I, First-aid 
assistance,  
280 survivors 
Stril Offshore 
AS; 
c/o Simon 
Møkster 
Shipping AS 
2009 - 
Havyard 
Leirvik AS 
Norway 
“Stril 
Commander” 
100A1,  
1E 
AHTS Oil. Rec., 
NOFO2005, 
FiFi I, First-aid 
assistance,  
280 survivors 
Stril Offshore 
AS; 
c/o Simon 
Møkster 
Shipping AS 
2009 – 
Havyard 
Leirvik AS 
Norway 
“Spasatel 
Karev” 
RMRS Arc5  
(ICE-1А*) 
Multipurpose 
rescue vessel - 
for oil spill 
response 
operations 
DYNPOS-2, 
Oil.Rec., 
2skimmers,  
Marine Rescue 
Service of 
Rosmorrechflot – 
MRS, Murmansk, 
Russia 
2010 – 
Nevsky 
Shipyard, 
St.Petersburg 
Russian 
 
According to the interviewee of Russian oil company #3, the company faced a number of 
logistics challenges when exploring the Dolginskoye field: 
- “In addition to the already familiar claims to severe climatic conditions, we experienced 
the rigidity of the project schedule how it is difficult to organize the full-fledged operations 
in a very short operating window until ice. We had only four months to deliver the drilling 
platform to the field site, install it, drill an exploration well, test it and then conserve it 
before the first ice comes. This considerably increases the cost of exploration”. 
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- “Another logistics challenge we experienced was the need to use remote support 
infrastructure in Murmansk port located more than 750 km from the drilling well because 
the coastal service infrastructure in Varandey and Naryan-Mar, close to the work sites, 
was at the development stage. We found that supply market is quite undeveloped that 
required more our efforts to arrange the services of suppliers in time”. 
 
 
Figure 69. The logistics scheme of drilling operations at Dolginskoye field, including the distances to the main 
infrastructure sites (Source: GazpromNeft-Sakhalin). 
 
 
After completing the drilling operations at the Dolginskoye field, jack-up rig GSP Saturn 
was towed to Murmansk. Under its way to Murmansk, the rig was damaged in stormy weather by 
waves in the Pechora Sea. Reportedly GSP Saturn lost a lifeboat, the helicopter pad was damaged. 
It was decided to evacuate all the rig’s personnel: 21 people went on board rescue vessel “Spasatel 
Karev”, 25 persons went on board AHTS “Strilborg”. The rig was towed by AHTS “Stril 
Challenger” and AHTS “Stril Commander”, escorted by AHTS “Strilborg” and rescue vessel 
“Spasatel Karev”91. 
 
                                                 
91 For more information, see https://www.fleetmon.com/maritime-news/2014/5369/jack-rig-gsp-saturn-damaged-
storm-pechora-sea-russ/ 
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3.2.3.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response 
The rescue vessel “Spasatel Karev” remained on duty 24 hours a day while the rig was in 
operation at the field. 
One of the measures to ensure that emergency preparedness is obligatory exercises for 
containment and response of oil and oil products spills during building of exploratory well N 3-
SD of the Dolginskoye oil field. Oil spill response exercises were conducted July 17-18, 2014 by 
Russian Marine Emergency Rescue Service. 
The oil spill response team was membered among others by multipurpose rescue vessel 
“Spasatel Karev”, AHTS “Stril Commander”, the “GSP Saturn” rig, MRCC Murmansk, 
Gazpromneft-Sakhalin LLC, one high-speed work boat, one boat-boner and about 80 crew 
members.  
 
Figure 70. The oil spill response exercises during the drilling operations at the Dolginskoye field in 2014 
(Source: Gosmorspassluzhba). 
 
 The exercises had the following purposes: 
 1. Cooperation organization training of SMPCSA Baltic Branch forces and facilities, 
operational and duty watch of Gazpromneft-Sakhalin LLC and SEFDR "GSP Saturn". 
2. Check of emergency readiness level of forces and facilities during oil and oil products 
spills response. 
3. Actions practicing for containment and response of oil and oil products spills92. 
                                                 
92 Available on http://www.nssz.ru/en/novosti/2014/the-vessel-spasatel-karev-took-part-in-trainings-of-the-pechora-
sea-shelf.html 
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Figure 71. Participation of “Spasatel Karev” in oil spill response training in 2014 
(Source: Marine Engineering Bureau). 
 
 
 
3.2.4. Case 8. Sakhalin-1 oil and gas project. 
3.2.4.1. Field location and natural conditions 
General info and location: 
The Sakhalin-1 project includes three offshore oil and gas fields: Chayvo, Odoptu, and 
Arkutun-Dagi, which underlie the sea bed of the Sea of Okhotsk off the northeastern coast of 
Sakhalin Island in the Russian Far East. The location of this project is not the Arctic region. This 
is the so-called sub-Arctic, which is characterized with hurricanes, prolonged blizzards, severe 
storms, typhoons and harsh ice conditions. This location in the Sea of Okhotsk experiences more 
dynamic ice conditions than many offshore areas north of the Arctic Circle. These factors greatly 
hinder offshore supply logistics and drilling operations, as well as pose serious threats for oil 
production facilities. We take this case for consideration in this report because of harsh 
environmental conditions of the location of the Sakhalin-1 Project that makes it interesting to 
illustrate the challenges and experience of oil and gas companies when developing these three oil 
and gas fields. This experience has a special meaning to be used for the development of the Arctic 
offshore field projects.    
Sakhalin-1 is one of the largest oil and gas projects in Russia with direct foreign investment, 
implemented by an international consortium. The Consortium consists of the following 
representatives: 
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- Exxon Neftegas Limited, a subsidiary of American ExxonMobil (30%) – the project 
operator; 
- Consortium SODECO (Japan) – 30%; 
- Rosneft, JSC (Russia) acting via its affiliates: RN-Astra (Russia) – 8,5% and 
Sakhalinmorneftegaz-Shelf (Russia) – 11,5%; 
- ONGC Videsh Ltd. (India) – 20%. 
 
Figure 72. The Sakhalin-1 project location (Source: Exxon Neftegas) 
 
Potential recoverable resources of the fields are estimated at 307 million tonnes (2.3 billion 
barrels) of oil and 485 billion cubic meters (17.1 trillion cubic feet) of natural gas. 
The consortium works under a PSA (see Section 2.4.4). It means that the Sakhalin-1 project 
requires that the major amount of materials and resources be of Russian origin. Notably, more than 
80% of the Sakhalin-1 project drilling rig operators are Russian nationals and project contract 
awards to Russian companies have reached approximately $3.8billion93. 
 
Each of three oil and gas fields has been developed in stages. 
The Chayvo mainly gas field (discovered in 1979): 
It was the first field to be exploited in the Sakhalin-1 project. 
                                                 
93 For more information, see http://www.offshore-technology.com/features/feature1089/ 
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The Chayvo field was the first field to be exploited in the Sakhalin-1 project. It was initially 
developed using both onshore “Yastreb” and offshore “Orlan” drilling facilities. While the Orlan 
platform has been in continuous operation there, the Yastreb drilling rig was dismantled and 
moved to the Odoptu field in July 2008. After successfully completing the Odoptu First Stage 
Production drilling program in February 2011, the Yastreb is currently being relocated back to 
Chayvo to resume development of the field. 
 
The Odoptu oil and gas field (discovered in 1977): 
The Odoptu field is located 70 km north of Chayvo and is very much different, which 
affected the drilling process. Even the Yastreb drilling rig temporarily relocated to a new site had 
to be modernized. The first well drilling at Odoptu started in 2009. Drilling operations at this 
location were completed over the next two years with 9 wells drilled and several world records 
set. Upon completion of drilling operations at Odoptu, the Yastreb drilling rig was 
decommissioned and returned back to Chayvo. In addition, a new drilling rig similar to Yastreb 
has been shipped to site and is expected to commence operations there in the nearest future. 
 
The Arkutun-Dagi oil and gas field (discovered in 1989):  
Arkutun-Dagi is the third and final field developed as part of the larger Sakhalin-1 project. 
Discovered in 1989, the Arkutun-Dagi oil and gas field is located 25km offshore Sakhalin Island 
in the sea of Okhotsk, approximately 25km east of the Chayvo field and 18km north-east of the 
Orlan platform. The field is located at water depths ranging from 15m to 40m, and developed in 
phases starting from the northern section. The Arkutun-Dagi field is being developed using an ice-
resistant fixed platform named “Berkut”. 
Production from the Arkutun-Dagi field’s first well started in January 2015. It is expected 
to increase to a peak of 85,000 barrels of oil a day by 2019. The field will increase the annual 
production capacity of Sakhalin-1 by 32.5 million barrels (4.5 million tonnes) of oil. The total 
annual production from Sakhalin-1 project is estimated to exceed ten million tonnes by 2018. 
 
Natural conditions: 
The Sea of Okhotsk is subject to dangerous storm winds, severe waves, icing of vessels, 
intense snowfalls and poor visibility. The average annual extreme low ranges between -32°C and 
-35°C. Ice sheets up to 1.5m thick move at speeds of 1-2 knots. 
Offshore structures can be exposed to icing from October through to December, for around 
187 days. During the ice-free period, wave heights range between 1-3m, but can reach as high as 
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19m during 100-year storm conditions. Strong northeast and southeast winds cause a great amount 
of sea agitation in autumn and winter. 
 
3.2.4.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure 
Offshore facilities and sea supplies: 
“Orlan” offshore platform:  
The Orlan platform is a gravity base structure (GBS) set in around 14 m of water in the 
south-west sector of the Chayvo field, installed in July 2005. It assists the Yastreb onshore drilling 
rig.  This platform is able to withdraw ice, sea waves and large subsoil oscillations. It was designed 
for year-round exploration drilling in arctic waters at depths up to 15m. 
The “Orlan” characteristics: 
- platform weight =  ab. 70,000 tonnes; 
- length = 96 m 
- width = 89.9 m 
- total base height = 30 m 
- seismicity = up to 8 points;  
- wave height = up to 13 m; 
- ice and hummocks in height = up to 6 m; 
- number of wells = 20 
- maximum oil production = 23 tons per day 
On the platform, about 100 people work for a month. The shift is 28 days. Work watch is 
12/12 hours. 
In order to maximize the drilling space on the “Orlan” platform, minimal integral 
processing facilities are included offshore. The well stream is exported to the onshore processing 
facility where it co-mingles with the Chayvo stream. The stabilized crude oil is shipped to the 
newly-constructed DeKastri terminal in the Khabarovsk Region terminal for export, while the 
natural gas is supplied to the Russian Far East or injected back into Chayvo for reservoir support. 
This was based on a 140-mile (225km) pipeline to the Chayvo onshore processing facility. 
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Figure 73. The “Orlan” platform in the Sea of Okhotsk, “Vitus Bering” supply vessel and “Kigoriak” anchor-
handling vessel (Source: https://russos.livejournal.com/1201698.html) 
 
“Berkut” offshore platform: 
“Berkut” is an ice-resistant fixed platform at the Arkutun-Dagi field, installed in 2012. that 
is the largest oil and gas production platform in Russia. The platform is placed on top of a gravity-
based structure (GBS) fixed to the seabed at a depth of 35m. A total of 45 wells, including 28 oil 
producing wells, 16 water injection wells and a cutting re-injection well, was drilled at Arkutun-
Dagi.  
Production from the Berkut platform commenced in January 2015. Oil produced from the 
field is transferred to the existing Chayvo onshore processing facility (OPF) via an approximately 
25km-long well-stream flowline and further to the De-Kastri export terminal, while natural gas is 
sold domestically.  
The “Berkut” platform is designed to withstand extreme temperatures of up to -44°C, 
waves up to 18m-high and pressure of 2m-thick ice. The platform is 105m long, 60m wide and 
144m high. Its topside is equipped with a drilling rig, processing facilities, living quarters, a 
helipad and ancillary facilities. The topside weighs 42,000t, while the total weight of the platform 
exceeds 200,000t. The drilling rig has a top drive of 142kN/m and a lifting capacity of 1,150t.  
More than 4,000 people were involved during construction of the “Berkut” platform. 
Because of this, in the beginning of 2014, Sea Trucks Group’s “Jascon 34”, a pipelay construction 
vessel (built in 2010, flag: Gibraltar; accommodation complement 335 prs.), provided additional 
accommodation support for personnel of “Berkut” platform and lifting services. The capacity of 
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the “Jascon 34” vessel was increased with modular accommodation units to accommodate up to 
595 people on board94. 
 
Figure 74. Jascon 34 vessel near “Berkut” platform (Source: offshoreenergytoday.com) 
 
 
Figure 75. Sakhalin-1 project facilities (Source: Sakhalin-1.ru) 
 
Maritime vessel availability: 
Three of SCF Group’s multi-purpose ice-breaking supply vessels – “Vitus Bering”, 
“Aleksey Chirikov” and “SCF Sakhalin” service the drilling platforms “Orlan” (Chayvo field) and 
“Berkut” (Arkutun-Dagi field). All of these vessels work under long-term contracts with the 
project operator. These icebreaking platform supply and stand-by vessels assist to meet the 
demanding conditions, including the shallow depth of water around the platform. They are 
                                                 
94 For more information, see https://www.marinelink.com/news/contract-brings-trucks361051 
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designed to operate in temperatures down to -400 C and to cope with solid ice 1.5m thick and ice 
ridges of up to 20m deep. The vessels are fitted with two Azipod propulsion units and uses the 
double-acting concept developed by Aker arctic technology (See Table #14). 
“Kigoriak” icebreaker is constantly near the “Orlan” platform and responsible for 
emergency preparedness.  
 
Figure 76. “Kigoriak” icebreaker (Source: https://russos.livejournal.com/1201698.html) 
 
In addition, the icebreakers – “Admiral Makarov", "Krasin" and "Kapitan Khlebnikov" 
carry out the icebreaker escort of the OSVs involved the during the winter navigation. 
In 2005, “Vengery” (former “Crowley Alliance”) vessel, owned and operated by Crowley 
Sakhalin LLC, served the “Orlan” platform. The vessel – AHTS, Ice Class 1A Super. It provided 
an ice strengthened anchor handling tug, ocean towing and general supply duties for the project. 
In order to provide this service on a long-term basis, the vessel was flagged under the Russian 
Federation and crewed by Russian Nationals. “Crowley Alliance” vessel had the hull strength and 
power to break first year ice up to 1m (39in) thick, and during the most severe part of the Sakhalin 
winters followed an icebreaker to the Orlan location. 
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Table 14. Vessels serve “Berkut” and “Orlan” platforms in the Sakhalin-1 project. 
Vessel Ice class Characteristics Additional 
equipment 
Owner Built Flag 
“Kigoriak” Ice class 3 Anchor 
handling 
vessel; Gross 
tonnage 3898 
tons 
Oil.rec., FiFi FEMCO 
Management – 
Yuzhno 
Sakhalinsk 
1979 – Saint 
John 
Shipbuilding 
(Canada) 
Russia 
“SCF 
Sakhalin” 
ICE-10 
Icebreaker 
Platform 
supply and 
stand-by 
vessel 
Diesel-electric 
2 × ABB Azipod 
VI1600, KaMeWa 
Ulstein TT2200 
bow thrusters, 
winterized, 
150 evacuees, oil 
spill response gear, 
an arctic oil 
skimmer, 200m of 
oil boom, a 
reception tank for 
oily water 
SCF Sakhalin 
Vessels Limited 
(Sovcomflot) 
2005 - Aker 
Finnyards, 
Helsinki, 
Finland 
Russia 
“Vitus 
Bering” 
Icebreaker6 Platform 
supply and 
stand-by 
vessel 
Two ABB Azipod 
VI1600 units; two 
bow thrusters, 
winterized, 195 
evacuees 
Owner: Dafne 
Line Shipping; 
Operator: 
Sovcomflot 
2012 – Arctech 
Helsinki 
Shipyard, 
Helsinki, 
Finland 
Russia 
“Aleksey 
Chirikov” 
Icebreaker6 Platform 
supply and 
stand-by 
vessel 
Two ABB Azipod 
VI1600 units; two 
bow thrusters, 
winterized, 195 
evacuees 
Sovcomflot 2012 – Arctech 
Helsinki 
Shipyard, 
Helsinki, 
Finland 
Russia 
“Tor 
Viking” 
Icebreaker6, 
DNV ICE-
10 
AHTS Winterized Viking Supply 
Ships  
2000 - Havyard 
Leirvik AS 
Sweden/ 
Russia 
“Admiral 
Makarov” 
ICE-1B 
(LL2) 
Icebreaker Helipad and hangar FESCO Far 
East shipping 
company 
1975 - Helsinki 
New Shipyard, 
Helsinki, 
Finland 
Russia 
“Krasin” ICE-1B, 
LL2 
Icebreaker Helipad and hangar FESCO Far 
East shipping 
company 
1976 – Wärtsilä 
Helsinki 
Shipyard, 
Helsinki, 
Finland 
Russia 
“Kapitan 
Khlebnikov” 
Polar10 Icebreaker Helipad, hangar for 
one KA-32 
helicopter 
FESCO Far 
East shipping 
company 
1981 – Wärtsilä 
Helsinki 
shipyard, 
Finland 
Russia 
“Vengery” 
– served 
“Orlan” 
platform 
only in 
2005-2006 
1A Super AHTS Decommissioned 
currently 
FEMCO 
Management 
1983 - Hyundai 
Heavy 
Industries, 
Ulsan, Korea 
Russia 
 
 
Oil is transported from the De-Kastri oil loading terminal, which includes two 100,000 
cubic meters (650,000 barrel) capacity storage tanks to hold the Sakhalin-1 crude oil prior to tanker 
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transfer and shipment. Then the crude is transported via a sub-sea loading line to the single point 
mooring facility, which is located 5.7 kilometers east of the Klykov Peninsula in Chikhacheva 
Bay. Tanker loading operations began at De-Kastri in September 2006. By September 2016, 781 
tankers were loaded. The terminal has safely transported more than 60 million tons of stabilized 
crude oil without incident.  
 
Figure 77. De-Kastri Terminal and Aframax shuttle tanker (Source: Exxonmobil.com) 
 
The loading speed is 7,700 tons/hour, the full tanker is loaded for 13 hours. 
The De-Kastri is located 5.7 km south-east of the onshore oil terminal. The water depth is 
21 m, the height is 82.5 m above the seabed, the weight is 3,773 tons. The rotating boom is 360 
degrees, the departure is 49m. 
The special icebreaking tugboat “Pevek” is operated at the loading terminal water area 
during the tankers loading process to ensure the safe and effective loading operations.  
Currently five of SCF’s doubled-hulled Aframax-class shuttle tankers with a high ice class 
are engaged in transporting oil from the terminal: “Yuri Senkevich”, “Viktor Titov”, “Victor 
Konetsky”, “Captain Kostichev” and “Pavel Chernysh”. Carrying year-round up to 100,000 tons 
(720,000 barrels) of crude are used for export of crude oil from the De-Kastri Terminal to world 
markets (See Table #15). 
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Table 15. Vessels serve De-Kastri oil terminal in the Sakhalin-1 project. 
Vessel Ice class Characteristics Additional 
equipment 
Owner Built Flag 
“Polar 
Pevek” 
ICE-10, 
DnV 1A1 
Icebreaker 
Tug 
FiFi 1 Rieber 
Shipping ASA 
/ Primorsk 
2006 – Aker 
Langsten 
Russia 
“Admiral 
Makarov” 
ICE-1B 
(LL2) 
Icebreaker Helipad and hangar FESCO Far 
East shipping 
company 
1975 - Helsinki 
New Shipyard, 
Helsinki, 
Finland 
Russia 
“Krasin” ICE-1B, 
LL2 
Icebreaker Helipad and hangar FESCO Far 
East shipping 
company 
1976 – Wärtsilä 
Helsinki 
Shipyard, 
Helsinki, 
Finland 
Russia 
“Kapitan 
Khlebnikov” 
Polar10 Icebreaker Helipad, hangar for 
one KA-32 
helicopter 
FESCO Far 
East shipping 
company 
1981 – Wärtsilä 
Helsinki 
shipyard, 
Finland 
Russia 
“Yuri 
Senkevich” 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Aframax 
shuttle tanker 
(double-
hulled) 
 Sovcomflot 2005 - Hyundai 
Heavy 
Industries, 
Korea 
Cyprus 
“Viktor 
Titov” 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Aframax 
shuttle tanker 
(double-
hulled) 
 Sovcomflot 2005 - Hyundai 
Heavy 
Industries, 
Korea 
Cyprus 
“Viktor 
Konetsky” 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Aframax 
shuttle tanker 
(double-
hulled) 
 Sovcomflot 2005 - Hyundai 
Heavy 
Industries, 
Korea 
Cyprus 
“Captain 
Kostichev” 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Aframax 
shuttle tanker 
(double-
hulled) 
 Sovcomflot 2005 - Hyundai 
Heavy 
Industries, 
Korea 
Cyprus 
“Pavel 
Chernysh” 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Aframax 
shuttle tanker 
(double-
hulled) 
 Sovcomflot 2005 - Hyundai 
Heavy 
Industries, 
Korea 
Cyprus 
 
Icebreakers provide support of tankers in winter period that allows to carry loading 
operations on a year-round schedule. The icebreakers “Admiral Makarov”, “Krasin” and “Kapitan 
Khlebnikov” are involved in escort operations (See Figure 78).  
During the ice season, Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) supports the loading 
operations by providing the live and forecast data of ice conditions and meteorological data and 
route planning by tankers in the Tatar Strait, according to the interviewee of Russian oil company 
#2. 
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Figure 78. Icebreakers duties and oil tankers routing map (Source: Rosneft) 
 
Most part of ice concentration is located to the south of De-Kasti. The icebreaker break the 
ice in area around the oil loading terminal, but this is done by a different icebreaker than those 
which support tankers. Ice around the oil loading point is crashed by the icebreaker “Polar Pevek”. 
When loading operations are quite often, it happens that the area can stay ice-free and then there 
is no need for extra use of icebreakers, as told by the interviewee of Russian oil company #2. 
 
Figure 79. The icebreaker escort of an oil tanker in the Tatar Strait from the De-Kastri oil terminal 
(Source: Rosneft). 
 
The formation of ice coverage in the Tatar Strait usually begins in November-December. 
Oil tankers escort operations is carried out from mid-December to end of March. Depending on 
the ice conditions, one or two icebreakers involves in escort operation (See Figure 80). 
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Figure 80. Icebreakers support operations in the Tatar Strait for the oil tankers from 2007 to 2014 
(Source: Rosneft) 
 
 
 
Onshore facilities: 
Onshore processing facilities include several units: 
- “Yastreb” land drilling rig is one of the most powerful land rigs in the industry. It is designed 
to drill extended reach wells to offshore targets from land-based locations. 
- The Chayvo Onshore Processing Facility receives oil and gas produced from the Sakhalin-1 
fields and then stabilizes oil for shipment to the international market and gas for supply to the 
Russian domestic market or reinjection to the field to maintain reservoir pressure. 
- Sakhalin-1's oil transportation system was commissioned in August 2006. Construction was 
completed on a 226 kilometer (140 mile) pipeline to transport crude from the onshore 
processing facility across Sakhalin Island and the Tatar Strait to the De-Kastri Terminal in 
Russia's Khabarovsk Krai.  
 There are several supply bases to provide supply deliveries under “Sakhalin-1” project, presented 
on Figure 81: 
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Figure 81. The location of the supply shore bases on Sakhalin (Source: Sakhalin-Shelf-Service, LLC). 
 
- Korsakov shore base in Korsakov Marine Trade Port (founded in 1997). During 20 years of 
its operation, Korsakov supply base has fully supported all activities of exploration drilling, 
process all cargo and equipment, required for construction of Chayvo and Odoptu platforms 
as well as onshore drilling facility “Yastreb”. In addition, the base has processed cargo for 
“Orlan” drilling platform95.  
Facilities: - Offices  102 м2 
 - Warehouses  2000 м2. 
 - Open storage areas  10400 м2.   
Main equipment: -  Mobile cranes, capacity  50-160 tons. 
 - Forklifts, capacity 5-10 tons. 
 
 
Figure 82. The Korsakov shore base on Sakhalin (Source: Sakhalin-Shelf-Service, LLC). 
                                                 
95 At the moment, the Korsakov shore base provides services under “Sakhalin-3” project (the operators are  LLC 
“Gazpromgeologorazvedka” & LLC “Gazprom Flot”). For more information, http://www.sssc.ru/engpage_27.html 
 169 
 
- Sakhalin Western Seaport (founded in 2002) near Kholmsk settlement is the most modern 
port on Sakhalin and the only port on the Far East, specialized on supporting oil and gas 
projects. Since 2005, it has been functioning as unified onshore supply base for “Sakhalin-
1” and “Sakhalin-2” projects96.   
Facilities: - Offices  2000 м2 
 - Warehouses  30000 м2. 
 - Open storage areas  70000 м2.   
 - Berths 1090 m 
 - Railway spurs 2,5 km 
Main equipment: -  Port cranes, capacity  20 tons. 
 - Forklifts, capacity 1,5-23 tons. 
 - Mobile cranes, capacity 50-150 tons 
 - Port cranes, capacity 32 tons 
 - Port cranes, capacity 60 tons 
 - Gantry cranes, capacity 20-32 tons 
 - Trucks, capacity 20 tons 
 
- Kholmsk shore base located in Kholmsk Marine Trade Port is used as a supplementary 
facility (mostly for the needs of Sakhalin-2 project). 
- Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk operations base (founded in 1998) maintains equipment and provides 
cargo transportation, as well as there are hazardous waste (I-IV class) treatment facilities.      
Facilities: - Offices  450 м2 
 - Warehouses  4306 м2. 
 - Open storage areas  20000 м2.   
Main equipment: -  Mobile cranes, capacity  50-90 tons. 
 - Forklifts, capacity 3-5 tons. 
 - Low boy truck with trailer 75 tons 
 - Trucks, capacity 18-42 tons 
 
- Nogliki Supply Base (founded in 2006) provides continuous supply of diesel fuel by trucks 
for OPF generators, which produce electric power for LUN-A drill platform.  There is 
satellite communication system and 24-hours monitoring system to monitor vehicles’ 
movement. There was developed oil spill response plan for quick oil spill response97.    
Facilities: - Office  70 м2 
 - Warehouse  4660 м2. 
 - Open storage area  10000 м2.   
                                                 
96 It is worth adding that since 2009 Sakhalin Western port provides services also for “Sakhalin-3” project (LLC 
“Gazflot” – in 2014 renamed into LLC “Gazpromflot”), in 2013 – for LLC “Gazprom Geologorazvedka”, providing 
services for new drilling  platforms. Today, this port provides services for all Sakhalin shelf projects. Besides, it 
provides services for line vessels (LLC “FESCO Integrated Transport”) and tramp vessels as well. 
For more information, see http://www.sssc.ru/engpage_29.htm 
97 For more information, see http://www.sssc.ru/engpage_32.htm 
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Main 
equipment: -  Fuel truck KAMAZ   
 - NEFAZ” bus for crew change  
 - Escort vehicles - Land Cruiser  
 - KAMAZ with oil spill response equipment  
 
- Wakkanai shore base (founded in 2000) in Wakkanai Japanese port provides winter 
parking for rig installations and specialized support fleet.   
 
Figure 83. The Wakkanai shore base (Source: Sakhalin-Shelf-Service, LLC). 
 
3.2.4.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response 
Emergency risk analysis conducted in the course of the Sakhalin 1 implementation showed 
that incidents involving oil and product spills could cause the greatest damage to the environment. 
The Sakhalin 1 Oil Spill Response and Prevention Plan was approved by the Ministry of Civil 
Defense and Emergencies and other regional and federal authorities. 
The plan covers all oil product spills that may occur at ENL oil production and export 
facilities for the Sakhalin 1 Project located on the Sakhalin Island shelf, on Sakhalin Island, and in 
the Tatar Strait, as well as in some Khabarovsk Krai mainland areas, including: 
♦ the Sea of Okhotsk; 
♦ coastal zones, including Chayvo Bay and Piltun Bay on the northeast coast of Sakhalin 
Island; 
♦ land areas along the routes of main and field pipelines in northern Sakhalin Island; 
♦ the Tatar Strait and Nevelskoy Strait, including the west coast of Sakhalin Island and the 
coastal areas of Khabarovsk Krai. 
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In 2016, 30 minor oil and petroleum product spills as a result of construction and 
production activities were recorded at ENL facilities, of which 29 occurred at production sites in 
Sakhalin Oblast, and 1 occurred at the production site in Khabarovsk Krai (not from marine 
vessels). The total volume of spilled oil and petroleum products was 787.54 liters. All these spills 
occurred within boundaries of the company’s industrial sites and were immediately and fully 
cleaned up. 
The main reason for such spills/leaks of petroleum products such as hydraulic fluids, 
lubricating oils, diesel fuel is the failure of mechanisms of heavy machinery and motor vehicles 
used in production activities at the Sakhalin-1 Project sites. Due to the start of construction at the 
Odoptu Well Site 2 (South) and repair of the piping network at the production site of the Chayvo 
Onshore Processing Facility, the volume of oil and petroleum products spills/leaks increased 
slightly in 2016 compared to 2015. The consequences of the leakage were eliminated immediately. 
The Orlan and Berkut fixed offshore platforms for the Sakhalin-1 Project are equipped with 
an internal drain system operating in a closed loop. In the event of leakage of oil or oil products 
on any of the platform decks, all liquids are confined in the drain system, which keeps them out of 
the environment. 
In each case of oil product leaks, a written report was prepared, and an investigation and 
analysis of the causes was conducted98. 
 
Figure 84. Safe boats on the «Orlan» platform (available on https://russos.livejournal.com/1201698.html) 
 
It is worth adding that spreading and movement of the oil spill on the sea surface was 
simulated in the SIMAP model for the worst-case scenario for the volumes calculated in 
accordance with the requirements of the RF Government Resolution No. 1189 of November 14, 
                                                 
98 For more information, see http://cdn.sakhalin-1.com/~/media/sakhalin/files/environmental-policies/2016-enl-
report-on-environmental-protection-activities-2016.pdf 
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2014 "On Management of Oil and Petroleum Product Spill Prevention and Response on the 
Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation and in Inland Sea Waters, Territorial Waters, and the 
Contiguous Zone of the Russian Federation"99. 
 
 
3.2.5. Case 9. Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project. 
3.2.5.1. Field location and natural conditions 
General info and location: 
The Sakhalin-2 project is an oil and gas development in Sakhalin Island, Russia. It includes 
development of the Piltun-Astokhskoye oil field and the Lunskoye natural gas field offshore 
Sakhalin Island in the Okhotsk Sea, and associated infrastructure onshore.  
The project is managed and operated by Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. 
(Sakhalin Energy). Shareholders of Sakhalin Energy are: 
- Gazprom Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (subsidiary of Gazprom) - 50% plus 1 share; 
- Shell Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell) - 27.5% minus 1 share; 
- Mitsui Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (subsidiary of Mitsui)- 12.5%; 
- Diamond Gas Sakhalin (subsidiary of Mitsubishi) - 10%. 
                                                 
99 For more information, see http://cdn.sakhalin-1.com/~/media/sakhalin/files/environmental-policies/2015-enl-oil-
spill-response-plan-summary-eng.pdf 
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Figure 85. The Sakhalin-2 project location. 
 
The Piltun Astokhskoye oil and gas field: 
Piltun Astokhskoye lies 16km offshore Sakhalin Island’s north-east shore, in the Sea of 
Okhotsk. It lies in 30m of water. This field is developed by the Vityaz Production Complex. This 
consists of the newly refitted Molikpaq, a single anchor leg mooring (SALM) 2km away and a 
floating storage and offloading vessel (FSO). 
The Lunskoye natural gas field: 
Lunskoye Oil And Gas Field is 20 km offshore in 50 m water depth. The field was 
discovered in 1984 and was appraised by seven wells drilled from a mobile rig confirming a large 
gas accumulation. 
 
Natural conditions: 
The natural conditions of the Sea of Okhotsk are the same as for the Sakhalin-1 project, 
described in Section 3.2.4.1 of the report. 
3.2.5.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure 
Offshore facilities and sea suppliers: 
The project’s infrastructure includes three offshore ice-resistant platforms: 
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- Piltun-Astokhskoye-A platform100 is the Molikpaq ice-resistant drilling and oil production 
platform, originally built to explore for oil in the Canadian Beaufort Sea. It had been 
mothballed in 1990, and was installed in the Astokh area of the Piltun-Astokhskoye field, 16 
kilometers (9.9 mi) offshore, on September 1998. The Molikpaq has production capacity of 
90,000 barrels per day (14,000 m3/d) of oil and 1.7 million cubic meters of associated gas. 
Year-round oil production from the PA-A platform was launched in December 2008. Oil from 
the platform streams through the Transsakhalin pipeline system to the oil export terminal of 
the Prigorodnoye production complex. 
 
Figure 86. Piltun-Astokhskoye-A Molikpaq oil production platform (Source: Sakhalin Energy). 
 
Figure 87. Prigorodnoye production complex and Piltun-Astokhskoye-A platform (Source: Gazprom.com). 
- The Piltun-Astokhskoye-B (PA-B), the largest platform of the Sakhalin-2 project, is a drilling, 
processing and production platform that has been extracting oil and associated gas from the 
Piltun reservoir since 2008. The hydrocarbons from the PA-B platform flows through the 
                                                 
100 Piltun-Astokhskoye-A Platform is available on video https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JadRUedjEVE 
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offshore and onshore pipelines to the LNG plant and oil export terminal at the Prigorodnoye 
production complex. The platform is located 12 km off the northeastern coast of Sakhalin 
Island, in a water depth of around 30 m. With the topsides installed on the base structure, the 
total height of the PA-B platform is 121 m from the sea floor to the top of the derrick - as large 
as a 30-store building. Production capacity: oil approximately 70,000 b/d (11,130 m3/d); 
associated gas 100 mln scf/d (2.8 mln m3/d)101. 
 
Figure 88. Piltun-Astokhskoye-B oil production platform (Source: Sakhalin Energy). 
 
-  The Lunskoye-A platform is the first in Russia offshore gas production platform. This platform 
produces the majority of the gas for the LNG plant. Oil/condensate and gas separation 
including gas treatment for transport to the LNG plant is done at the onshore processing 
facility. The platform is located 15 km off the north eastern coast of Sakhalin Island, in a water 
depth of 48 m. The height is 174.5 m, that is higher than the great pyramid of Cheops. The 
platform includes drilling and gas/hydrocarbon liquids/water separation facilities, storage for 
chemicals. The living quarters have a capacity for 100 permanent and additional 36 temporary 
staff. Production capacity: gas – 51 mln m3/d; condensate about 50,000 b/d (8,000 m3/d)102. 
                                                 
101 For more information, see  
http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/company/company_assets/platforma_piltun_astokhskaya_b.wbp 
102 For more information, see  
http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/company/company_assets/platforma_lunskaya.wbp 
 176 
 
Figure 89. Lunskoye-A gas production platform (Source: Sakhalin Energy). 
 
In addition, Sakhalin-2 includes a pipeline system of 300km of pipes that covers the whole 
of Sakhalin, and also above-ground gas pipeline and oil pipeline, each 800km long, which connect 
to an onshore production facility, oil export terminal, and also Russia’s first (and so far only) LNG 
production plant. 
 
Maritime vessel availability: 
Currently seven of SCF Group’s multi-purpose ice-breaking supply vessels are engaged in 
the Sakhalin-2 project: “SCF Endurance” (since 2009), “SCF Endeavour” (since 2016), “SCF 
Enterprise” (since 2016), “Fedor Ushakov” (since 2017), “Gennadiy Nevelskoy” (since 2017), 
“Stepan Makarov” (since 2017), “Yevgeny Primakov” (since 2017). 
Two LNG carriers “Grand Aniva” and “Grand Elena” transport LNG from a terminal in 
the town of Prigorodnoye (Aniva Bay) in the south of the island to Japan, South Korea and China 
under long-term contracts with the project operator. Deliveries began in March 2009.  
Transportation of crude oil from the Sakhalin-2 project is undertaken under long-term 
contracts with the project operator, by three of Sovcomflot’s ice-class Aframax tankers: “Zaliv 
Aniva”, “Sakhalin Island” and “Governor Farkhutdinov”. 
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Table 16. Vessels engaged in the Sakhain-2 project. 
Vessel Ice class Characteristi
cs 
Additional 
equipment 
Owner Built Flag 
“SCF 
Endurance” 
ICE-10 
Icebreaker, 
DnV +1A1 
Icebreaking 
platform supply 
vessel 
OIL-REC, 150 
evacuees 
Sovcomflot 2006 – Aker 
Langsten, Norway 
Russian 
“SCF 
Endeavour” 
ICE-10 
Icebreaker, 
DnV +1A1 
Icebreaking 
platform supply 
vessel 
OIL-REC, 150 
evacuees 
Sovcomflot 2006 – Aker 
Langsten, Norway 
Russian 
“SCF 
Enterprise” 
ICE-10 
Icebreaker, 
DnV +1A1 
Icebreaking 
platform supply 
vessel 
OIL-REC, 150 
evacuees 
Sovcomflot 2006 – Aker 
Langsten, Norway 
Russian 
“Fedor 
Ushakov” 
ICE-15 
Icebreaker, 
DnV +1A1 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking stand-
by vessel 
Winterized 
Cold, DAT (-
35°C), Fire 
Fighter 1, OIL 
Rec., 150 
evacuees 
Sovcomflot 2017 – Arctech 
Helsinki Shipyard 
OY, Finland 
Russian 
“Gennadiy 
Nevelskoy” 
ICE-15 
Icebreaker, 
DnV +1A1 
Icebreaking 
platform supply 
vessel 
Winterized 
Cold, DAT (-
35°C), Fire 
Fighter 1, OIL 
Rec., 150 
evacuees 
Sovcomflot 2017 – Arctech 
Helsinki Shipyard 
OY, Finland 
Russian 
“Stepan 
Makarov” 
ICE-15 
Icebreaker, 
DnV +1A1 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking stand-
by vessel 
Winterized 
Cold, DAT (-
35°C), Fire 
Fighter 1, OIL 
Rec., 150 
evacuees 
Sovcomflot 2017 – Arctech 
Helsinki Shipyard 
OY, Finland 
Russian 
“Yevgeny 
Primakov” 
ICE-15 
Icebreaker, 
DnV +1A1 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking stand-
by vessel 
Winterized Cold, 
DAT (-35°C), 
Fire Fighter 1, 
OIL Rec., 150 
evacuees 
Sovcomflot 2017 – Arctech 
Helsinki Shipyard 
OY, Finland 
Russian 
“Vidar 
Viking” 
Icebreaker
6, DNV 
ICE-10 
AHTS Winterized Viking 
Supply Ships 
2001 - Havyard 
Leirvik AS 
Sweden/
Russia 
“Zaliv 
Aniva” 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Aframax shuttle 
tanker (double-
hulled) 
 Sovcomflot 2009 - Hyundai 
Heavy Industries, 
Korea 
Cyprus 
“Sakhalin 
Island” 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Aframax shuttle 
tanker (double-
hulled) 
 Sovcomflot 2004 - Brodosplit 
Shipyard, Croatia 
Cyprus 
“Governor 
Farkhutdinov
” 
+1A1, 
ICE-1C 
Aframax shuttle 
tanker (double-
hulled) 
 Sovcomflot 2004 - Brodosplit 
Shipyard, Croatia 
Cyprus 
“Grand 
Aniva” 
+100A1, 
1C 
LNG carrier  Sovcomflot 2008 - Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries, 
LTD 
Cyprus 
“Grand 
Elena” 
+100A1, 
1C 
LNG carrier  Sovcomflot 2007 - Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries, 
LTD 
Cyprus 
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Onshore facilities: 
There are several supply bases to provide supply deliveries under “Sakhalin-1” project: 
- Kholmsk shore base (founded in 1998) located in Kholmsk Marine Trade Port supports 
Sakhalin Energy’s three offshore production platforms. The port is able to accept ice-class 
vessels with 8,5 meters drought. Due to this, the port is able to provide all year round 
onshore support of “Molikpaq” platform and all oil production complex “Vityaz103.    
 
 
Figure 90. The location of the supply shore bases on Sakhalin (Source: Sakhalin-Shelf-Service, LLC). 
 
- Sakhalin Western Seaport (founded in 2002) near Kholmsk settlement is the most modern 
port on Sakhalin and the only port on the Far East, specialized on supporting oil and gas 
projects. Since 2005, it has been functioning as unified onshore supply base for “Sakhalin-
1” and “Sakhalin-2” projects104.   
Facilities: - Offices  2000 м2 
 - Warehouses  30000 м2. 
 - Open storage areas  70000 м2.   
 - Berths 1090 m 
 - Railway spurs 2,5 km 
Main equipment: -  Port cranes, capacity  20 tons. 
 - Forklifts, capacity 1,5-23 tons. 
 - Mobile cranes, capacity 50-150 tons 
 - Port cranes, capacity 32 tons, 60 tons 
 - Gantry cranes, capacity 20-32 tons 
 - Trucks, capacity 20 tons 
                                                 
103 For more information, see http://www.sssc.ru/engpage_28.htm 
104 For more information, see http://www.sssc.ru/engpage_29.htm 
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Figure 91. The Sakhalin Western Seaport on Sakhalin (Source: Sakhalin-Shelf-Service). 
 
- Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk operations base (founded in 1998) maintains equipment and provides 
cargo transportation, as well as there are hazardous waste (I-IV class) treatment facilities.      
Facilities: - Offices  450 м2 
 - Warehouses  4306 м2. 
 - Open storage areas  20000 м2.   
Main equipment: -  Mobile cranes, capacity  50-90 tons. 
 - Forklifts, capacity 3-5 tons. 
 - Low boy truck with trailer 75 tons 
 - Trucks, capacity 18-42 tons 
 
- Nogliki Supply Base (founded in 2006) provides continuous supply of diesel fuel by trucks 
for OPF generators, which produce electric power for LUN-A drill platform.  There is 
satellite communication system and 24-hours monitoring system to monitor vehicles’ 
movement. There was developed oil spill response plan for quick oil spill response105.    
Facilities: - Office  70 м2 
 - Warehouse  4660 м2. 
 - Open storage area  10000 м2.   
Equipment: -  Fuel truck KAMAZ   
 - NEFAZ” bus for crew change  
 - Escort vehicles - Land Cruiser  
 - KAMAZ with oil spill response equipment  
 
- Wakkanai shore base (founded in 2000) in the Wakkanai Japanese port provides winter 
parking for rig installations and specialized support fleet.   
                                                 
105 For more information, see http://www.sssc.ru/engpage_32.htm 
 180 
3.2.5.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response 
Oil Spill Response (OSR) plans for all production facilities are developed and agreed with 
the authorities. 
Non-professional emergency response teams are in permanent readiness: 
- at  LNG plant; 
- at  Onshore Processing Facility; 
- on  Piltun-Astokhskoye-A platform; 
- on  Piltun-Astokhskoye-B platform; and 
- on  Lunskoye-A platform. 
The management bodies are on duty day and night in case of emergencies and crisis 
situations: the duty members of the crisis management team and the emergency coordination team. 
The duty dispatcher service works round the clock. 
In accordance with Russian Federation Government Regulation of 21.08.2000 No. 613, 
revised on 15 April 2002, No. 240, and Ordinance of the Sakhalin Oblast Administration of 
10.11.2005 No. 203-pa, the goal of planning of actions for oil and oil product spill response shall 
be determination of the necessary composition of forces and special technical devices for 
containment of spills in an offshore area within 4 hours after spill detection or obtaining 
information on a spill, and for organization of subsequent operations response to such spills. 
First-priority response actions on facilities are based on the strategy of spill containment 
and gathering of spilled oil, which suggests: 
• deployment of OSR forces and facilities; 
• spill containment (booms); 
• collection of oil (skimmers); and 
• temporary and long-term storage of collected wastes. 
OSR actions envisaged by Sakhalin Energy include prompt response actions at the place 
of spill, actions of onshore-based forces and facilities, and response with participation of additional 
vessels from the Lunskoye Field. 
Oil spill response under ice conditions with ice consolidation factor above 70 % does not 
require compulsory utilization of special means for spill containment, since this role may be played 
by ice. 
 
Response offshore: 
On the Piltun-Astokhskoye and Lunskoye fields, multi-function support vessels are on 
twenty-four hour alert, which are complete with equipment or responding in case of emergency 
events (oil) and manned with qualified personnel trained for performance of emergency rescue 
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operations during emergencies (oil). In case of a spill, supply vessels working in the area of the 
platforms will come to the aid to the said vessel(s), which may be used for deployment of 
equipment, both independently and in a couple with multi-function support vessel(s). There is a 
multi-function support vessel on twenty-four hour alert in the Lunskoye field, equipped, ready to 
The list of equipment onboard multi-function support vessels comprises oceanic and arctic 
containment and oil-collecting systems. There are two different booming systems, i.e. 600 m of 
Heavy-Duty oil Boom and 75 m of Light Oil Boom. There are four skimmers, i.e. two weir 
skimmers and two oleophilic brush skimmers at each field. 
 
Response onshore: 
Onshore, equipment is placed at PMDs and/or production facilities of the Company. 
Servicing and repairs of equipment for oil spill response are provided by Sakhalin Energy’s OSR 
contractor. It also draws up annual inventory of this equipment. The location of depots with OSR 
equipment available at them relative to the Company’s facilities is shown in Figure 3, their full list 
is given below. 
• Nogliki PMD (response equipment for onshore and in bays); 
• Lunskoye PMD at the OPF site (response equipment for onshore and rivers); 
• Yasnoye PMD (onshore); 
• Gastello PMD at the Booster Station-2 site (onshore); 
• Sovetskoye PMD (onshore); 
• Prigorodnoye (onshore and marine); and 
• Kholmsk Support Base (marine). 
For transportation of equipment into bays that are to be protected in case of oil spill, 
helicopters are available at the disposal of Sakhalin Energy. The flight time from the settlement of 
Nogliki to the Piltun- Astokhskoye Field is about 45 minutes. The flight time from the settlement 
of Nogliki Airport to the Lunskoye field is about 25 minutes106. 
At each PMD, fast deployment packages (FDP) are available. Fast deployment packages 
consist of light equipment accommodated in 5-ton containers that may be transported by helicopter 
on a suspended-type lifting gear, by Ural trucks (with trailer), cargo trailers, or by other means of 
container transport. 
In addition, at PMD there are available OSR mobile packages on the base of Ural trucks 
(OSR MP) and fast response trailers. This equipment is intended for fastest delivery to an oil spill 
                                                 
106 For more information, see  
http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/media/library/eng/Environmental/OilSpillResponse/5.6_LUN-
A_OSPR_summary_en_final.pdf 
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spot for the purpose of providing first-priority actions for oil slick containment. Storage of OSR 
equipment and tools in the form of fast deployment packages assures prompt mobilization in case 
of emergency (oil) with a minimum time of loading onto a transport means and delivery. 
Deployment of equipment with utilization of motor transport will need about 3 hours 
(delivery from the settlement of Nogliki to the Chaivo Bay) of 4 hours (delivery from the 
settlement of Nogliki to the Lunskoy Bay), plus 1 hour for loading operations107. 
 
Theoretical classes, drills and exercises on emergency response of various levels are 
conducted regularly. 
In October 2017, Sakhalin Energy conducted Oiled Wildlife Response Training. Company 
provides theoretical and practical trainings of this kind since 2005. This year HSE specialists 
representing oil and gas companies and competent authorities took part in the exercise. About 300 
company employees were trained for over twelve years of wildlife response program 
implementation108. 
 
 
Figure 92. Sakhalin Energy’s training in October 2017 (Source: Sakhalin Energy) 
  
                                                 
107 For more information, see  
http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/media/library/eng/Environmental/OilSpillResponse/5.7_Piltun-
Astokhskoye%20Summary_ENG.pdf 
108 For more information, see http://www.sakhalinenergy.ru/en/media-centre/news/item.wbp?article_id=132f951a-
6912-4023-a3ed-cb967b2b2100&date=02%C2%A0November%C2%A02017 
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3.2.5.4. Summary of both cases Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 
Table 17. Summary of logistics infrastructure in Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2. 
Project Project Operator Investors 
Field/  
contract 
territory 
Platform Distance 
from the 
shore 
Oil /gas 
productio
n 
Supply vessels & 
tankers 
Sakhalin-
I 
Exxon 
Neftegaz 
Ltd. 
(Bahamas) 
- Exxon Neftegaz Ltd 
(Bahamas) (a 
subsidiary of Exxon 
Mobil (USA)) – 30% 
- Consortium 
SODECO (Japan) – 
30% 
- JSC Rosneft (Russia) 
acting via its 
affiliates: RN-Astra 
(Russia) – 8,5% and 
Sakhalinmorneftegaz-
Shelf (Russia) – 
11,5% 
- ONGC Videsh Ltd. 
(India) – 20% 
Chayvo 
field 
“Orlan”- 
offshore 
platform: 
Weight: 
70,000tons 
Length = 96m 
Width=89.9m 
Height=50m 
“Yastreb” – 
onshore drilling 
rig 
 
11 km Since 2005 
“Kigoriak” 
“SCF Sakhalin” 
“Vitus Bering” 
“Aleksey 
Chirikov” 
“Tor Viking” 
 
Tankers: 
“Yuri Senkevich” 
“Viktor Titov” 
“Viktor 
Konetsky” 
“Captain 
Kostichev” 
“Pavel Chernysh” 
Odoptu 
field 
Yastreb” – 
onshore drilling 
rig 
 Since 2010 
Arkutun-
Dagi field 
“Berkut” 
offshore 
platform 
(installed in 
2014) 
25km Since 2015 
Sakhalin-
II 
Sakhalin 
Energy 
Investment 
Company 
Ltd. 
(Sakhalin 
Energy 
Bermuda) 
- GazpromSakhalin 
Holdings B.V. 
(Neverlands),(a 
subsidiary of JSC 
Gazprom (Russia)) – 
50% + 1 share 
- Shell Sakhalin 
Holdings B.V. 
(Netherlands) (a 
subsidiary of Royal 
Dutch Shell plc. 
(Netherlands/UK)) 
27,5% - 1share 
- Mitsui Sakhalin 
Holdings B.V. 
(Netherlands) (a 
subsidiary of Mitsui 
and Co., Ltd. (Japan)) 
– 12,5% 
- Diamond Gas 
Sakhalin B.V. 
(Netherlands) (a 
subsidiary of 
Mitsubishi 
Corporation (Japan)) 
– 10% 
Piltun-
Astokhsko
ye field  
Molikpaq 
(Piltun-
Astokhskaya-
A) platform 
16 km 
Since 
1999 
SCF Endurance 
SCF Endeavour 
SCF Enterprise 
“Fedor Ushakov” 
“Gennadiy 
Nevelskoy” 
“Stepan Makarov”
“Yevgeny 
Primakov” 
“Vidar Viking” 
 
3 tankers: 
“Zaliv Aniva” 
“Sakhalin Island” 
“Governor 
Farkhutdinov” 
 
2 LNG carriers 
Piltun-
Astokhskoye-B 
platform 
12 km 
Lunskoye 
field 
Lunskaya 
platform 15km  
Since 
2009 
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It is worth noting that two vessels owned by Viking Supply Ships have been involved in 
both projects Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 from time to time. The interviewee of Norwegian shipping 
company #1 told what experience the company obtained: 
“Since 2012, our two vessels have been conducting ice management and supply operations 
in the Okhotsk Sea. For example, the gross value of the contract on “Vidar Viking” for providing 
services in the summer of 2012 was approximately 70 million USD. The contract on “Tor Viking” 
in 2016 was valued at approximately 45 million USD for six months. It was the first and important 
experience to operate the vessel under the Russian flag with the Russian crew, using the Russian 
resources and collaboration with the Russian government. At the same time, we got a very positive 
experience of our vessels’ transit via the Northern Sea Route towards/back Sakhalin projects”. 
 
 
 
3.2.6. Case 10. Fields in the Laptev Sea 
 
3.2.6.1. Field location and natural conditions 
 
General info: 
The Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1 well is the only northernmost well in the World located at 
the bottom of the Laptev Sea (near the Khara-Tumus Peninsula). Rosneft possesses this Khatanga 
license since November 2015. Oil reserves are estimated at 9.5 billion tons with huge additional 
gas reserves, as Rosneft’s leader Igor Sechin told President Vladimir Putin in early April 2017109. 
Rosneft completed preparations for drilling at Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1 in record-short time. Since 
2015 till April 2017, a total of 21,000 meter of seismic studies have been conducted and as many 
as 114 prospective structures identified. 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 For more information, see http://xn--b1agjasmlcka4m.xn--p1ai/event/rosneft-nachala-burenie-skvazhiny-
centralno-olginskaya-1 
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Figure 93. The location of the Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1 well in the Laptev Sea (Source: 
thebarentsobserver.com). 
 
 
Figure 94. The location of the Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1 well in Khatanga bay (Source: Rosneft.com). 
 
The well is located 70 meters from the coast, and is to be drilled at an angle of 5 kilometers 
under the very waters of the bay. Water depths in the Khatanga license area, which is north of the 
Krasnoyarsk Region, reach 32 m (105 ft).  
The Gulf of Khatanga is among the least accessible places in the Russian Arctic. Located 
east of the Taymyr Peninsula by the ice-covered Laptev Sea, the license area is open for regular 
shipping only two months in the year. The nearest settlement is Khatanga, a town with a population 
of about 2,500 located about 350 km to the southwest110. 
                                                 
110 For more information, see https://www.rosneft.ru/press/news/item/183143/ 
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Figure 95. Rosneft’s drilling operation site at the Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1 well in Khatanga bay in April 2017 
(Source: Rosneft.ru). 
 
The Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1 well was drilled from the shore of the Khara-Tumus 
Peninsula on the shelf of Khatanga Bay. During the drilling operations of the Tsentralno-
Olginskaya-1 well in April 2017, three core samples were taken from depths of 2,305 to 2,363 
meter. These samples show high oil saturation dominated with light oily fractions (Rosneft press 
release). 
Mastering the resources and even any talk about the mining of minerals in the Arctic is 
preceded by an extensive scientific study. Before the drilling operations started, Rosneft opened a 
research station in the area in August 2016. The station was developed as “a research outpost for 
development and testing of new technology, technical equipment and materials”. Research 
activities have been conducted on site at that same as the oil drilling. The research station is 16 km 
from the drilling site. 24 people were in the research camp and 20 more in the field expedition on 
an ice floe of 80 kilometers. If the weather goes bad, scientists from the camp could be evacuated 
only by helicopter. The team of researchers and Rosneft’s specialists spent two spring months at 
the base to study ice conditions in the area in 2017. A total of 40 drifting buoys were placed on the 
ice and more than thousand measurements and samples of ice qualities were made, according to 
Rosneft’s press release111. 
"We solve complex problems of interaction between the natural environment and man, 
because the ice is a carrier platform which absorbs all the information of human activity,” said 
Evgeny Makarov, head of the Khatanga-Zima expedition. “We study ice as an environment for 
life because it is a memory of planet Earth and displays all the processes that occur in the air and 
water environment"112. 
                                                 
111 For more information, see https://www.rosneft.ru/press/news/item/186951/ 
112 Available on: http://georgiatoday.ge/news/6295/Russia-Drills-the-Northern-Most-Well-in-the-World 
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Source of water for drinking, sanitary and household needs is delivered water. Source of 
water for technical and fire safety needs is sea water (water passes the stage of desalination and 
water treatment), fresh water from Kutuyikan stream (an additional source of water in the warm 
period of the year), treated domestic waste water, rain and thawed waters. 
Electricity is produced using diesel-generator installations. The heating is provided by a 
boiler house, heaters on diesel fuel and electric ones. 
 
Natural conditions: 
The Laptev Sea has a severe climate with temperatures below 0 °C (32 °F) for more than 
nine months of the year. Navigation is open only in July until August. 
 The Laptev Sea has the largest expanse of fast ice in the world from January till June. The 
fast ice thickness typically reaches 200 centimeters due to mean midwinter air temperature of -30 
0C and can grow up to 250 centimeters during severe winters. The concentration of multiyear ice 
in the Laptev Sea is limited due to wind directions and ocean currents. The total area of summer 
melt is particularly extensive due to the reduced concentration of multiyear ice. In the western part, 
the ice drift is southwards and large masses of ice are deposited along the coast of Severnaya 
Zemlya and the Taymyr Peninsula113. 
There is an increased refraction, which slightly increases the duration of the day, and a 
slow change in n the sun's decline above the horizon at high latitudes prolongs twilight. The 
duration of the polar night increases from 70-80 days in the southern part of the Laptev Sea to 100-
120 days - in the northern part. The polar day due to refraction is about 16 days longer than the 
polar night. 
Air temperatures stay below 0 °С 11 months a year on the north and 9 months on the south. 
The average temperature in January (coldest month) varies across the sea between −31 °C and −34 
°C. The minimum is −50 °C. In July, the temperature rises to 0 °С (maximum 4 °С) in the north 
and to 5 °С (maximum 10 °С) in the south. However, it may reach 22–24 °С on the coast in August.  
Strong winds, blizzards and snowstorms are common in winter. Snow falls even in summer 
and is alternating with fogs. The winds blow from south and south-west in winter with the average 
speed of 8 m/s, which subsides toward the spring. In summer, the winds change direction to the 
northerly, and their speed is 3–4 m/s114. 
                                                 
113 Available on: 
http://www.arctis-search.com/Natural+Conditions+and+Navigation+through+the+Northeast+Passage 
114 For more information, see “Plan for works on the object: "Program of marine geophysical works on the area of the 
Laptev Sea in 2013-2014" - Environmental impact assessment” by NefteGasStroy Center LLC, available on 
http://smng.com/site-specific/smng.com/upload/ovos/laptev-t2.pdf 
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As told by the interviewee of Russian oil company #2 about the natural conditions during 
the drilling operations: 
“Well, how the Laptev Sea looked like in April – the air temperature reached -40/-45 0C, 
the wind was quite strong, 18-20m/s. This weather is really a challenge for both people and 
machinery. No civilization at all. Reindeer breeders with herds appear here only during the short 
northern summer, as well as white bears. Now, they prefer to spend time on ice closer to the 
Northern Sea Route”.  
 
 
2.2.7.2. Field logistics: offshore/onshore infrastructure 
There are no seaports in the vicinity of the Khara-Tumus peninsula where the drilling 
operations were conducted. The navigation period in this area lasts no longer than two months a 
year.  
These drilling operations are offshore, but carried out actually by the drilling installation 
at an angle of five kilometers down, from the shore. Thus, there was no need to mobilize the 
offshore drilling platform and support of OSVs. That made it possible to reduce costs significantly. 
At the same time, the field logistics included unique operations before the drilling started.  
The captains and sailors on board vessels, which happen to visit the Khatanga Bay, talk 
about this place like this: “To sail in the Khatanga bay means to visit the edge of the map”115.  
The reason for this saying is that the nearest seaport of Khatanga is located on the right 
shore of the Khatanga River flowing into Khatanga Bay in the Laptev Sea, 115 miles from the 
mouth. The port functions only during the summer navigation (from the middle of June until the 
end of September). Ice covered period is September – May. The port can admit vessels with the 
draught of up to 4.6m. Loading from sea to river vessels is carried out at the Cape of Kosistiy. The 
seaport of Khatanga is equipped by 5 berths, 3 floating cranes, 3 crawler cranes, 1 autocrane, 6 
forklift trucks and has open-air storage capacity of 17,500 m2. Commodities and refrigerated 
cargoes, various general cargoes for the Arctic urban areas, timber and bulk freights (coal, sand 
and gravel mixtures), and bulk oil cargoes are handled at the port116. It is worth noting that every 
year an ice dam (20 m high and 60 m long) has been built in the port in order to protect the 
"wintering" fleet and some infrastructure from spring ice fields drifting along the Khatanga River 
to the Laptev Sea. 
                                                 
115 Available on: https://www.e-river.ru/uploads/newspaper/paper/230/6233.pdf 
116 For more information, see  
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A5%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%B0_(%D0%BF%D
0%BE%D1%80%D1%82) 
Some details were used from ESIMO Centre at the Ministry of Transport of Russia at ZAO CNIIMF. 
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Figure 96. Ice dam in the port of Khatanga in July (Source: http://myphototravel.livejournal.com). 
 
In 2016, during the summer navigation, ice-class vessel “Sevmorput” and one more ice-
class vessel delivered more than 8,000 tons of equipment, materials for drilling and technology, 
including the drilling rig and accommodation modules, from the sea port of Arkhangelsk to the 
drilling site. They covered the distance of 3,600 kilometers across the areas of the White Sea, the 
Kara Sea and the Laptev Sea to the remote Khatanga Bay with the icebreaker assistance of 
“Yamal”117.  
 
Figure 97. The development of the research base in Khatanga Bay, summer 2016 (Source: Rosneft.ru). 
 
However, ice-class vessels were not able to sail in shallow waters of the Khatanga Bay, 
and there was a need for using river vessels with light draught of water, which were more 
maneuverable. In June 2016, two river vessels “Solnechnogorsk” and “Electrostal” were towed by 
                                                 
117 For more information, see http://xn--b1agjasmlcka4m.xn--p1ai/event/rosneft-nachala-burenie-skvazhiny-
centralno-olginskaya-1 
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icebreaker “Dikson”118 one by one during ca. 5 days from Yenisey River along the Northern Sea 
Route via Vilkitsky Strait119 connecting the Kara and Laptev Seas to the Khatanga Bay. 
“Solnechnogorsk” and “Electrostal” operated during 1.5 months from August to October 2016. 
The distance between the sea ice-class vessel and the drilling site was 50-60 km. Loading on the 
river vessels could reach up to 10 hours, the river vessel's sailing took about 5-6 hours. Unloading 
from the river vessels to the shore also took about 10 hours120.  
At the beginning of August 2017, “Taymyr” icebreaker provided ice assistance for the 
vessels sailed to the Laptev Sea for the field operations at Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1121: "Grigoriy 
Shelikhov" and "Ermak", as well as research vessels "Nikolai Trubyatchinsky" and "Geologist 
Dmitry Nalivkin"122.  
 
                                                 
118 It is worth noting that in November 2017, an experimental 30-kW laser installation was tested on “Dikson” 
icebreaker, which is able to cut ice up to four meters thick. , which can prolong navigation in the conditions of the 
severe climate of the Arctic. This innovation has been carried out under the federal target program "Civil shipbuilding" 
(the 1st author’s note). 
119 Vilkitsky Strait is considered one of the most difficult part of the Northern Sea Route for navigation because the 
depth is between 32 m and 210 m and it is covered with drifting ice all year round (the 1st author’s note). 
120 For more information, see https://www.e-river.ru/uploads/newspaper/paper/230/6233.pdf 
121 For more information, see http://gazetazp.ru/lenta/32448 
122 Both research vessels were engaged by the Marine Arctic Geological Exploration Expedition, which carried out 
13.3 thousand kilometers of 2D seismic surveys for Rosneft in July-October, 2017 in the Kara Sea, Laptev Sea and 
East Siberian Sea (the 1st author’s note). 
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Table 18. Vessels operated in the Khatanga Bay for the field project “Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1 well” in summer 
navigations 2016 and 2017 (not OSVs excluding research vessels). 
Vessel Ice class Characteristics Owner Built Flag Navigation
period 
“Solnechnogorsk” No ice class; 
intended for 
summer 
navigation 
General cargo 
ship for 
shallow depth 
Yenisey River 
Shipping - 
Krasnoyarsk, 
Russia 
1965 – Zavody 
Tazkeho 
Strojarstva, 
Komarno, Slovakia 
Russian Summer 
2016 
“Electrostal” No ice class; 
intended for 
summer 
navigation 
General cargo 
ship for 
shallow depth 
Yenisey River 
Shipping - 
Krasnoyarsk, 
Russia 
1965 -  Slovenske 
Lodenice - 
Komarno, Slovakia 
Russian Summer 
2016 
“Dikson” Icebreaker: 
RMRS123 L4 
(ICE-C, Ice 1) 
Tug icebreaker Rosmorport, 
Arkhangelsk 
1983 - STX 
Helsinki, Finland 
Russian Summer 
2016 
 
“Sevmorput“ RMRS UL 
(DNV ICE-
1А*) 
General cargo 
container vessel
FSUE 
Atomflot 
1988 - Zaliv 
Shipyard, Kerch, 
Ukrainian SSR 
Russian Summer 
2016 
“-“ (no data) High ice class Container vessel 
- from 
Arkhangelsk 
port with major 
equipment 
- - Russian Summer 
2016 
“Yamal” Arktika-class 
icebreaker; 
RMRS 
Icebreaker9 
Icebreaker; 
helipad and 
hangar for one 
helicopter: 
Mi-2, Mi-8 or 
Ka-27 
FSUE 
Atomflot 
1992 – Baltic 
Shipyard,  
St. Petersburg 
Russian Summer 
2016 
"Grigoriy 
Shelikhov" 
No ice class General cargo 
vessel 
Spliethoff´s  
Bevrachtingsk
antoor - 
Amsterdam, 
Netherlands 
1992 - IHC 
Holland 
Sliedrecht 
Russian Summer 
2017 
“Ermak” No ice class General cargo 
vessel 
Khatanga 
Maritime 
Trade Port – 
Khatanga, 
Russia 
1999 - Malta 
Shipyard - Marsa, 
Malta 
Russian Summer 
2017 
“Taymyr” Polar 10 Helipad, 
hangar for one 
KA-32 
helicopter 
FSUE 
Atomflot 
1989 - Wärtsilä 
Marine, Helsinki 
Shipyard, Finland; 
Baltic Shipyard, 
Leningrad, Soviet 
Union 
Russian Summer 
2017 
 
According to the Head of Rosneft, the logistics operation and preparation required a lot of 
efforts and time before the drilling operations started in April 2017:    
“The results of our studies have shown that the deposit at the Khatanga licensed site is 
unique by its high hydrocarbon content and productive bed thickness. Since offshore operations 
have been conducted from the shore, there is no need to use the fleet of OSVs. This significantly 
reduces exploration costs. However, the remoteness of this site, I would say rather the isolation, 
                                                 
123 RMRS means the Russian Maritime Register of Shipping that maintains a ship register of the Russian Federation, 
based in Saint Petersburg, and is a marine classification society. 
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from the infrastructure and civilization required a serious and too long preparation. Logistics 
operations for the delivery of the necessary equipment and materials have been complex and 
lengthy. For example, the delivery of major equipment and accommodation blocks took 8 months 
to be prepared for one-month drilling operations in April 2017. In addition, all maritime deliveries 
to this area have been carried out under the legislative norms for navigation in the waters of the 
Northern Sea Route that it requires the icebreaker assistance and permissions for sailing of 
freighted vessels. At the same time, due to the huge remoteness, we gained a very good experience 
of setting up and settling the first year-round research base in the Arctic region located in the 
proximity of the drilling site in Khatanga bay”124. 
 
2.2.7.3. Emergency preparedness logistics: SAR and oil spill response 
 
The analysis of the risk and impact of potential emergencies was made by Rosneft. Oil 
spills at sea have been not expected, because drilling operations are carried out from the shore, 
according to the project documentation "Environmental Impact Assessment, Non-Technical 
Summary, 2017"125. In accordance with the requirements of MARPOL 73/78, all vessels used have 
appropriate equipment for oil spill response to prevent the pollution of the marine environment by 
oil products. 
It is worth adding that until July 06, 2017, Rosneft conducted an open tender for services 
and proposals for the response and liquidation of oil spills during the development of the 
Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1 well. This lot was intended for the East Siberian branch of RN-Burenie 
LLC. The price of this lot is 2373510.95 roubles126 or about 42,000 USD. 
 
In order to ensure offshore operations in the Laptev Sea, being safe and friendly to the 
environment, and prevent any emergencies in harsh weather conditions, Rosneft organizes special 
expeditions to investigate the morphometric and dynamic parameters of the ice cover and the 
internal structure of hummocks. These studies are helpful to increase knowledge and develop 
experience for future offshore operations how to make them safe and more efficient in ice 
conditions.  
During two months in spring 2017, ice-exploration expedition “Khatanga-Winter 2017” 
organized by Rosneft together with the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute and Arctic 
Research Centre completed field studies in the Khatanga Bay and the southern part of the Laptev 
                                                 
124 For more information, see https://www.rosneft.ru/press/today/item/187017/ 
125 Available in Russian on http://hatanga-well.ecoalliance.ru/wp-content/blogs.dir/37/files/hatanga-
well_kpz_2017.pdf 
126 Available on: http://zakupki.rosneft.ru/node/325479 
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Sea. A comprehensive study of the Arctic region was conducted for the first time at the newest 
year-round scientific and research base of Rosneft located on the shore of the Khara-Tumus 
Peninsula in the Khatanga Bay of the Laptev Sea. 40 drifting buoys were set upon the ice. The 
researchers used a helicopter Mi-8МТВ, as well as unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles like 
drones. 
 
Figure 98. Ice-exploration expedition “Khatanga-Winter 2017” by Rosneft (Source: Rosneft.ru) 
 
The research was conducted at 40 ice bases. Within the expedition framework 23 
hummocks and 17 stamukhas were explored, over a thousand assessments of ice structural 
behavior were performed, 80 core samples of ice were taken in order to determine its physical 
properties127. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
127 “Khatanga-Winter 2017” was actually the third ice-exploration expedition of the Company to the Ust-Olenek and 
Ust-Lensk licence areas and the first one to the Khatanga licence area. For more information, see 
https://www.rosneft.com/press/news/item/186955/ 
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 THE HIGH ARCTIC  FIELD LOGISTICS INFRASTRUCTURE 
4.1 Overview of the cases. 
In Section #3, we presented 10 specific cases of the field development projects in order to 
reveal the logistics infrastructure, offshore and onshore facilities, main features and challenges the 
companies face when managing maritime logistics operations at various Arctic localities 
(including two cases of sub-Arctic) and ensuring SAR and emergency preparedness in demanding 
waters: 
- Four cases in the Norwegian Barents Sea (North/South); 
- Four cases in the Russian Arctic Seas: the Pechora Sea, the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea; 
- Two cases in the Russian sub-Arctic: the Sea of Okhotsk128.   
 
The summary table of the case data illustrates briefly each of the cases presented in the 
report (see, Table #19). We have divided them into two categories: 
- Exploitation category includes those cases that produce oil and gas: the Goliat project, 
“Prirazlomnaya” platform, Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2; 
- Exploration category includes those cases that experienced drilling operations: Johan 
Castberg project, Korpfjell project, Wisting Central III, Universitetskaya-1 well, 
Dolginskoye field, Tsentralno-Olginskaya-1 well. 
 
Exploitation 
There are very few oil and gas producing facilities in the Arctic or in similar conditions 
like sub-Arctic areas: the Goliat project, “Prirazlomnaya” platform, Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 
projects. It is also worth noting that the Barents Sea is the most promising area for petroleum 
development; the Pechora Sea is more challenging, but still promising; the Kara, the Laptev and 
the East-Siberian Seas are extremely challenging, although the Kara Sea is very rich for 
hydrocarbons; the Sakhalin area is seismically active zone. While the Goliat project is located in 
the most favorable zone, the localities of three other exploitation cases like Prirazlomnaya 
platform, Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 are characterized by extremely harsh climatic conditions for 
offshore activities where the ice period lasts from November/December to May/June. In addition, 
both Sakhalin projects are in a zone of magnitude 6.4 – 7.6 earthquakes. 
 
                                                 
128 We took these two cases for consideration in this report because their location in the Sea of Okhotsk experiences 
more dynamic ice conditions, including hurricanes, severe storms and seismic activity, than many offshore areas north 
of the Arctic Circle. 
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From the interviews with the respondents, we have identified two issues related to 
exploitation operations in the Arctic icy waters: 
1. Loading/Offloading operations: 
In Arctic harsh conditions, the access to the platform by OSVs can be challenged by ice 
drifting, wind above limits or wave heights, especially in autumn and winter period. There is a 
need to ensure access for the tankers to the platform or offshore oil terminals.  
The ice drift is affected by the direction of the current. Around the Prirazlomnaya platform, 
a wide ice-free zone is formed behind the platform along the direction of the current (See Figure 
99). The tankers use this pass to avoid large ice loads while offloading oil. 
 
Figure 99. An ice free zone behind the Prirazlomnaya platform (left) and offloading operation (right) 
(Source: Gazpromneft Shelf). 
 
However, the wind can easily change the ice drift direction. According to the interviewee 
of Russian oil company #3, 
“The Prirazlomnaya platform has only two offloading centers at opposite corners of the 
platform. They are along the direction of the current to make offloading operations safe, but the 
wind force can change ice drifting in direction of the wake behind the platform. That can create 
some difficulties or even possible emergencies”. 
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Thus, the offloading operation can be done only when the wake is at the side of offloading 
centers (see Figure 99, right).  
 
2. Ice rubbling: 
The ice is often accumulated at one side of the platform hull consolidating and forming ice 
rubble that can impede the vessels ability to get close to the platform (see Figure 100).  
“Actually, it is quite hard to remove the ice rubble because it is formed again and again. 
It creates delays as the OSVs are not able to get close to the platform. The length of the cargo 
cranes is limited (for example, around 50 m) and the width of the ice rubble could be the same. 
Lifting cargo from the vessels can be difficult and risky”, as told by the interviewee of Russian oil 
company #3. 
 
 
Figure 100. Ice rubbles in front of the Prirazlomnaya platform (Source:  Gazpromneft Shelf). 
 
At the same time, the ice rubbles increase the loads on the platform structure and can reduce 
horizontal stability of the platform. Thus, the shape of the platform in Arctic waters should make 
it possible the ice rubbles flush by currents and ice drift like the structure of the platforms in 
Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 projects.  
 
 
. 
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In table #19 we have emphasized the main transport challenges and challenges to SAR and 
oil spill response related to each case. We have also cited the respondents’  main experience gained 
during participation in the development of the offshore operations related to each field case (see 
the last line in Table #19).   
The respondents specifically highlighted the following challenges in their work: 
1. Arctic harsh climate: 
- “The  extreme weather conditions even in summer time is a real challenge. There are 
polar lows, a lot of fog, which limits visibility. This may disrupt the regular supply of the 
rig/platform and complicate navigation” - the interviewee of Norwegian shipping 
company #1. 
-  
- “We work in harsh weather and ice conditions at the Prirazlomnaya platform. Moreover, 
the platform is located far from the onshore supply base” – Official within oil and gas 
company logistics department129. 
 
- “One of the most specific challenges in the Arctic is the ice! I think that we need to find a 
solution on how to deal not with the Arctic, but the icy waters. How we deal with the ice 
it is still a challenge without a solution!” - the interviewee of Russian oil company #2. 
 
2. Distances: 
- “The long distances is the major issue in the Arctic and the sudden change of the 
weather”- the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #2. 
 
- “The distance to the supply base is a real challenge to organize regular supply deliveries 
through the ice in Arctic waters, especially when it comes to personnel transportation by 
helicopters. You are more reliant on larger transport capacities on the vessels so that the 
long distances might be overcome” – the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1.  
- “The main risks for the offshore northern projects are long distances and remoteness. This 
challenge requires a lot of preparations including field analyses and logistics planning. It 
takes too long time  to meet all requirements and arrange the schedule of the vessels and 
helicopters” – the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1. 
 
                                                 
129 Available at: https://rogtecmagazine.com/gazprom-neft-arctic-routes2/ 
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3. Lack of infrastructure: 
- “Limited infrastructure adds complexity to logistics schemes development. There are just 
a few Northern ports. The facilities are limited. So, if you have some technical problems, 
the distance is much longer, and it takes time to get maintenance and transport support in 
Arctic waters” - the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1. 
- “Communication in the High Arctic is a challenge! The reason for that is because you 
have much lower pending use when operating in the High North. There are limitations on 
satellite communication. Today you require much more data to know the transport 
location solutions…It can be difficult to keep up a good communication between all 
players involved – from rigs, shore, the vessels and so on” - the interviewee of Norwegian 
shipping company #1. 
 
4. Lack of experience: 
- “One of the main weaknesses is the lack of experience of operating in the northern areas. 
The Arctic is a new area where all players have little experience. If something happens, 
how to handle it?” -   the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #2.  
 
- “Operating in the Arctic waters implies a combination of the vessel power and the crew 
onboard. So, the crew’s qualifications and experience gained from working in the ice are 
valuable, especially, to ensure safety of operations and life onboard. At the same time, it’s 
too expensive and difficult to organize trainings in the real Arctic conditions for hundreds 
of personnel. As a result, there are a number of operators who invest in an Arctic project, 
but have never been there before. For instance, we got a call from a Norwegian ship-
owner who provided the Prirazlomnaya platform with the supply vessels like: “We have 
ice around the ship. What are we going to do?” They did not know what to do because 
they had not operated in the ice before. They woke up one morning and were surprised by 
seeing the ice around the ship. That’s an example, but it is a challenge that there is a huge 
lack of experience of operating in the Arctic ice conditions” - the interviewee of 
Norwegian shipping company #1. 
 
- “We like when our vessels equipped for harsh cold-climate conditions get work in the 
Barents Sea. It means that the vessels use all their capabilities like ice class, anti-icing 
systems and special equipment available onboard. Also, our employees and the crews gain 
experience of working in harsh conditions. However, it is difficult to win any contract to 
operate in the Norwegian Barents Sea. We have found a lot of improvements on the 
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logistics side by all oil companies for the last five years. However, there is still a huge 
lack of crews’ experience on working in the polar lows and darkness, because there is a 
limited number of operations in the northern Barents Sea. At the same time, there are too 
many vessels in the market” – the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #2. 
-  
- “Oil companies lack experience specifically to manage operations in Arctic waters. It is 
quite a different task to operate being surrounded by the Arctic ice compared with the 
traditional conditions in the North Sea! If oil companies aim at operating in Arctic waters, 
they need to reconstruct their management systems to be flexible and innovative enough” 
– the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #2. 
 
- “During the Kara Sea operations in 2014, we realized how difficult it was to manage all 
operations in such difficult conditions. It must be noted that this was in the summer period. 
Though we got a great experience then, we looked like “dummies” to learn – not so good 
qualification and past experience at all to work among ice flows. In recent years, we have 
conducted several summer expeditions in the Kara Sea to develop our experience in the 
field of ice management, as well as to increase the experience and qualifications of our 
employees to work in hard-to-reach Arctic waters, especially in the harsh winter 
conditions of the polar night and ice. We assure that this experience and tests in real ice 
conditions will allow in the future to increase emergency preparedness of marine 
infrastructure when performing our Arctic offshore projects” – the interviewee of Russian 
oil company #2. 
 
The respondents singled out several challenges categorized in the table. They have 
specifically emphasized the lack of experience of managing offshore field operations in Arctic 
remote and icy waters. Respondents have indicated that this lack of experience is critical for safety, 
and for the emergency preparedness and oil spill response. 
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Summary Table 19. Overview of the case data. 
 Exploitation Exploration   
 Goliat, 
Norway 
Prirazlomnaya 
platform, 
Russia 
Sakhalin-1 
Russia (PSA) 
Sakhalin-2 
Russia (PSA) 
Johan 
Castberg, 
Norway 
Korpfjell 
PL859,  
Norway 
Wisting 
Central III, 
Norway 
Universitetskaya-1 well, 
Russia 
Dolginskoye field 
Russia 
Tsentralno-
Olginskaya-1 well 
Russia 
Stakehol-
ders 
ENI Norge (65%) 
- operator; 
Equinor 
Petroleum (35%) 
Gazpromneft 
Shelf - operator 
Exxon Neftegaz  
(30%) – operator;
SODECO (30%); 
Rosneft (20%);  
ONGC Videsh 
(20%)  
Sakhalin Energy  – 
operator: 
Gazprom Sakhalin 
Holdings (50% + 1 
share); 
Shell Sakhalin 
Holdings (27,5% - 
1share); 
Mitsui Sakhalin 
Holdings (12,5%); 
Diamond Gas 
Sakhalin (10%) 
Equinor 
(50%) – 
operator; 
ENI Norge 
(30%); 
Petoro (20%) 
Equinor (30%) 
– operator; 
Chevron 
(20%); 
Conoco Phillips 
(15%); 
Lundin (15%); 
SDØE (20%) 
OMV(25%) – 
operator; 
Petoro (20%);
Idemitsu 
(20%); 
Tullow 
(20%); 
Equinor 
(15%) 
Rosneft (51%); 
Exxon Mobil (49%) (by joint 
venture “Karmornefte-gaz”) 
Gazprom Neft-
Sakhalin, LLC 
Rosneft 
Start of 
operations 
2000 2013 2005 1996 2018 planned 2017 drilling: 
August 
2017 drilling: 
August 
2014 drilling: July-August; 
(2019 planned) 
2014 drilling: 
July-August 
2017 drilling: April 
- June 
Production 
start 
Since 2016 Since 2014 Since 2005 
(Chayvo field); 
Since 2010 
(Odoptu field); 
Since 2015 
(Arkutun-Dagi) 
Since 1999 (Piltun-
Astokhskoye field);
 
Since 2009 
(Lunskoye field) 
- - - - - - 
Location The Barents Sea The Pechora 
Sea 
The Sea of Okhotsk 
 
The Barents 
Sea 
The Barents 
Sea 
The Barents 
Sea 
The Kara Sea The Pechora Sea The Laptev Sea 
Water 
depth 
341 m 19-20 m about 50 m 50 m 360-390 m 253 m 394.5 m 81 m (straight well depth 
2,113m) 
40-55 m 32 m 
Ice 
conditions 
No ice, iceberg 
availability 
during winter; 
Icing; 
Heavy snow falls 
Ice period 
during 
November-
June; 
Average 
drifting ice 
thickness 0.8m 
(max.1.45m); 
Hummocks 
Ice thickness average 1.5 m from 
December to May;  
Ridges of compressed ice; 
Icing from October until December 
No ice; 
Heavy snow 
fall; 
icing 
Occurrence of 
sea ice (during 
ca.10 days); 
Occurrence of 
icebergs; 
heavy snow 
fall, 
Icing 
No ice;  
heavy snow 
fall,  
icing 
Ice period during mid of 
September- July with close 
drifting ice; Navigation season 
August-September;  
Average ice thickness 1.8m up 
to 2.5-3.0 m (north-east); 
Ice ranges thickness 1.2-1.6 m; 
Hummocking – above water 
10-15m, under water 20-25m  
Ice period during 
November-June; 
Average open water 
110 days; 
Average ice thickness 
1.3m 
Ice period is almost 
the whole year 
(minimum in 
September) 
Weather 
conditions 
Average temp. 
00C/+2.70C; 
Average January 
air temp.-150C; 
Polar lows; 
Average 
February temp. 
-17.40C (min. -
480C); Average 
July t=+6.50C 
(max.+260C); 
Winter temperature can drop to -450C; 
with high humidity and a wind-chill 
down to -70°C; 
Seismic zone (6.4 & 7.6 in the past 15 
years); Polar lows, 
Sea temp. 
above +1оС; 
Wind speed 
2-15 m/s; 
Polar lows, 
fogs 
Average 
January sea 
temp. 00C; 
Average wind 
speed 8.3 m/s; 
Sea temp. 
above +1оС; 
Wind speed 
2-15 m/s; 
Polar lows 
Air temp. below 0oC 9-10 
months (northern Kara Sea), 7-
8 months (southern Kara Sea). 
Average January temp. -20 оС 
/-28 оС (minimum up to -500C);
Minimum air temp.= 
-480C; 
Maximum summer 
temp.=+260C; 
Wave height:  
3.2-4.7 m 
Average summer 
temp.=+50С/+70C; 
Average winter 
temp.=-35оС/ -37оС 
up to -600C 
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Average wind 
speed 27 m/s; 
Average wave 
height 2 m 
 
Wave height:  
3.2-4.7 m 
(extreme up to 
11.5m) 
Storm waves and sea agitation in 
autumn/winter 
Wave height 
ab. 2.1m 
(extreme up to 
13.8m) 
Average July temp. -6 оС /+1
оС (maximum +16 оС); 
High humidity; 
July-August: maximum fog and 
low visibility 
 
Distance 
from the 
shore 
88 km 60km 11km Orlan 
platform 
 
16km Molikpaq 
(Piltun-
Astokhskaya-A) 
platform  
50 km 415 km from 
the Norwegian 
shore;  
37 km from the 
Russian border 
315 km 
 
250 km 90 km 70 meters 
25 km Berkut 
platform 
12km Piltun-
Astokhskaya-B 
platform 
- 15km Lunskaya 
platform 
Distance 
from the 
supply 
base 
88km from 
Hammerfest 
980km from 
Murmansk 
no data no data About 240km 
from 
Hammerfest 
About 570 km 
from 
Hammerfest 
315 km from 
Hammerfest 
Over 1,600 km from 
Murmansk 
About 960 km 
(Murmansk); 780km 
(Arkhangelsk) 
350km from the 
nearest settlement 
Khatanga; 3,600km 
from Arkhangelsk 
Infrastructure       
Number of 
OSVs 
3 OSVs 3 OSVs; 
1 stand-by 
vessel; 
1 icebreaker 
4 OSVs;  
1 rescue vessel 
8 OSVs 1 OSV; 
1 stand-by 
vessel - as 
assumed 
2 OSVs; 
1 stand-by 
vessel; 
1 shared 
emergency 
vessel from 
Goliat project 
4 OSVs 11 OSVs;  
1 rescue vessel;  
2 icebreakers;  
1 chemical tanker 
3 OSVs+ 
1 rescue vessel 
No OSVs;  
4 general cargo 
shallow ships; 
3 icebreakers; 
2 ice-class 
container vessels 
via the NSR 
Number of 
helicopters 
used 
1SAR + 
1transport 
helicopters 
4 helicopters 1SAR + 
1transport 
helicopters 
1SAR + 
1transport 
helicopters 
1SAR + 
1transport 
helicopters 
1SAR + 
1transport 
helicopters 
1 SAR 
helicopter 
Not allowed to use 1 SAR helicopter; 
no data about 
transport helicopter 
no data 
Number of 
tankers 
3 shuttle tankers 2 shuttle 
tankers 
5 Aframax  
tankers 
3 Aframax tankers;  
2 LNG carriers 
No oil production yet 
Transport 
challenges 
Polar nights, 
Wind, storms; 
Icing 
 
- Remoteness 
for regular 
support; 
- Ice drifting; 
- High waves; 
- Insufficient 
railway 
capacity in 
Murmansk 
port; 
- Leasing 
warehouses; 
- Ice drifting, 
- Ice thickness up to 2m; 
- Wave height up to 19m,  
- Seismic zone 
- Long 
distance – 
10h by a 
supply 
vessel, 
- Polar lows, 
fogs;  
Lack of 
infrastructure;
-Polar nights 
- Long 
distance,  
- Wind high 
speed; 
- Lack of 
infrastructure 
- Dense fogs; 
- Polar lows; 
- Long 
distance; 
- Lack of 
resources 
- Extreme remoteness (3,5 days 
of sailing from Murmansk); 
- Fogs; 
- Squally wind; 
- Ice drifting; 
- Polar nights; 
- Special regulation in waters 
of the NSR: icebreaker escort 
& permissions 
- Ice drift, shallow 
water, wind, waves, 
polar lows; 
- Insufficient 
capacity of railway 
in Murmansk port 
- Extreme 
remoteness from 
supply bases; 
- Long distance; 
- Supply deliveries 
during summer 
navigation; 
- Escort by atomic 
icebreakers; 
- Specific 
regulation on the 
NSR 
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- Leasing the 
airport in 
Varandey 
Challenges 
to SAR & 
oil spill 
response 
- Close to the 
coast due to 
very short 
drifting time in 
this area; 
- Long response 
time for 
resources from 
the Norwegian 
Sea and North 
Sea; 
- Light conditions 
(polar nights); 
- Icing 
- Close to the 
national parks; 
- Long response 
time for 
resources from 
Murmansk; 
- Ice drifting; 
- High waves; 
- Ice rubble 
formation; 
- Polar nights 
- Fast changes of ice conditions; 
- Seismic zone; 
 
- Limited 
preparedness 
in Svalbard; 
- Remote 
location from 
onshore 
resources like 
helicopters 
and hospitals;
- Polar nights 
- Remoteness 
from the coast 
- Fogs 
- Remoteness:
appr. 4hours 
to Tromsø 
hospital; 
- Long 
periods of 
dense fogs; 
- Polar lows; 
- Sparse 
metocean 
data; 
- Helicopter 
restriction 
- Ice masses drift & Icebergs; 
- Constant change of 
weather/ice conditions; 
- Long distance to the shore 
and supply base; 
- Poor communication & JPS 
signals; 
- Magnetics; 
- Complicate to predict exact 
vessel speed and sailing time; 
- In case of oil spills, no good 
solution how to treat it in ice; 
- No vessel to collect oil in ice 
today 
Remoteness,  
Sea depth variations, 
Ice drifting, 
Currents, 
Waves 
- Extreme 
remoteness; 
- Low temperatures 
- polar lows 
- Communication; 
- Lack of 
infrastructure and 
experience; 
- Polar nights 
Main 
experience 
(the 
interviewe
es) 
“Planning is 
much more 
essential in the 
Barents Sea than 
in the North Sea” 
– Norwegian 
shipping comp.#2
“At first, it was 
a great 
challenge to 
ensure regular 
support of the 
platform due to 
changing harsh 
weather 
conditions, ice 
drifting and 
long distance to 
the onshore 
supply base” – 
Russian oil 
company #3 
- “We got a very positive experience of 
our vessels’ transit via the Northern 
Sea Route towards/back Sakhalin 
projects” – Norwegian shipping 
company #1. 
- “It was the first and important 
experience to operate the vessel 
under the Russian flag with the 
Russian crew, using the Russian 
resources and collaboration with the 
Russian government” – Norwegian 
shipping company #1 
- “The 
logistics 
solutions are 
the main 
driver for 
cost-
effectiveness 
of the 
project” – 
Norwegian 
oil company 
#1 
- “To elaborate 
the logistics 
scheme and 
emergency 
preparedness 
for so remote 
area from the 
shore requires 
long 
preparations 
and efforts” – 
Norwegian oil 
company #1. 
- “It was the 
first and 
positive 
experience of 
sharing the 
SAR 
helicopter 
with ENI and 
the Goliat’s 
vessel in the 
case of 
possible oil 
spills” – 
Norwegian oil 
company #1    
- - “The logistics was maybe 
where we didn’t actually 
provide the best service. It 
was a lot of failing and 
learning during those 
operations. The logistics 
could be more efficient what 
we plan to improve in the next 
campaign in 2019” – 
Norwegian shipping company 
#1 
- “The most important 
experience was how to 
operate in a very short 
operating window, trying to 
identify when the ice melts 
and when the ice freezes 
again. It was a crucial 
learning from the operation to 
identify when is the earliest 
point of time you can start and 
when is the latest point of time 
you have to leave the area” – 
Norwegian shipping company 
#1. 
“We learned how it is 
difficult to organize 
the full-fledged 
operation in a very 
short operating 
window of 2014 until 
ice. During four 
months, it’s 
necessary to deliver 
the drilling platform 
to the field, install it, 
drill an exploration 
well, test it and have 
time to eliminate or 
conserve it before the 
first ice comes. This 
considerably 
increases the cost of 
exploration” – 
Russian oil company 
#3 
- “In order to 
prepare for one 
month drilling 
operation, the 
logistics operation 
took 8 months to 
deliver 8,000 tons 
of equipment and 
materials” – 
Russian oil 
company #2. 
- “It was good 
experience to use 
the first year-round 
research base in 
the Arctic region 
located in the 
proximity of the 
drilling site in 
Khatanga bay” – 
Russian oil 
company #2. 
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 *Some explanation to Summary Table #19: 
Five columns marked in green represent the Norwegian cases located in the Norwegian Barents Sea. 
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4.2. Demand for supply services 
The OSVs engaged in the field projects in the Norwegian Barents Sea. 
The Norwegian offshore fleet is generally presented by a large number of companies 
compared with the Russian one, e.g. DOF Subsea, Esvagt, Havila Shipping, REM Offshore, SIEM 
Offshore, Troms Offshore, Viking Supply Ships, and others130.  
 
Based on the cases, presented in the report, Table #20 provides an overview of the type of 
OSVs, used by oil companies for the implementation of offshore field operations in the Norwegian 
Barents Sea. 
 
 Table 20. The type of OSVs engaged in the field projects in the Norwegian Barents Sea. 
Owner Vessel 
name 
Flag Built Ice class Type Emergency 
preparedness 
equipment 
Project 
Esvagt “Esvagt 
Aurora” 
Denmark 2012 DNV 
Ice-1C; 
+1A1 
Multifunctional 
supply vessel 
oil detecting radar; IR 
cameras, winterized, Fire 
Fighting 1, 320 evacuees 
Goliat project 
Simon 
Møkster 
Shipping 
“Stril 
Barents” 
Norway 2015 +1A1 Supply/standby 
vessel 
NOFO2009; oil 
detecting radar, IR 
cameras, 240 evacuees+ 
hospital on board 
DOF Group “Skandi 
Iceman” 
Norway 2013 DNV 
Ice-1B; 
+1A1  
AHTS FiFi I+II, NOFO 2009; 
winterized, oil.rec., 300 
evacuees 
Havila 
Shipping 
“Havila 
Troll” 
Norway 2003 DNV 
Ice-1C; 
+1A1 
Standby vessel FiFi I; oil detecting 
radar, IR cameras, 
winterized, 320 evacuees 
Korpfjell 
project 
(2017) 
Troms 
Offshore 
“Troms 
Arcturus” 
Norway 2014 DNV 
Ice-1C, 
+1A1 
Platform supply 
vessel 
NOFO 2009, oil.rec., 
winterized, 150 
evacuees 
GulfMark 
Rederi, AS 
“North 
Cruys” 
Norway 2014 Ice-1B Platform supply 
vessel 
OIL-REC., NOFO2009, 
Oil- and Ice-radar, 
Winterized,  
300 evacuees 
Wisting 
 
“North 
Barents” 
Norway 2013 Ice-1B Platform supply 
vessel 
OIL-REC., NOFO2009, 
Oil- and Ice-radar, 
Winterized, 
300 evacuees 
Wisting 
 
“K” Line 
Offshore 
AS 
(Kawasaki 
Kisen 
Kaisha) 
KL 
Sandefjord 
 
Norway 2011 DnV 
+1A1 
AHTS ROV, Hospital 1 Wisting 
KL Saltfjord Norway 2011 DnV 
+1A1 
AHTS ROV, Hospital 1 Wisting 
 
When developing field projects on the Norwegian continental shelf in the Barents Sea, oil 
companies prefer to utilize pure specialist vessels, which provide a wide range of specific 
                                                 
130 For more information, see http://offshore-fleet.com/data/companies-norway.htm 
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functions. According to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1, “We have just to allocate 
the right vessel to the right job”.  
As presented in Table #20, “Esvagt Aurora” is the only multifunctional vessel, which has 
been engaged in the Goliat project.   
“The fields in the Norwegian Barents Sea are very vast and far away from the shore. They 
need the support of different types of vessels to perform various offshore operations” – as 
emphasized by the interviewee of the Norwegian vessel-designer. 
He also identified the following issue in specialized shipbuilding: 
“There are specific requirements for the vessel design in the area with harsh conditions. 
At the same time, we learn a lot by collaborating with the customer on the development of the 
vessel design for an area where the vessel will operate. I think that the vessels must be more 
purposeful for the areas where they are used. That’s why it is so important to discuss with oil 
companies what kind of operations and demands, and limitations they face to operate in order to 
avoid design uncertainty in building specialized vessels for offshore oil and gas exploration. It can 
happen, e.g., due to possible unsystematic customer input”.    
 
 
The international OSVs engaged temporally in drilling operations or as extra support in 
winter navigation on the Russian Arctic shelf: 
Table #21 presents the OSVs, owned by international companies (mostly by Norwegian 
ones) on the Russian Arctic shelf. These OSVs were involved temporarily in operations at different 
Russian field projects we investigated in this report. Most of the OSVs listed in Table #21 
participated in drilling operations in 2014 within the field projects - Universitety-1 well and 
Dolginskoye field. There are three vessels in Table #21, namely “Balder Viking”, “Vidar Viking”, 
“Tor Viking”, which provided services as an extra support to the existing fleets for the projects: 
Prirazlomnaya platform, Sakhalin-1, Sakhalin-2. 
As commented by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1,  
“ “Balder Viking” provided services of ice-management at the Prirazlomnaya platform for 
two winter seasons in 2013 and 2015 (from December/January till May). The ice-management at 
Prirazlomnaya has been challenged because they have regularly loading/offloading operations of 
oil tankers. In case of ice drifting and ice building up alongside the platform, the operations can 
be delayed. The contract was initiated by GazpromNeft-Shelf (operator). They needed our vessel 
because the icebreaker was going to maintenance, docking additional tonnage during those winter 
periods. In 2018, “Balder Viking” is going to continue providing its services for the 
Prirazlomnaya platform”.  
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Vessel “Tor Viking” provided two kind of services simultaneously: for anchor handling 
and ice-management as operations for ice-charts and ice removing on board the vessel in the period 
of 2012-2014 in the Sakhalin-1 project.   
Since 2012, “Vidar Viking” provided two tasks in the Sakhalin-2 project: 1) supply 
operations in summers for three platforms - Molikpaq (Piltun-Astokhskaya-A), Piltun-
Astokhskaya-B and Lunskaya-A; and 2) winter watch during 2014-2016 at the platform Piltun-
Astokhskaya-B as the most northern platform among others in Sakhalin-2.  
Photos from winter watch by “Vidar Viking” in the Sea of Okhotsk at Piltun-Astokhskaya-
B (April 2013): 
 
 
 
 
In order to reach Sakhalin projects, both vessels “Vidar Viking” and “Tor Viking” 
experienced several transits via the Northern Sea Route131.   
 
                                                 
131 Also towards/back Alaska in 2007, 2010, 2012 when “Tor Viking” was working for Shell’s project in the Beaufort 
Sea and Chukchi Sea because the shorter distance instead of via Panama from Seattle to Sweden 9,500-
7,400=2,400nm, as well as good experiences with previous transits via the Northern Sea Route (from the interview 
with the representative of Viking Ice Consultancy). 
Figure 102. Winter watch in April, 2013
(Source: vikingsupply.com) 
Figure 101. Vessel icing in January, 2014 
(Source: vikingsupply.com) 
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Figure 103. Transit of “Tor Viking” via the Northern Sea Route during the summer navigation in 2014  
(Source: vikingsupply.com) 
 
 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1, 
“We got very positive experience of our vessels’ transit via the Northern Sea Route 
towards/back Sakhalin projects and Alaska. We increased considerably our knowledge about the 
Arctic conditions. Atomflot, of course, provided us with icebreaker assistance. For instance, in 
2014 two icebreakers “Vaygach” and “Yamal” made the ice channel for our vessel. That transit 
took 16 days for “Tor Viking” eastward to reach the Sakhalin-1 project”. 
 
It is worth noting that while “Balder Viking” during several contracts at Prirazlomnaya 
platform did not need to change the Swedish flag into the Russian, both vessels “Vidar Viking” 
and “Tor Viking” had to change their flags into the Russian flag132.  
“It was the first and important experience for Viking Supply to operate the vessel under 
the Russian flag with the Russian crew, using the Russian resources and collaboration with the 
Russian government”, as commented the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1 on the 
participation of both “Vidar Viking” and “Tor Viking” in Sakhalin. 
All the other vessels presented in Table #21 did need to change their original flags into the 
Russian flag because they were involved in both Universitetskaya-1 well and Dolginskoye field 
projects only for the very short period of drilling operations. 
  
                                                 
132 According to the Russian legislation, an international vessel is allowed to operate in the Russian waters under its 
origin flag only within six months. Then, the vessel has to change its origin flag into the Russian flag (the 1st author’s 
note).   
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Table 21. International OSVs engaged temporally in operations on the Russian Arctic shelf. 
Owner Vessel 
name 
Flag Built Ice class Type Emergency 
preparedness 
equipment 
Project 
Viking 
Supply 
Ships, AS 
“Balder 
Viking” 
Sweden 2000 DnV Ice-
10, +1A1 
AHTS - Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
Prirazlomnaya in 
2013, 2015, 2018
“Brage 
Viking” 
Norway 2012 DnV-GL, 
Ice-1A 
Super, 
+1A1 
AHTS FiFi II, Oil Rec., 
NOFO2009; 120-200 
evacuees 
Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
“Loke 
Viking” 
Norway 2010 DnV, Ice-
1A; 
+1A1 
AHTS FiFi II, Oil Rec., 
NOFO2009; 120-200 
evacuees 
Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
“Magne 
Viking” 
Denmark 2011 DnV, Ice-
1A; 
+1A1 
AHTS FiFi II, Oil Rec., 
NOFO2009; 120-200 
evacuees 
Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
“Vidar 
Viking” 
Sweden/
Russia 
2001 DnV Ice-
10; 
+1A1 
AHTS winterized Sakhalin-2 in 
2012-2014, 2014-
2016, 2016 
“Tor 
Viking” 
Sweden/
Russia 
2000 DnV Ice-
10; 
+1A1 
AHTS winterized Sakhalin-1 in 
2012- 2014 
Siem 
Offshore 
Rederi, AS 
“SIEM 
Amethyst” 
Norway 2011 DnV, Ice-
C, +1A1 
AHTS Oil.rec., NOFO2009,  
FiFi, De-ice 
Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
“SIEM 
Topaz” 
Norway 2010 DnV, 
Ice-C, 
+1A1 
AHTS Oil.rec., NOFO2009,  
FiFi 2, De-ice, 
300 evacuees 
Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
“SIEM 
Pilot” 
Norway 2010 DnV, 
Ice-C, 
+1A1 
Platform 
supply vessel 
Oil.rec., FiFi 2,  Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
Rem 
Supply AS 
“REM 
Server” 
Norway 2011 DnV, 
Ice C, 
+1A1 
Platform 
supply vessel 
Oil. Rec. Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
“REM 
Supporter” 
Norway 2012 DnV, 
Ice-C, 
+1A1 
Platform 
supply vessel 
Oil. Rec. Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
Island 
Offshore 
Group 
“Island 
Crown” 
Bahamas 2013 DnV, 
Ice-C, 
+1A1 
OSV Oil. Rec. Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
TS 
Shipping 
Haren 
“Botnica” Estonia 1998 DNV Ice-
10 
Multipurpose 
icebreaker 
2 5MW Azipods, 
Helipad, 
 
Universitetskaya-
1 well in 2014 
Simon 
Møkster 
Rederi AS 
“Strilborg” Norway 1998 DnV 
+1A1, 
ICE-C  
AHTS Oil. Rec. NOFO 2009, 
DYNPOS AUTR., 
FiFi I&II,  
300 evacuees 
Dolginskoye field 
(in 2014) 
Stril 
Offshore 
AS, 
c/o Simon 
Møkster 
shipping 
AS 
“Stril 
Challenger”
Norway 2009 100A1,  
1E 
AHTS Oil. Rec. NOFO 2005, 
FiFi I, First-aid 
assistance, 
280 evacuees  
“Stril 
Comman-
der” 
Norway 2009 100A1, 
1E 
AHTS Oil. Rec. NOFO 2005, 
FiFi I, First-aid 
assistance, 
280 evacuees 
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In addition, the findings of the report have shown that both Gazprom and Rosneft are used 
to employ international OSVs for drilling operations on the Russian shelf. For exploitation 
operations, both companies use the OSVs owned by their subsidiaries and/or other Russian ship 
owners.  
 
The OSVs engaged in the Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic projects nowadays: 
The Russian offshore fleet is generally presented by a variety of OSVs owned and operated 
by the following companies: Dalmorneftegeophysica (DMNG). Gazflot, FEMCO, Luk’oil, Marine 
Arctic Geological Expedition, Northern Shipping Company (NSC), Sovcomflot (SCF)133. In this 
report, we specifically focus on OSVs, which operate only in the Arctic areas (See Table #22).  
 
Table 22. The Russian market of OSVs that operate in the Arctic areas nowadays. 
Owner Vessel 
name 
Flag Built Ice 
class 
Type Characteristics Emergency 
preparedness 
equipment 
Project 
Gazflot - 
subsidiary 
of Gazprom 
“Yury 
Topchev” 
Russia 2006 DNV 
Ice-15 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking 
supply vessel 
2 ABB Azipod 
units; Ice 
thickness up to 
1.7 m, t = down  
-500C 
equipment for oil 
spill recovery 
Prirazlom-
naya 
platform 
“Vladislav 
Strizhov” 
Russia 2003 DNV 
Ice-15 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking 
supply vessel 
Ice 2 ABB 
Azipod units; 
thickness up to 
1.7 m, t = down  
-500C 
equipment for oil 
spill recovery 
FEMCO 
 
“Aleut” Russia 2015 Icebrea-
ker 6; 
ARC5 
Supply vessel  Oil.Rec., 
DYNPOS-1, 
Winterized (-30), 
FiFi 3 
Prirazlom-
naya 
platform 
“Kigoriak” Russia 1979 Ice 
class3 
Anchor 
handling vessel
 Oil water 
separator, rescue 
boat, life rafts for 
80 persons, FiFi - 
Fire pump, 
emergency fire 
pump 
Sakhalin-1 
“Vengery”*
134 
Russia 1983 1A 
Super 
AHTS Decommissioned currently Sakhalin-1 
(2005-2006) 
Rosmorrec
hflot - The 
Federal 
Agency for 
Maritime 
and River 
Transport 
“Murman” Russia 2015 Icebrea
ker 6 
Rescue vessel Propulsion: 2 x 
3500 kW 
Azipods 
Oil.Rec., 
DYNPOS-2, 
FiFi 2, helidec; 
95 survivors 
Prirazlom-
naya 
platform 
“Spasatel 
Kavdeykin”
* 
Russia 2013 Ice-1A* Multipurpose 
rescue vessel 
 DYNPOS-2, 
Oil.Rec., 
2skimmers   
Universitets-
kaya-1 well 
(2014) 
“Spasatel 
Karev”* 
Russia 2010 Ice-1A* Multipurpose 
rescue vessel 
 DYNPOS-2, 
Oil.Rec., 
2skimmers 
Dolginskoye 
field (2014) 
                                                 
133 For more information, see http://offshore-fleet.com/data/companies-russia.htm 
134 In the project, this vessel participated under its former name “Crowley Alliance” that it had until 2007 (the 1st 
author’s note). 
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Sovcomflot 
(SCF) 
SCF 
Sakhalin 
Russia 2005 DNV 
Ice-10; 
RMRS 
Icebrea-
ker 7 
Platform 
supply and 
stand-by vessel 
2 ABB Azipod 
units, 2 bow 
thrusters; Ice 
thickness up to 
1.7 m, t = down  
-500C 
winterization, 
Oil. Rec., oil 
spill response 
gear, Arctic oil 
skimmer, 
reception tank 
for oily water, 
150 evacuees 
Sakhalin-1 
“Vitus 
Bering” 
Russia 2012 DNV 
Ice-10; 
+100A1
Multifunctional 
icebreaker - 
Platform 
supply and 
stand-by vessel 
2 ABB Azipod 
units, 2 bow 
thrusters; Ice 
thickness up to 
1.7 m, t = down  
-500C 
winterization, 
Oil.Rec.; oil spill 
response gear, 
Arctic oil 
skimmer, FiFi 1; 
reception tank 
for oily water, 
195 evacuees 
Sakhalin-1 
“Aleksey 
Chirikov” 
Russia 2012 DNV 
Ice-10 
Multifunctional 
icebreaker - 
Platform 
supply and 
stand-by vessel 
2 ABB Azipod 
units, 2 bow 
thrusters; Ice 
thickness up to 
1.7 m, t = down  
-500C 
winterization, 
Oil.Rec.; oil spill 
response gear, 
Arctic oil 
skimmer, FiFi 1; 
reception tank 
for oily water, 
195 evacuees 
Sakhalin-1 
SCF 
Endurance 
Russia 2006 Ice-10; 
+1A1 
Icebreaking 
platform supply 
vessel 
 Oil-Rec, 150 
evacuees 
Sakhalin-2 
SCF 
Enterprise 
Russia 2006 Ice-10; 
+1A1 
Icebreaking 
platform supply 
vessel 
 Oil-Rec, 150 
evacuees 
Sakhalin-2 
SCF 
Endeavour 
Russia 2006 Ice-10; 
+1A1 
Icebreaking 
platform supply 
vessel 
 Oil-Rec, 150 
evacuees 
Sakhalin-2 
“Fedor 
Ushakov” 
Russia 2017 Ice-15; 
+1A1 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking 
stand-by vessel 
Able to operate 
in 1.7 meter 
thick ice 
Winterized 
Cold,  
Dat (-35°C), 
FiFi 1, Oil Rec., 
150 evacuees 
Sakhalin-2 
“Gennadiy 
Nevelskoy” 
Russia 2017 Ice-15; 
+1A1 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking 
platform supply 
vessel 
Able to operate 
in 1.7 meter 
thick ice 
Winterized 
Cold,  
Dat (-35°C), 
FiFi 1, Oil Rec., 
150 evacuees 
Sakhalin-2 
“Stepan 
Makarov” 
Russia 2017 Ice-15; 
+1A1 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking 
standby vessel 
Able to operate 
in 1.7 meter 
thick ice 
Winterized 
Cold,  
Dat (-35°C), 
FiFi 1, Oil Rec., 
150 evacuees 
Sakhalin-2
“Yevgeny 
Primakov” 
Russia 2017 Ice-15; 
+1A1 
Multifunctional 
icebreaking 
standby vessel 
Able to operate 
in 1.7 meter 
thick ice 
Winterized 
Cold,  
Dat (-35°C), 
FiFi 1, Oil Rec., 
150 evacuees 
Sakhalin-2
Gazprom 
Neft135 
“Alexander 
Sannikov” 
Russia 2018 Icebrea-
ker 8 
diesel-electric 
icebreaker – 
ice-class tug & 
rescue vessel 
Able to operate 
in ice of up to 
2m thick, 
the principle of 
zero emissions 
FF1WS, 
DYNPOS-2, 
ANTI-ICE, 
ECO, Oil.Rec. 
Winterization  
For 
Novoportovs
koye field 
project to 
ensure the 
                                                 
135 For more information, see http://www.gazprom-neft.com/press-center/news/1115315/ 
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(-50°C), hospital, 
treatment room, 
isolation cabin, 
helipad for 
a Mi-8 
year-round 
operation of 
the Arctic 
Gates oil 
export 
terminal, 
located in 
the western 
part of the 
Gulf of Ob, 
SAR 
operations, 
oil spill 
response 
“Andrei 
Vilkitskiy” 
Russia 2018 Icebrea-
ker 8 
diesel-electric 
icebreaker – 
ice-class tug & 
rescue vessel 
Able to operate 
in ice of up to 
2m thick, 
the principle of 
zero emissions 
FF1WS, 
DYNPOS-2, 
ANTI-ICE, 
ECO, Oil.Rec. 
Winterization  
(-50°C), hospital, 
treatment room, 
isolation cabin, 
helipad for 
A Mi-8 
Rosneft136 “Ekaterina 
the Great” 
Russia 2019  Multipurpose 
ice-class supply 
vessel 
Able to operate 
in 1.5 meter 
thick ice 
 For projects 
in the 
Northern 
Seas like the 
Kara Sea 
and the 
Laptev Sea 
“St. Maria” Russia 2019  Multipurpose 
ice-class supply 
vessel 
Able to operate 
in 1.5 meter 
thick ice 
 
“Aleksander 
Nevskiy” 
Russia 2019  Multipurpose 
ice-class supply 
vessel 
Able to operate 
in 1.5 meter 
thick ice 
 
“Vladimir 
Monomakh
” 
Russia 2019  Multipurpose 
ice-class supply 
vessel 
Able to operate 
in 1.5 meter 
thick ice 
 
* Some explanation to Table #22: 
Indication of the years to some vessels in the last column means that they operated within these projects only in 
specific years and were no longer involved. The other vessels without years to the projects (in the last column) mean 
that they have been operating within these projects for a long time and nowadays. 
 
In addition to the vessels represented in each separately examined case, Table #22 also 
includes five offshore vessels for GazpromNeft and Rosneft, which have still been under the 
construction. At the same time, Table #22 does not contain OSVs that were built specifically for 
the Russian Navy’s Arctic-going fleet, for instance the ice-class Arctic patrol vessel “Ilya 
Muromets” (built 2017, Icebreaker6). 
It is generally known that the primary function of OSVs is to deliver supplies associated 
with the operation to the offshore installations. Analyzing the data from Table #22 we can find 
that OSVs constructed in earlier years had a rather narrow specificity, but covering already a quite 
wide range of additional functions, such as towing offshore structures, drilling rigs and barges, 
anchor handling and installation of mooring systems, diving, ROV and some other operations. In 
recent years, the development of OSVs has made a shift towards more multifunctional vessels than 
only specialist vessels, as we can find in Table #22.  
The main Russian players in the oil and gas field development including – Rosneft, 
Gazprom, Sakhalin Energy, as well as Russian large shipping companies – Sovcomflot have 
                                                 
136 For more information, see http://www.oilexp.ru/news/world/arkticheskuyu-neft-prikroyut-flagom-video/133910/ 
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recently ordered the vessels of a new series of vessels at shipyards like “Fedor Ushakov”. The new 
vessel type has been designed for extreme environmental conditions with high icebreaking 
capability. These vessels are able to operate without the icebreaker escort in 1.7-meter thick 
drifting ice in temperatures as cold as - 350C. In addition, it is worth noting that they combine high 
maneuverability, a powerful propulsion system, environmental friendliness, and a large passenger 
capacity (during an evacuation, the vessel can hold up to 150 people). 
”These state-of-the-art multifunctional icebreaking supply vessels can be utilized in many 
arctic areas in the future and I see a global need for such Arctic vessel”, said the Managing 
Director of Arctech Helsinki Shipyard, Esko Mustamäki, about vessels “Vitus Bering” and 
“Aleksey Chirikov”137. The construction of these vessels ensures and expands “companies’ 
participation in field projects on Russia’s continental shelf”, according to Sergey Frank, President 
of Sovcomflot (SOE). 
The demand for multipurpose vessels for the field projects on Russia’s continental shelf 
can be explained by two basic distinctive features related to most Russian Arctic offshore fields 
such as the presence of harsh ice conditions, long distances, and the necessity to create at least 
some basic onshore facilities for each project before the start. Multipurpose vessels are flexible in 
not only carrying various type of cargo and providing a number of specialized services as a 
supplement like anchor handling, rig moves, towing, ROV and others, but also they ensure 
emergency preparedness to SAR and oil spills. In addition, it is worth emphasizing that new 
multifunctional OSVs in Russia have been built to be engaged in the development of the concrete 
projects.    
At the same time, personnel transportation remains an important issue for Arctic fields 
located in extremely remote areas from the shore and supply bases. Today helicopters are 
preferred, but long distances require new thinking involving ice strengthened maritime vessels and 
multitask vessels for direct and intermediate transportation, as shown by the case of the 
Universitetskaya-1 well development in the Kara Sea. 
Therefore, as oil and gas companies are looking for new fields to be explored on Russia’s 
continental shelf, where local conditions are harsh and challengeable like the Arctic seas, the 
demand for multifunctional and multipurpose OSVs, providing with more developed and 
improved services, considerably increases nowadays. In the Russian offshore operations, we can 
observe the tendency that oil and gas companies prefer to have a large ship owner’s share in the 
supply chain like Sovcomflot, FEMCO, Gazflot.   
According to the interviewee of Russian oil company #2,  
                                                 
137 Available on: http://www.setcorp.ru/main/pressrelease.phtml?language=english&news_id=46521 
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“That occurs because there is a limited number of service providers and too much limited 
number of the customers – Rosneft and GazpromNeft. Multifunctional OSVs integrate different 
kinds of equipment on board and provide the whole capacity in this case. They becomes also of 
importance due to extreme remoteness between the installations and supply bases on the Russian 
shelf”.    
In contrast, the Norwegian petroleum companies have still tended to contract OSVs on 
specific specialty, which provide a wide range of specific functions, because  
“there is a large number of customers – more than 50 oil companies in Norway, and a 
large number of independent suppliers on the Norwegian offshore market”, according to the 
interviewee of Russian oil company #2. 
 
4.3. OSVs’ services required in the High Arctic  
The demand for OSVs is defined by the harsh and challenging environment in the Arctic 
with specific requirements on OSVs functions and design.    
“While the ship-owner knows how to build and design a vessel, the oil company, which 
operates in concrete specific conditions, is the only who realizes how to use the vessel and what 
kind of features it needs” – as told by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1. 
 
In addition, “the very latest innovations in shipbuilding science and technology are in high 
demand from both Russian and international oil and gas companies”, said Sergey Frank, President 
of OAO Sovcomflot138. The following OSVs’ services are in demand: 
- Cargo supply; 
- Anchor handling and towing; 
- Ice management; 
- Emergency preparedness and standby; 
- Special navigation systems on board; 
- Special vessel capabilities: ice strengthening and winterization. 
 
 
We may here find different solutions as to multi-functionality within each ship versus 
more specialized vessels as listed below: 
 
                                                 
138 Available on: http://www.setcorp.ru/main/pressrelease.phtml?language=english&news_id=46521 
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• Each ship: 
• PSVs and AHTVs with maximum multi-functionality due to need for redundancy 
• Highest possible cargo capacity due to distances 
• High maneuverability due to wind, waves and stability issues at rig and a route 
• Helicopter landing platform due to fog and polar lows 
• HIFR-functionality -in-air helicopter fueling facilities 
• High(est) winterization for safety 
• Highest comfort class for crew welfare and stayer ability 
 
• Fleet: 
• Redundancy in transport capacity 
• Redundancy in towing for fast removal of rig  
• Ice management capacity against ice berg and ice floes 
• Offshore depot 
• Offshore spare parts and repair facilities 
• Passenger transport and hotel capacity 
• Hospital capacity 
• Helicopter fueling and hub capacity 
 
 
 
4.3.1. Cargo supply operational capacity  
Almost every Arctic offshore operations are characterized by long distances to ports and 
onshore supply bases from offshore installations. The cargo type differs very slightly for drilling 
operations or oil production facilities. The table below illuminates the critical parameters: 
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LOGISTICS VALUE: 
• Cost efficiency: 
Supply chain time efficiency  
• Cargo damage elimination  
• Productivity-resource per ton distance 
• Transaction-cost reductions  
Quality and effectiveness: 
• Prompt delivery  
• Coordination between service providers 
• Flexibility  
• Responsiveness  
Safety, security, sustainability and stakeholder relations: 
• Person and ship safety and security 
• Capacities within preparedness (SAR, ORO, etc.) 
• Hub capacities 
• Public relations capabilities 
 
 
One of the main challenges is the fuel supply to the rig.  Both increased tank capacities and 
deck space may be needed. This calls for larger vessels than the ones serving today. Using a hotel 
and storage vessel on site is another solution used both in the Greenland and Kara sea operations.  
According to the interviewee of Russian oil company #2, “If a field’s location is too 
remote, for commercial purposes, an operator can organize a drill tanker in the vicinity of the 
field site. This solution can be valuable and reasonable only if the tanker is used for servicing 
more than one site”. 
 Almost all Arctic offshore field projects are characterized by the extreme remoteness and 
too long distances between onshore supply bases and offshore installations.  
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As told by the interviewee of Russian oil company #3, “The OSV capacity is significant 
factor for us due to long distances to carry the necessary supplies”.  
The long distances in transport and weather delays may be followed by limited time windows for 
loading and discharging between the rig and the vessel due to wind and wave conditions.  The 
limited satellite communication may hamper positioning at the rig run by the  dynamic positioning 
system on board. This may call for extra use of satellite capacities for GPS correction signals, extra 
low-angle GPS antennas, and extra link-up facilities to the rig for exact positioning, for example 
through the  Radius system. 
4.3.2. Anchor handling and towing 
This service refers to securing the stability of an offshore facility by mooring anchors to 
the sea bed. Modern drilling units possess a dynamic positioning system when anchor handling is 
less required. However, in the High Arctic offshore fields with ice constant flowing and the water 
depth it may require both dynamical position systems and anchor handling. 
Towing is mostly referred to exploration activities, when a drilling rig is moved in and out 
of the drilling site. The towing duty is  challenging and has been subject to accidents. For instance, 
the jack-up rig “GSP Saturn” was damaged in stormy weather by waves in the Pechora Sea in 
November 06, 2014 when it was towed to Murmansk after the drilling operations at the 
Dolginskoye field. In the mid-December 2011, the Russian jack-up rig “Kolskaya” with 67 crew 
onboard capsized and sank within twenty minutes during a storm in the Okhotsk Sea while being 
towed through a winter storm, leaving more than 50 dead or missing in the icy waters139.   
The water depth can be a problem for both rigs and dynamical positioning systems due to 
constant offset movements of the drill installation. 
As told by the interviewee of Russian oil company #3, 
“The water depth at the Dolginskoye field is only about 40m. So, the offset movement of 
jack-up rig “Saturn” could reach up to 0.8 m. We took additional efforts that anchor handling 
could secure this maximum of the rig offset movement. At the same time, the water depth was a 
reason why we used a jack-up rig during the drilling operations in summer months of 2014 because 
this type of rigs decreases the demand for anchor handling activity, but increases the demand for 
towing. This specificity added to some extent nervousness to implement and finish all the necessary 
operations in a short window before the ice came”.   
   
                                                 
139 For more information, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-platform-capsize/russian-rig-sinks-more-
than-50-feared-dead-idUSTRE7BH04020111218 
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4.3.3. Ice management 
One of the rules in the book, titled “Handling ships in Ice”, says: “Work with the ice, not 
against it!” (Buysse, 2007).  
Arctic offshore operations are a very demanding job in extremely difficult conditions. 
During the winter, many Arctic areas are characterized by the air temperatures down to -35 C°, 
waves up to 18 meters in height, wind speeds 140 kilometers per hour and the ice thickness up to 
two meters. It is important that the oil and gas rigs are served by vessels, which are capable of 
managing masses of ice effectively. In the worst case, piling masses of ice can damage production 
platforms and cause serious danger to people and the environment. Proactive ice management by 
using special vessels is therefore a crucial factor. 
Table #22, shows that on the Russian continental shelf there is a demand for supply vessels 
that are able to perform ice management services, ensuring the year-round delivery of supplies 
without icebreaker assistance with high maneuverability in the Arctic winter. The new Russian 
offshore vessels like “Vitus Bering”, “Aleksey Chirikov”, “Gennadiy Nevelskoy”, “Fedor 
Ushakov” have been designed specifically for these tasks. The vessels are based on double acting 
ship concept and move bow first in open waters, then stern in heavy ice providing icebreaking 
functions.  
With proper ice management, the drilling season can be extended in some areas from a 2-
3 months window to all year round, according to the interviewee from the Norwegian shipping 
company #1.  
Ice management includes a number of different tasks like icebreaking, ice monitoring, 
providing the knowledge hon ow the ice conditions differ and how the ice moves, iceberg towing, 
deflecting sea ice and ice floes, surveillance, operational ice charts, and ice advisory.  
“It’s important to choose the right ice-advisors that can find the optimal solution for the 
concrete project!”, as emphasized the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1. 
Monitoring the ice movements is a constant challenge. For instance, in case of drilling 
operations at the Universitetskaya-1 well in the Kara Sea in 2014, ice monitoring, including 
breaking ice formations and altering possible iceberg courses, was carried out by separate vessels 
not to distract supply vessels from their main functions.  
“To make sure the drilling operations was not at risk, we used 5 drones and iceberg 
tracking to survey the proximity of the protected area during drilling operations in the Kara Sea“ 
– according to the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1.  
An additional challenge to ice management is underdeveloped monitoring systems and 
polar night conditions. 
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Figure 104. Providing ice management services by “Vidar Viking” on the Lomonosov Ridge close to the North 
Pole in 2003 (Source: vikingsupply.com) 
 
The company Rosneft has been paying attention to the development of experience and 
skills in ice management for the past several years, by performing experimental work in the waters 
of the Kara and Barents seas. Within the Kara Summer-2016 expedition, Rosneft tested for the 
first time in Russia the technology allowing changing the trajectory of iceberg drifts by external 
influence. Icebreaker "Captain Dranitsin" performed 18 successful towages of icebergs in the Kara 
Sea with a 90 and 180-degree turn of movement vs. their original trajectory. At the same time, 
specialists managed to successfully perform simultaneous towing of two icebergs. Within the Kara 
Summer-2017 expedition, Rosneft and specialists of the LLC Arctic Science Center performed 
eight experiments detecting and tracking of icebergs using different technical tools, including 
drones. In addition, 18 experiments on physical impact on icebergs were successfully performed, 
including the use of towing equipment, propellers and water cannon. During the Kara Summer-
2017, the maximum weight of the towed iceberg was 1.1 million tons; the towing of the iceberg 
per day was 50 miles (from the southern part of the British Channel to the Geographer's Bay of 
Prince George Land Island located in Franz Josef Land); the maximum towing speed was 3.2 knots 
(about 6 km/h); maximum wind speed at towing -15m/s140. 
 
                                                 
140 For more information, see https://www.rosneft.ru/press/news/item/188167/ 
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“The experiments performed during the Kara Summer expeditions will allow to protect the 
marine infrastructure from contact with icebergs while performing operations in the Arctic seas, 
particularly in the Kara Sea, Laptev Sea and Chukchi Sea” as emphasized by the interviewee of 
Russian oil company #2. 
 
Figure 105. Kara Summer-2017 expedition (Source: Rosneft.ru) 
 
The Kara Summer-2017 expedition also aimed to develop training scenarios on the 
interaction of the icebreaker and the Coast Operations Center in protecting the conventional 
offshore oil and gas production facility from the iceberg threat in the Barents and Kara Seas. Each 
of the scenarios determined the location of the "platform" in an area with a large number of 
icebergs, the degree of ice danger for the protected object, and the drift of dangerous ice formations 
was monitored. 
 
4.3.4. Emergency preparedness and standby functionality 
Due to long distances from the shore and supply bases and logistics challenges linked to 
low temperatures and poor daylight conditions, emergency preparedness and oil response 
capability become a special and even rather essential functions for the development of oil and gas 
projects in Arctic waters.  
As told by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“The offshore installations have to be fully self-sufficient due to the remoteness, because it 
will take a much long time for the nearest assistance to reach the installation in case of any 
emergency or accident. OSVs are the only ones that are able to ensure this capacity in the Arctic 
waters. We face a number of issues with the use of helicopters. For example, the inability to use 
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helicopters because of the abundance of fogs or the presence of military bases like in the Kara 
Sea. These issues increase the risk and affect the cargo capacity of OSVs negatively”. 
“That’s why all operations in Arctic waters require too long and careful preparations 
before they start in real conditions” as added by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1. 
In most field projects, OSVs are equipped with the necessary equipment to be ready for 
participating in developed emergency plans in case of a failure. However, this may not be sufficient 
at all when you are dealing with ice as emphasized by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping 
company #1: 
“When oil companies operate in the ice, emergency prevention and oil spill response 
capabilities decrease considerably. There is actually no good solution today how to treat an oil 
spill in ice. You can probably burn it off?!? But there are no vessels and sufficient equipment for 
today, which are able to collect oil from the ice and/or ice mixed with oil. I think what we can do 
is to take the best equipment, the best people we have and do our best out of it. We have to not 
allow anything go wrong in Arctic icy waters”.  
Ice management is ensuring emergency preparedness according to the interviewee of 
Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“The operators and all others involved in the field project should be aware of where the 
ice is and where the ice is moving. Using OSVs with high ice class and towing equipment, you can 
tow away the ice, maybe with oil, from the platform and then you can tow it to the area where you 
can start collecting oil. So, good skills in ice management are important for emergency 
preparedness along with good equipment and well-trained personnel”.   
 
The findings of the report have also shown that one of the most important capacities of 
OSVs is the ability to accommodate 100-200 persons on board in case of an emergency evacuation 
from the rig (see Tables #20,#21,#22).  
“It is a real challenge to perform the evacuation operation in high waves and drifting ice” 
as told by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1. 
“The number of standby vessels can depend on the distance to shore and                   
reach 2-3 vessels near one platform. For instance, in Equinor, we have a general requirement that 
the first recovery system should be in the sea within five hours. However, at the Korpfjell, 
according to NOFO arrangement, the whole recovery system should be in the sea within two hours 
to start the emergency operations”, according to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1. 
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4.3.5. Ice surveillance tools 
In order to obtain safe and effective operations in the demanding Arctic waters, there is a 
strong necessary to use special navigation systems on board and operational systems by sharing 
information between all project participants. 
“Be aware of challenges! – We follow this principle as decisive that everyone in the project 
sees the same operational picture in real-time getting the same information and messages 
integrated in a single system for both offshore and onshore units. We call our system “COPD - 
Common Operational Picture Display”. It makes everybody in the project – people on the rig, 
from oil companies, crews on board, suppliers, vessel operators - be aware of the situation: time 
data, the weather and ice conditions, the position of the vessels, and so on”, as told by the 
interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1. 
The combination of both integrated navigation systems and geographical information 
systems can provide with effective logistics solutions, particularly when all operations have to be 
carried out for very short operating window before the ice season begins again. 
“When everybody see the same picture how the ice is moving, you can plan the operations 
much more efficient, because you can predict where a new open window is during next several 
hours. You don’t need to explain, argue or discuss your next strategic steps with anybody. 
Everybody has the same picture that makes it clear how the best safe operations can be carried 
out”, as commented by the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1. 
 
4.3.6. Ice strengthening and winterization 
One of the main features for the vessels to operate in Arctic waters and meet cold-climate 
operating needs are: 
- Ice strengthening – via the PC polar ice classes, from PC(1) to PC(7), and the Baltic ice 
classes, ICE(1A*) to ICE(1C); 
-  Winterization – the protection of ship systems from freezing and avoiding ice on 
superstructure. 
The following experience with  respect to ice strengthening capability was shared by the 
interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1: 
“We had a vessel with ice class 1A. We assumed that if we could modify the vessel design 
and increase the ice class, we were able to qualify that vessel for some other jobs. So, we 
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redesigned the vessel to 1A Super (1A+). And that was something what was appreciated by Exxon 
Neftegaz (operator of the Sakhalin-1 project) and they decided to employ our vessel instead of 
another. I mean if we would not make a decision about the modification of the vessel, we could not 
be qualified for being involved in the operations in Sakhalin”. 
The preparation of equipment for extremely low winter temperatures reduces stress levels, 
cuts downtime and ensure the safety of personnel. 
“Equipment on board designed for use in particularly extreme cold conditions is of great 
importance to prevent damage, reduce stress and cut downtimes. As we can say here: “Pay me 
now or pay me much more later”. I mean that without due attention to the winterized requirements, 
the operational efficiency of a vessel can be at high risk in cold-climate conditions”, according 
the interviewee of Norwegian shipping company #1. 
 
Temperature maintenance anti-icing and de-icing systems on OSVs will prevent ice 
formation on exposed surfaces that can create serious problems, influencing the safety of personnel 
and operations on board OSVs, platforms, walkways and helidecks. 
The findings, based on Table #22, have also shown that the icebreaker capability inherent 
in vessels specially designed to break ice is in demand for the Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic field 
projects. 
 
4.3.7. Additional vessel equipment 
Additional demands for operations will be added spare parts stores both onboard and on 
the supply base as there may be more strain on technical equipment and more difficult transport to 
get spare parts on short notice. 
This also includes equipment and capacity in the hospital on board the vessels, where more 
advanced medical equipment may be needed as transport to hospital may be take time.  
For the crew, lack of communication to shore and more time in the sea may call for more 
entertainment facilities to avoid fatigue and depressions. 
  
 223 
4.3.8. Innovation in OSV vessels towards the Extreme Arctic 
There has been a continuous development in vessel technology including increased functionality.  
Most vessels built in the Norwegian sector have a low ice class (Ice C). The vessels are built larger 
with more deck cargo tank load capacity, more advanced navigation and positioning technology. 
Especially platform supply vessels have had increased functionality as to search and rescue and 
oil spill response.   
 
 
 
Troms Arcturus. PSV  
Type: PSV, VARD CD 07, Built: 2014 Aukra. 
Class:  DNV 1A1 ICE-C DYNPOS-AUTR, Clean Design, Comf-V(2)-C(3), E0, LFL*, SF, Oil 
rec, DK+HL 2,8 NAUT-OSV(A), Winterized Basic, NMD Rescue (150) NOFO 2009,  
Gross tonnage: 4969 t, Length overall 94,65 m, Deck area: 1150m2 
 
Figure The platform supply vessel Troms Arcturus. http://www.tromsoffshore.no 
  
The Vard design CD 07 as shown in the picture above is an example of the continuous development 
in capacities and functionality, with ice class, an enhanced comfort class, MD rescue and NOFO 
oil response classes as well as winterization that makes it well suited for operations in the Southern 
parts of the Barents Sea. 
 
The table below shows how the vessels for the colder, icier, and more remote oil and gas regions 
may be configured.     
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Low Arctic 
(no sea ice) 
Medium 
Arctic 
(risk of ice) 
High Arctic 
(1st year ice) 
Extreme Arctic 
(multi-year ice, ice 
bergs) 
Class: 
 
PSV/ERRV Ice1C High Ice1A* PC 5 PC5 
AHTV Ice 1C 1st year ice PC5 PC4 
Winterization Basic Cold Polar Polar 
Comfort class High (2) Highest (1) Highest (1) Highest (1+) 
Emission/sea noise Battery-LNG Battery-LNG Battery-LNG Battery-LNG, diesel 
TRANSPORT 
Cargo capacity 1100m2 1200m2 1400m2 Xlarge 1500m2 
Hotel capacity 25-50 25-50 50+ 75+ 
PREPAREDNESS: 
Rescue capacity NMD 150 NMD 150 Advanced 
SAR 
equipment 
and hospital 
Advanced 
SAR equipment and 
hospital 
Oil Recovery ORO Medium High Advanced Advanced 
Surveillance Low High Very high Very high 
Fire-fighting Fi-fi 1 Fi-fi 2 Fi-fi 3 Fi-fi 3 
 
 
The table above illuminate the extra vessel demands when we move from low Arctic to the 
extreme Arctic. In the Low Arctic the challenges is not sea ice but a harsh winter climate with 
icing and heavy winter storms, and heavy fog in summer time, like in the Barents Sea South. In 
the High Arctic the challenges are multitude with heavy icing risk, ice bergs and multi-year ice, as 
in the eastern part of Russia. 
The vessel characteristics has to be developed towards a higher ice class with strengthened 
hull and engine capacity,  moving way up the scale towards ice breaker classes. This will, however, 
both increase the investment costs and the operating costs as well, and increase emissions. Thus, 
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the ship owner may need assurance for an all-year and a longer term contract than normal. The 
winterization and increase in comfort class are also costly. The reduction in emissions and sea 
noise is obligatory and the demands to use the lowest emission fueling achievable will 
continuously increase. Moving to battery and LNG-gas powered engines may cause a reduction in 
tank cargo capacity due to space demands for LNG-fuel and batteries. Battery charging and LNG 
fueling facilities must also be available at bases.  
Increases in cargo capacity and passenger call for an increase the length and breadth of the 
vessel. A longer vessel may operate with higher speed. However, it may reduce the 
maneuverability in situations with high waves and strong wind in loading and discharging 
positioning along the rig calling for more thruster capacity.  
The functionality as to emergency response should be at the highest capacity and state of 
the art. The special needs in this field calls for innovations beyond the present notations when it 
comes to equipment that can operate at very low temperatures and in icy conditions. As an 
example, innovation areas  within emergency, search and rescue could be: 
 
• Situational awareness tools, vessel sensors, surveillance, UAV,  
• Remote maneuvering, route transfer  
• Escape tools facilitating evacuation from other vessels and installations 
• Broadband radio and mobile communication uplinks  
• Polar adapted personal rescue equipment – rescue suits, personal sensors, immersion suits 
• Evacuation tools (winterized rig gangways, MOB boats, life boats, life rafts, ice floe tents 
and equipment) 
• Helicopter adaptation for lifting and transfer persons and collective rescue units 
• Telemedicine 
 
These special demands within evacuation, search and rescue opens for opportunities for a  PSV 
having this capacity to serve at least periodically as stand-by guard, emergency response and 
rescue vessel (ERRV) for a region or linked to a specific rig/installation.  
 
As discussed above, there are pro and cons as to an increased number of functions built in one 
vessel. Therefore, there is a need for a discussion on multi-functionality turning towards a “multi-
useless” reputation with lower operational capacity. Some tasks may therefore be channeled to 
more specialized vessels more tailor-made for the Arctic region. 
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As an example, passenger transport and SAR-capacities may be built into one specialized type of 
vessel. The points below shows how such a vessel could be configured. 
 
• Large passenger capacity 100-150 pax 
• Fast going: 15-25 knots  
• Very high stability -limited heave and roll 
• Very high positioning capability-reference systems 
• Very high winterization 
• Highest comfort class 
• Hospital with treatment ward and observation rooms  
• Mobile broadband systems 
• Heli platform  
• Drone capacity 
• Heave-stabilized rig gangway solutions 
• Heave-stabilized crane for personnel lifting 
• Environment-friendly – low emissions – Hybrid LNG-electricity engines 
 
Table. Functionality criteria Passenger transport and evacuation vessel 
 
The demands shown above opens for a more specialized construction with high speed as well as 
high stability and maneuverability at rig. In general, the innovation process has to take a broad 
view in the High Arctic region, with more actors involved to achieve more radical innovations. 
Close cooperation on new design demands and experience sharing as to present technology 
between the oil companies, ship owners and design companies are strongly recommended.  
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4.4. Supply bases 
An onshore supply base is a complex of operational and maintenance services to support 
wells and further extraction of oil and gas on the continental shelf. Onshore supply bases may 
accept, handle, store different cargos, materials and equipment, as well as provide domestic and 
industrial waste treatment services, including drill cuttings. 
According to the data from the interviews with several respondents, we can generally 
identify the following challenges of onshore logistics: 
 
- Planning and execution of inbound logistics, loading and unloading,  
- Long distances to the offshore installations; 
- Dependence on contractors. 
 
Servicing the activities in the Norwegian Barents Sea: 
Two supply bases organized by NorSeaGroup (Polarbase) and ASCO Company serve the 
petroleum activity on the NCS in the Barents Sea (see Table #23). Both supply bases are located 
in Hammerfest, which is the nearest port at the shortest distance to the field projects. This location 
makes both supply bases important participants for the ongoing and future development of field 
projects in the Norwegian Barents Sea.  
The Polarbase, built on a concept “A one stop shop”, has been the supply base for operators 
engaged in exploration and production drilling in the Barents Sea since 1980141. ASCO 
Hammerfest Base was established in January 2016 after being awarded a contract with OMV 
(Wisting project) and has handled all supply base services for Lundin Norway related to the 
activities in the North Sea since 2013142.     
                                                 
141 For more information, see http://ziggi.no/en/portfolio/video-polarbase-basen-for-barentshavet/ 
142 For more information, see http://ziggi.no/en/portfolio/video-asco-base-hammerfest/ 
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Figure 108. ASCO Hammerfest base (Source: ASCO) 
 
Both bases provide integrated logistics services when oil/gas companies can operate along 
the entire Norwegian continental shelf under one contract. 
Land transport between supply bases and to/from the supply bases in Hammerfest is carried 
out by trucks of freight-transport company “Bring Logistics” and by ships of “Norlines”. For 
instance, in 2012, Equinor shipped approximately 110 000 tons base-base in Norway only by 
trucks. In 2017 from January-July there were shipped 2.100 tons using boat to/from Hammerfest 
& Sandnessjøen with “Norlines” (from the interview with the representative of Equinor).   
Figure 106. The Polarbase plan 
(Source: NorSea Group) 
Figure 107. The Polarbase in Hammerfest 
(Source: iFinmark.no) 
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The Norwegian government requires that the base location has to be as close as possible to 
the offshore field projects. Secondly, the supplier industry, including deliveries to the petroleum 
sector, transport and communication, office-related goods and services at oil companies have 
significant ripple effects on the regional development like Northern Norway and particularly 
Finnmark. In 2013, the turnover related to deliveries to the petroleum development in the Barents 
Sea was 1,407.20 MNOK as the greatest volume among other northern municipalities. This is 
mostly due to the opening of ENI’s new office in Hammerfest and Equinor’s plant in Melkøya. 
The governmental strategy is that competence should come from the local community or be moved 
to the Hammerfest region. Since 2002, when Equinor established its Snøvit project the population 
in this area has grown with 14 %. Since 2008, when ENI started the Goliat project, the population 
has grown by 9.35 % (Nyvold et al., 2013). Hammerfest as a location of two northern supply bases 
has become a strategic gateway to the Barents Sea. 
 
For servicing the activities in the Russian Arctic and sub-Arctic waters: 
Offshore fields in the Russian Arctic are far from the infrastructure centers. Hence, there 
is a challenge to ensure regular supply with necessary materials, equipment, resources. Both 
Gazprom and Rosneft chose the port of Murmansk as the ground for onshore supply bases (see 
Table #23). Murmansk port is the largest ice-free ports in Russian Arctic and has a well-developed 
infrastructure, including transport connection with other regions.                           
According to the interviewee of Russian oil company #3 (the Dolginskoye field project), 
“We have chosen to develop the supply base for the Pechora Sea project at two berths in the 
Murmansk Sea Fishing Port. Ice-free port of Murmansk, which is located about 1,000 km from the 
field but linked with the other regions of Russia. We chose it because no transportation hubs are 
located close to the field” (for more information see Section #3.2.3. of the report). 
According to two interviewees of Russian oil company #2 and Norwegian shipping 
company #1, “Rosneft plans to construct a supply base in the vicinity of Murmansk port (in Lavna 
district), at the territory of 82nd ship repair plant”. 
One of the most important issues at the port of Murmansk is that there is “insufficient 
capacity of the railway towards Murmansk, which can become a ‘bottleneck’ of the supply logistics 
as the remote approached to Murmansk are busy with delivering fuel to the region” as noted by 
the interviewee of Russian oil company #3.  
At the same time, onshore supply bases for both Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 are organized 
at the ports in the vicinity from the offshore field operations.  It is worth noting that today all 
supply bases located on Sakhalin island start providing services for all Sakhalin shelf projects, 
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based on integrated mechanism -Sakhalin-1, Sakhalin-2; Sakhalin-3; Sakhalin-5; new projects on 
Far East shelf and on Sakhalin. 
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Table 23. Overview of the onshore supply bases 
Field project Main 
onshore 
facility 
Distance: 
offshore 
units - 
onshore 
facilities 
Respon-
sible 
Main challenges & 
peculiarities of the 
main facilities 
Additional facilities Respon-
sible 
The Norwegian Arctic continental shelf: 
Goliat Polarbase, 
inbound 
transport of 
all supplies 
to the base 
and waste 
from the 
base by 
“Bring-
Logistics” 
trucks 
88 km NorSea 
Group 
- Loading/unloading: it 
can require too much 
time up to 20 hours 
than it actually needs;
- Short opening hours 
of the supply base; 
- Long demurrage 
2 depots in Hasvik 
(1163 m2) and Måsøy 
(1337 m2) for oil spill 
protection equipment 
and oil clean-up 
exercises 
NOFO 
Hammerfest 
helicopter base 
Bristow 
Offices in 
Hammerfest and 
Stavanger to facilitate 
efficient interaction 
in case of  
emergencies 
Eni 
Norge 
Johan 
Castberg 
Polarbase 240 km NorSea
Group 
ASCO base is a 
supplementary 
resource. Both bases 
can relieve each other 
during periods of high 
activity 
Hammerfest 
helicopter base to use 
2 helicopters 
Bristow 
ASCO 
Hammerfest 
base 
ASCO 
Norge 
Korpfjell Polarbase 415 km NorSea
Group 
- Loading/unloading: it 
can require much 
time, up to 20 hours  
- Short opening hours 
of the supply base; 
- Long demurrage 
Hammerfest 
helicopter base to use 
2 helicopters 
Bristow 
Extra receiving center 
in Kirkenes 
Equinor 
Wisting ASCO 
Hammerfest 
base 
314 km ASCO 
Norge 
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The Russian Arctic continental shelf: 
Prirazlomnaya Base located 
on the Kola 
Bay coast 
near 
Murmansk 
port – 
supplies 
come by 
trucks, 
trains, ships 
980 km 
(60km to 
the 
shore) 
Gazprom 
Neft-
Snabzhe-
nie 
- Several distant bases 
Leased from 3rd 
parties; 
- Remoteness; 
- Internal transport of 
supplies by 
trains/trucks to the 
Murmansk port; 
- Lack of 
subcontractors and no 
competition among 
suppliers; 
- Insufficient capacity 
of the railway 
Transport terminal in 
the Kola Bay for oil 
storage, customs 
clearance, border 
control, loading onto 
end-user tankers 
Gazprom 
Neft-
Snabzhe-
nie 
Varandey airport (1,7 
km from the 
platform) for 
personnel 
transportation 
Lukoil 
company 
Universitet-
skaya well-1 
Murmansk 
operations 
base at the 
port of 
Murmansk 
1,600 km Sakhalin-
Shelf-
Service, 
LLC 
- Long distance; 
- Leased from the 3d 
parties 
A permanent Arctic 
base of rescue 
personnel and divers 
in Amderma, a 
village on the Kara 
Sea coast 
Karmor-
neftegas 
Fedynsky 
field 
Possible base locations 
in Murmansk, Kirkenes  
No operations yet, drilling operations planned in 2018 
Dolginskoye 
field 
Murmansk 
port 
960 km Gazprom 
Neft-
Snabzhe-
nie 
the same challenges 
like for Prirazlomnaya 
platform 
Varandey airport for 
personnel 
transportation 
Lukoil 
company 
Arkhangelsk 
port (for 
future 
operations) 
780 km  
Tsentralno-
Olginskaya-1 
well 
Arkhangelsk 
port 
3,600km Rosneft - Northern Sea Route; 
- Dependence on the 
development and 
rules of the Northern 
Sea Route; 
- Extremely remote 
location/distance; 
- Extremely harsh 
natural conditions; 
- Seasonality of 
supplies. 
Transportation during 
short summer  
Khatanga settlement 
as the nearest – 350 
km 
 
Sakhalin-1 Korsakov 
marine 
trade port 
In the 
vicinity 
Sakhalin-
Shelf-
Service, 
LLC 
Onshore support of 
Chaivo and Odoptu 
OPF; onshore drilling 
facility “Yastreb”; 
“Orlan” drilling 
platform 
- Kholmsk marine 
trade port; 
- Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 
Operations Base  
- Nogliki Supply Base 
(diesel fuel); 
- Wakkanai Japanese 
winter port for rig   
Sakhalin-
Shelf-
Service, 
LLC 
Sakhalin-2 Kholmsk 
marine 
trade port 
In the 
vicinity 
Sakhalin-
Shelf-
Service, 
LLC 
All year round onshore 
support of “Molikpaq” 
platform and all oil 
production complex 
“Vityaz” 
- Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk 
Operations Base; 
- Nogliki Supply Base 
(diesel fuel); 
- Wakkanai Japanese 
winter port  
Sakhalin-
Shelf-
Service, 
LLC 
 
 233 
4.5. Opportunities for joint offshore logistics operations and cooperation  
In Norway integrated offshore logistics services are at hand for several fields close to each other. 
The development of Arctic Russian offshore logistics has recently started to turn into a strategic 
integrated process. The findings have revealed several examples in the Barents Sea and Northwest 
Russia. More opportunities are available in the fields on the border between Norway and Russia, 
where cross border cooperation is at hand. 
4.5.1. Potentials for cooperation in the Norwegian Barents Sea  
In the Norwegian Barents Sea, the Norwegian oil companies like Equinor, Eni Norge, 
Engie (GDF Suez), Lundin and OMV started a collaboration process by establishing Barents Sea 
Exploration Collaboration (BaSEC) project in April 2015. It is worth noting that the Norwegian 
government, represented by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA), has supported the 
business initiative and emphasized operator collaboration as a key to success for the further field 
development on the NCS. Since summer 2015, all operators on the Norwegian Continental Shelf 
were invited to join the collaboration, and now includes 18 operating companies. 
“Through the BASEC project, we look into these Arctic remote areas as one industry:  is 
it good for all operators? Is there a common understanding of facing the challenges for the 
operational activity?” – explains the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1 and adds “It 
requires many years to find new collaborative solutions for future development”. 
Equinor plays an active role in promoting the idea of cooperation between oil companies 
on the Norwegian shelf and, particularly, in the Norwegian Barents Sea. In 2015, Equinor opened 
their new logistics and emergency operations center at Sandsli in Bergen in order to find 
competitive and innovative logistics solutions through increased predictability and improved 
interaction143. 
Figure 109. The logistics and emergency operations center (Source: Equinor.com) 
 
                                                 
143 For more information, see http://www.vissim.no/news/Equinor-s-new-operations-center-in-bergen-norway 
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This logistics center is responsible for exercising cost-effective operations of logistics and 
emergency-response resources, including conducting 24/7 operational resource coordination and 
optimization of the vessel or helicopter operations. It coordinates the following resources: 
 
1) Vessels and supply: to achieve efficient use of the vessel resources, vessel 
allocation, optimizing sailing;   
2) Air: weather observations, coordination of all helicopter traffic offshore 
3) Surveillance and emergency 
  
In 2017, Equinor signed an agreement with Eni Norge for sharing one SAR helicopter and 
one transport helicopter, which can be converted to a SAR helicopter when needed. Both are 
Sikorsky S-92 helicopters. This is the cooperation with helicopter operator Bristow and the 
operating company Eni in Hammerfest. 
“The cooperation with Eni on helicopter services in Hammerfest will provide a robust and 
flexible solution for both the operating companies and the service provider,” says Pål Eitrheim, 
Chief Procurement Officer at Equinor ASA. 
This kind of joint procurement of helicopter services in the Barents Sea contributes to 
flexibility and good utilization of capacity, as well as long-term planning for the supplier144. 
Another example of operator cooperation took place this summer during the drilling 
operations at the Korpfjell field in 2017. Equinor initiated a cooperation agreement with ENI 
Norge (Goliat project) and Lundin (Gohta, Alta projects) for extra vessel capacity in order to use 
“Esvagt Aurora” vessel in the case of emergencies like oil spills.  
“This agreement was innovative and the first case where oil companies chose to  combine 
their efforts towards sharing resources. The main idea was to get an access to other operators’ 
vessel capacity. It means a lot of cost savings, including transaction costs, when having 
cooperation instead of a practice when each operator uses many vessels and helicopters on the 
project”, according to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1 145.   
These first steps to develop cooperation between the operators have turned out to be quite 
positive and, thereby, motivate the Norwegian oil companies to find a mutual solution for sharing 
OSVs as well.  
“When the drilling operations at the Johan Castberg field finish, we would like to elaborate 
a new agreement with ENI Norge on sharing OSVs from the Goliat project. It could be possible to 
                                                 
144 For more information, see https://www.Equinor.com/en/news/18sep-hammerfest.html 
145 The services of a transport helicopter for the crew shift cost about 80-90 million NOK per year. To hire a supply 
vessel on the spot market costs about 200 thousand NOK per day (from the interview).  
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do this in the future by 2020-2022 when the results of the drilling operations are accepted” – as 
noted by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1 .  
Thus, it has given a start towards the concept of common understanding among the 
operators in the Norwegian Barents Sea “that cooperation is beneficial for everyone”, according 
to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1.  
In addition, Equinor signed a new agreement with ASCO for the next four years of 
operations since 2017. As noted by the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1:  
“We are looking for new solutions for cooperation in sharing supply vessels if it is possible 
to use them together somehow. We believe that contracting with both Polarbase and ASCO will 
contribute to this process. It is because of costs and lack of supply vessels of Arctic class. To hire 
a supply vessel in the spot market costs about 200 thousand NOK per day.”  
 
There is a specific cooperation between NOFO, the petroleum and fishing industries since 
2016. Being a coordinating tool to ensure oil recovery preparedness, NOFO started to use fishing 
boats for emergency response along the coast at the Goliat project. The main task of fishing boats 
is to tow oil booms that collects, records and stores oil. Now it is assumed to use 27 fishing boats 
according to the Annual report of 2016146. 
According to the interviewee of Norwegian oil company #1: 
“The NOFO’s cooperation with the shoreline preparedness fleet turned out to be efficient 
and profitable to use the fishing fleet, because fishing boats are small. It makes the oil recovery 
preparedness more effective and adapted to local conditions. The agreements with local fishing 
boat owners became an important contribution to realizing this goal. Fishing vessels are now used 
along the entire Norwegian coast. It’s good cooperation between the petroleum and fishing 
industries”. 
 
4.5.2. Potentials for cooperation along the delineation line between 
Norway and Russia 
Another important offshore logistics’ development area is the delineation line between 
Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea. As a result of the 23rd licensing round on May 18, 2016, 
three production licenses have been awarded in the southeastern Barents Sea. Thereby, Norway 
                                                 
146 For more information, see http://www.nofo.no/globalassets/en_pdfs/annual-report/annual_report_2016_eng.pdf 
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has opened Arctic oil exploration close to the Russian border147. The area along the Norwegian-
Russian maritime border represent and arena for potential cooperation between Norwegian and 
Russian stakeholders in the Barents Sea.  
                                                 
147 It was possible after the treaty with Russia on maritime delimitation and collaboration in the Barents Sea and the 
Arctic Ocean came into force on 7 July 2011.  
For more information, see http://www.npd.no/en/news/News/2016/Thirteen-companies-are-offered-ten-production-
licences-in-the-23rd-licensing-round/ 
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Figure 110. The Barents Sea South-East area along the delineation line 
(Source: by the 1st author based on the data of Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and Rosneft.com). 
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Figure 110  illustrates the fields along the border and groups of companies. The Korpfjell 
field is located about 20 km from the delineation line and the Perseevsky field, about 200 km from 
Stockman field. License PL 858 is located from the Fedynskiy field less than 50 km. While Rosneft 
is operating company on the Russian part of the Barents Sea (in cooperation with Eni and possibly 
with Equinor), there is a number of license blocks on the Norwegian part and each of them is 
represented by certain group of companies. Therefore, it is unclear who will be counterparts from 
the both sides of the operating area in case of cross-border field exploration and further production. 
“The success of this area depends on, first, the ability of the authorities and, secondly, the 
major companies and also the local communities’ ability to build a framework for cross-border 
cooperation!”, as noted by the interviewee of Russian oil company #2.   
The Norwegian Barents Sea South-East is recognized by most of operating companies as 
a separate area, because it is more or less disconnected from the rest of the Norwegian continental 
shelf, at least at present.  
According to the interviewee of Russian oil company #2, logistics challenges, emergency 
preparedness, cost effectiveness and cooperation can be viewed as a Norwegian-Russian issue. 
Dealing with the delineation line, there is a huge number of unresolved issues and questions 
including: 
 the use of helicopters across the border 
 how to organize cooperative refueling possibility for OSVs from the Norwegian 
and Russian sides?  
 What requirements have to be arranged for the use of joint resources across the 
border in the delineation line area?  
 How will the management of an emergency on both sides (of Norway and 
Russia) be structured and organized? 
 The customs on both sides 
 
“If you take a certain cargo from the Russian supply base in Murmansk in order to deliver 
it into the Norwegian field, how will you deal with the customs? Different regulations and tax 
regimes considerably challenge the possibility of cooperation.  
The Arctic Council guidelines say that each country is responsible for emergency response 
management in their waters. However, it stops working when we cross the delineation line 
situation. Onshore and offshore operations in Norway and Russia are completely different 
“animals”. And now nobody can come with the answer- what needs to put in place?”, as argued 
by the interviewee of Russian oil company #2. 
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Despite a huge number of challenges, in 2012 Rosneft and Equinor signed the cooperation 
agreement to jointly explore the Perseevsky license in the Russian part of the Central Barents Sea, 
which is located at a distance of 20-50 km from the Korpfjell field, where Equinor is the 
operator148. This agreement may trigger further cooperation and joint exploration of fields 
simultaneously from both the Norwegian and Russian sides along the delineation line149. In 2012, 
Rosneft and Equinor also announced intentions to place orders with Russian shipyards for the 
construction of ice-class vessels and drilling platforms.  
In 2012, Rosneft and ENI Norge also signed a strategic cooperation agreement to jointly 
explore the Fedynsky and Tsentralno-Barentsovskiy fields in the Barents Sea. The Fedynsky block 
covers an area of 38,000 square kilometers in the ice-free southern part of the Barents Sea. Sea 
depth at the block varies from 200 to 320 meters. 2D seismic uncovered 9 promising formations 
holding total recoverable hydrocarbon resources of 18.7 billion barrels of oil equivalent. In 2018, 
Rosneft plans to start drilling operations at Fedynsky field. At the same time, there is a certain 
interest by the government. During his visit to Franz Josef Land at the end of March 2016, 
President Putin specifically mentioned the Fedynsky license in connection with development plans 
in the Barents Sea150.   
The Tsentralno-Barentsovskiy block adjoins Fedynsky to the north (See Figure 110). Sea 
depth here varies from 160 to 300 meters. Earlier seismic work at the block identified 3 promising 
formations holding total recoverable hydrocarbon resources of more than 7 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent. First exploration well is to be drilled by 2021, and if successful, second exploration 
well is to be drilled by 2026151. 
Rosneft will hold 66.67% and Eni will hold 33.33% in the joint project. According to the 
agreement terms, Eni will finance comprehensive geological exploration work to confirm the 
commercial value of the fields. 
The Barents Sea looks like the most attractive for potential cooperation, resource sharing 
and field project developments across the Norway-Russia border. 
“The more we manage to organize cooperation in this area,  the more cost effectively we 
can organize the development of oil/gas field operations, including logistics. This offshore area is 
the best to combine low risk and high profit. For instance, one of the reasons for this in the 
Norwegian part is a favorable tax regime”, according to the interviewee of the Russian oil 
company #2. 
                                                 
148 Under the terms of this agreement, both companies agreed also about joint exploration of three licences - the 
Kashevarovsky, Lisyansky and Magadan-1 – north of Sakhalin Island in the Sea of Okhotsk (the 1st author’s note). 
149 For more information, see https://www.Equinor.com/en/news/archive/2012/05/05/EquinorRosneftMay2012.html 
150 Available at: https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/industry-and-energy/2017/04/russian-drilling-barents-sea-coming  
151 For more information, see https://www.rosneft.com/press/releases/item/114471/ 
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This study has showed that cooperation between companies across the Norwegian and 
Russian borders are in demand. However, there can be observed just a few cases of cooperation 
among the key players for development integrated logistics operations (see, Table #24). The 
findings have revealed that the operators have recognized benefits by implementing strategic 
integrated logistics cooperation. This shows a positive drive towards specific terms and the 
development and implementation of new practices of logistics operations. 
Cooperation across borders may start with the seismic vessel mapping of resources. 
Norway and Russia have agreed on so-called unitization in the “Treaty between the Kingdom of 
Norway  and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation  in the 
Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean”. The oil companies owning licenses on each side of the 
delineation line has to make a unitization agreement that has to be sanctioned by each country. 
In the autumn of 2018, Norway and Russia signed an agreement where seismic vessels may pass 
the borders with 5 km when shooting seismic.   
 
Table 24. Potentials for the development of integrated offshore logistics operations in the Arctic areas 
Main initiators Interests of main players Actions of cooperation Field projects 
Cooperation in the Norwegian Barents Sea: 
Equinor  Increasing predictability, 
Monitoring and optimization of 
vessels and helicopters 
operations, 
Improving coordination of 
logistics operations at different 
fields, simultaneously 
Creating the logistics and 
emergency operations center 
The NCS 
Equinor & ENI 
Norge 
Cost-effectiveness; 
Integrated logistics operations 
Sharing a SAR helicopter; 
Sharing a standby vessel in the 
case of emergencies; 
Sharing OSVs from the Goliat 
project (planned); 
Contracting with the additional 
supply base ASCO 
Korpfjell & 
Goliat 
NOFO Increasing the level of oil spill 
preparedness; 
Increasing capacity of OSVs  
Recruiting fishing boats for 
emergency response along the 
coast;  
Cooperation with the fishing boats 
and shoreline preparedness fleet 
Goliat 
Cooperation along the delineation line: 
Rosneft & 
Equinor 
Developing the field projects 
located close to each other 
through sharing resources from 
both Norwegian and Russian 
sides; 
Increasing cost-effectiveness 
and feasibility of field projects 
Cooperation agreement in 2012; 
Intentions to place orders with 
Russian shipyards for the 
construction of ice-class vessels 
and drilling platforms. 
Korpfjell,  
PL 857, PL 858, 
Perseevsky field 
Rosneft & ENI 
Norge 
Increasing cost-effectiveness 
and feasibility of field project 
development. 
Cooperation agreement in 2012 Fedynskiy field, 
Tsentralno-
Barentsovskiy 
block 
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The BASEC cooperation on information sharing in the Barents Sea may also be extended 
across the borders to the Russian nearby fields as many of the same conditions are present on both 
sides of the border. 
There should also be opportunities for closer cooperation between the shipping companies 
and their organizations in Norway and Russia. The NOFO concept on oil recovery may also be 
integrated into Russian sector cooperation. 
As for government SAR and oil recovery authorities the cross-border cooperation is strong, 
based on long-term agreements, including annual joint exercises. Joint emergency response 
exercises SAR and oil spill response exercises may also include the vessels hired by the oil 
companies to facilitate private-government cooperation.    
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5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This report is a part of the OPLOG project, which provides knowledge on operational 
logistics and business models in the Arctic environments and innovative solutions  to deal with 
complexity and turbulence of the High Arctic  
This report reflects specifically on the offshore upstream logistics operations and field 
project development in the Arctic Seas on the Norwegian and Russian continental shelves. The 
analysis of 10 field cases has provided insight into the development of maritime upstream logistics 
operations and demonstrated challenges, vulnerability, tasks and factors contributing to the 
complexity of operational logistics and supply management in the Arctic, as well as looked into 
the preferences and solutions of oil/gas companies as operators in different settings regarding 
logistics field and emergency response operations.   
The report emphasizes a crucial role of OSVs in implementing offshore activities and 
providing the resilience of supply chain operations for the development offshore oil/gas fields and 
emergency preparedness to SAR and oil spills.  
On both continental shelves - Norwegian and Russian – the oil companies are striving to 
become cost-effective when developing field projects in the Arctic areas. The safety of operations 
and emergency preparedness in field projects are crucial operational criteria. Logistics operations 
are full of challenges and risks in the High Arctic latitudes. Due to remoteness of operational sites 
and harsh natural conditions, supply operations require careful planning and management. Larger 
transport volumes, speed to cover longer distances, ice management and emergency preparedness 
are in demand. Helicopter transport is a challenge due to long distances and crew change may rely 
on vessel transport or vessels as a helicopter hub. This adds to the functionality demands of the 
vessels involved. Despite the high requirements for OSVs, the demand for more developed OSVs 
offering innovative and improved services increases as oil and gas companies are moving 
northwards and looking for new fields in harsher and more remote localities in the Arctic Seas. 
The findings have revealed that the recent development of OSVs’ design has been a shift towards 
more multifunctional vessels than pure specialist vessels. The biggest difference and challenge of 
the Arctic areas in comparison with other offshore field projects is the harsh climate and ice 
conditions. Therefore, there is a demand for specific services of OSVs such as ice management 
and ice breaking capabilities, as well as vessel protection from very low temperatures fulfilling the 
Polar code demands. 
The findings have also identified two main factors for providing high quality services by 
OSVs: 
- ability of the vessel to provide a wide range of services over longer distances and, thereby, 
to ensure its high utilization; 
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- equipment, which can guarantee stability and flexibility in rig operations, safety for the 
personnel and environment where operations take place, as well as emergency 
preparedness. 
Added education and training as well as an experienced crew and high-quality onshore support 
teams are an important pre-requisite for providing good and sustainable services by the vessel. 
The report provides an overview over regulatory frameworks by the Norwegian and 
Russian governments regarding the development of offshore oil and gas fields in the High Arctic 
latitudes. A number of institutional mechanisms show that the regulatory policies from 
governments can act as a driver or an obstacle for existing operators and/or new entrants.  
The barriers to enter the Arctic market are characterized by high costs and lack of 
competence that affects the development of the petroleum industry and, therefore, operational 
logistics. A stepwise approach is needed to stretch the area of operation. The Norwegian 
government’s policy on production licensing and favorable taxation leads also to the emergence 
of new players and coming new technologies. Economies of scale in providing logistics operations 
is difficult in the High Arctic areas . The analysis of four cases in the Norwegian Barents Sea has 
showed that there is a new tendency among the oil Norwegian companies to develop integrated 
logistics cooperation in order to make offshore field projects more effective by sharing resources 
among different projects. This include SAR helicopter and ERRV vessels. However, the distances 
may be too long. In the near future, the oil companies plan to elaborate contracts of sharing supply 
vessels to be engaged in two or several offshore field developments at the same time. This 
integrated logistics cooperation allows the oil companies to enhance also emergency preparedness 
systems to their offshore projects in the Norwegian Barents Sea.  
The development of oil and gas field projects in the Russian Arctic has been relatively slow 
but are gaining speed. The complexity of the Arctic environment, the lack of technologies, 
,financial capital and resources are quite typical for any areas of the Arctic, there are several 
specific factors that have affected the activity of the petroleum industry and, simultaneously, the 
OSV industry in the Russian Arctic. Our investigation has identified the following institutional 
factors that influence on the speed of development: ‘ 
 the abundance of PSAs by replacing them with investment agreements; 
  the distribution of the licenses in the Russian Arctic Seas between Gazprom and 
Rosneft;  
 the imposition of sanctions by USA, EU and several other countries in 2014;  
 fluctuating oil prices on global markets and some others.  
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At the present, these factors considerably suppress the field development on the 
Russian Arctic shelf. At the same time, we can observe an active development of both 
Sakhalin projects where oil and gas companies are able to practice even economy of scale 
by sharing onshore and offshore resources like supply bases, SAR helicopters and OSVs. 
Acting under PSA terms with the participation of the Russian government, Sakhalin-1 and 
Sakhalin-2 have provided innovations and technologies for operations in ice and very low 
temperatures based on the international and Russian experience. Logistics schemes 
elaborated and tested within both the Sakhalin projects will be of great importance for the 
future development of the Arctic Russian shelf.  
 
6. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this report we have investigated 10 cases of offshore field project development and 
logistics operations in the Arctic waters. New fields have recently been discovered with new 
challenges. Among others,  a new hydrocarbon field named “Neptun” has been  discovered in the 
Okhotsk Sea by Gazpromneft-Sakhalin in October 2017 with initial in-place reserves estimated at 
255 million tons of oil equivalent (the Sakhalin-3 project)152.  Further investigation of offshore 
upstream logistics operations can extend and verify the findings, as well as provide deeper insight 
into new logistics solutions and upstream logistics management.  
In the report, we observed a number of diverse international and national (Norwegian and 
Russian) institutions, which affect offshore logistics operations in the Arctic areas. However, the 
Arctic intuitional environment has been changing all the time. Knowledge regarding actual 
impacts from a variety of institutions and all activities by the petroleum and OSV industries is 
relatively limited and needs more attention in order to fully understand the role of offshore logistics 
in ensuring the safety and emergency preparedness of offshore field project development in the 
Arctic.    
More focus on technology and specification of vessels with ice-breaking capabilities would 
be of value to make a thorough analysis of oil/gas companies’ preparedness to any emergencies, 
oil spills and SAR operations in extremely remote and icy Arctic waters. 
A next step would be to investigate the processes of integrated offshore/onshore logistics 
and the development of cooperation between the operating oil companies in order to make offshore 
field projects more efficient, effective and simultaneously to enhance emergency preparedness. 
We can already observe the prerequisites and the companies’ actions that have recently initiated 
                                                 
152 For more information, see http://www.gazprom-neft.com/press-center/news/1166743/ 
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the development of integrated offshore logistics, both between different projects in the Norwegian 
Barents Sea and between existing and new Sakhalin projects. Therefore, the findings of this report 
encourage future research to draw on and extend the investigation of the OSVs’ role in a broader 
cooperation within oil regions, including emergency preparedness in the Arctic areas. 
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Appendix #1.  
The list of the interviewees. 
 
Four face-to-face semi-strucutred longitudinal interviews and several telephone interviews 
were conducted during the collecting data process for the report. All the interviews were done by 
the 1st author in the period of June – October, 2017. 
All interviewees are experts in the field development of offshore oil and gas projects and 
some of them have a long experience of working directly in real Arctic conditions. In order to 
comply with ethical issues, the interviewees’ names were omitted, and the companies’ names were 
changed and presented in the following way: 
- Norwegian oil company #1; 
- Russian oil company #2; 
- Russian oil company #3; 
- Norwegian shipping company #1; 
- Norwegian shipping company #2; 
- Norwegian vessel-designer.   
